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The present document reviews the development of Latin America in the 1980s with 
special reference to three central aspects: the stagnation and contraction of 
economic activity, the deterioration of social conditions, and the external depen-
dence and vulnerability of the development of the Latin American countries. 
The first chapter analyses economic growth during the last three quinquennia, 
and brings to the fore the depth and extent of the crisis that has weighted down the 
national economies during the whole of the first half of the present decade. The 
phases of the evolution that has taken place during this period are identified as 
follows: a) acceleration of growth during the early 1970s; b) decline of the growth 
rate in the middle of that decade; c) a period of moderate recovery in its second 
half; and a phase of crisis as from 1981. The course followed by saving and invest-
ment is traced, attention being drawn, inter alia, to the steep drop in gross 
domestic investment during the crisis and the scale on which national investment 
resources have been eroded in consequence of the deterioration of the terms of trade 
and the ever-increasing amount of interest and profits on foreign capital. The 
social effects and repercussions of the crisis are considered, mainly in relation to 
income distribution, employment, and situations of poverty, taking into account the 
fact that even before the crisis Latin American societies were already extremely 
inequitable. Lastly, consideration is given to the evolution of different macro-
economic variables and their incidence on the scope and depth of the crisis, as well 
as to the nature of the structural and operational modifications which the adjustments 
pertaining to the crisis have entailed on the plane of the national economy, with 
particular reference to the changes noted in the transfer of resources. 
In chapter II, with a view to examining the internal and external problems 
confronting the process of reactivation and economic development of the countries of 
the region, two scenarios are presented: one, of slow recovery of economic growth, 
and another of greater dynamism, in which economic growth would be speeded up. As a 
first step, the elements characterizing each of these scenarios are defined, their 
objectives and targets are established and the main aspects of their nature and scope 
are highlighted. Next, each of the scenarios is studied in relation to various 
subjects: dynamism as a function of economic growth and trends in foreign trade; 
requirements in respect of domestic investment, saving and external resources; 
balance-of-payments projections; needs for capital inflows and their net contributions; 
and the evolution of the external debt and its relation to export earnings. Lastly, 
attention is drawn to the effects and repercussions of certain variants introduced 
in a few variables of key importance for the solution of the problems under 
consideration. 
The third chapter contains an appraisal of the initiatives and efforts under-
taken by governments and by regional and subregional co-operation and economic 
integration organizations in the following spheres: intra-regional trade; joint 
exploitation of natural resources and compensation of regional disequilibria; energy; 
industry; food and agriculture; science and technology; monetary and financial 
affairs; technical co-operation; co-operation with countries in special situations; 
and regional co-operation in negotiations with transnational corporations. 
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Chapter IV outlines the joint action taken by the United Nations regional 
commissions to promote and support interregional co-operation, and the recent 
activities of ECLAC, and of other regional commissions, for the purpose of fostering 
such co-operation in specific sectors. 
Chapter V reviews the effects of the international co-operation crisis in the 
trade, monetary and financial spheres. It also contains an analysis of other 
international matters of interest which concern the Latin American position in 
respect of agricultural production and trade, and the evolution of the levels of 
food self-sufficiency attained; the current difficulties of OPEC, due to changes in 
market structures which tend to bring down the prices of the member countries' 
products; the diminished and clearly insufficient role of direct foreign investment 
in the balancing of Latin America's external accounts; and the increasing trade and 
financial (mercantile and banking) power of the transnational corporations; the 
region's achievements in the field of science and technology; and the discouraging 
prospects for progressive redeployment of industry at the international level. The 
chapter also includes some considerations relating to transport, as well as to the 
more general and more recent features of co-operation with some developed areas 
(United States, the European Economic Community (EEC) and the countries members of 
the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA)). 
/INTRODUCTION 
INTRODUCTION 
The United Nations General Assembly adopted, in its resolution 35/56 of 
5 December 1980, the International Development Strategy for the Third United Nations 
Development Decade (IDS). This Strategy provided for the regional economic 
commissions of the United Nations to consider the feasibility of preparing programmes 
of action that should serve to support the efforts of developing countries to apply 
the IDS in their respective regions. 
In this framework, the ECLAC Committee of High-Level Government Experts (CEGAN), 
when it met at Quito, Ecuador, in March 1981, prepared a draft Regional Programme of 
Action designed to serve as an instrument for facilitating implementation of the 
Strategy as far as the countries of the region were concerned. The Regional 
Programme of Action for Latin America in the 1980s (RPA) was adopted at the 
nineteenth session of ECLAC, held at Montevideo, Uruguay, in May 1981. 
The Strategy establishes a mechanism for the analysis and appraisal of 
economic and social development, as well as for its own implementation, which is 
promoted on various levels. As regards regional appraisal, it provides that the 
United Nations regional economic commissions shall carry out the tasks of review 
and appraisal in their respective areas. 
CEGAN submitted the first appraisal of the implementation of the Strategy and 
of the RPA at the meeting held in Montevideo, Uruguay, from 18 to 23 January 1984.^/ 
On 20 December 1982, the General Assembly, in its resolution 37/202, decided 
to establish a Committee on the Review and Appraisal of the Implementation of the 
International Development Strategy for the Third United Nations Development Decade, 
with universal membership, to carry out during 1984 a review and appraisal of the 
implementation of the IDS at the world level. 
This Committee adopted by consensus, after long and difficult negotiations, 
its conclusions on the analysis and appraisal of the implementation of the Strategy. 
It also decided to append to its conclusions a statement by the Chairman of the 
Committee on positions formulated in the discussions on key policy issues, with 
particular attention to the areas of divergence. The General Assembly, in its 
Decision 40/438, of 17 December 1985, adopted the conclusions of the report of the 
Committee on the Review and Appraisal of the Application of the IDS. This report is 
of special importance in relation to the work of analysis and appraisal incumbent 
upon CEGAN. In its first paragraph, the Committee makes the following observations: 
"The International Development Strategy for the Third United Nations 
Development Decade remains an important and valid document. First, it 
represents the broadest consensus yet achieved in the international community 
on international co-operation for development. Second, it provides a general 
^J Report of the Eighth Session of the Committee of High-Level Government 
Experts: Appraisal of the implementation of the International Development Strategy 
for Latin America and the Caribbean, taking into account the current international 
economic crisis (E/CEPAL/G.1309). 
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framework and a major instrument for collaboration not only among States 
but also within the United Nations system itself. Third, the Strategy 
sets out related goals for the Decade and beyond, linking economic, social 
and political issues, short- and long-term perspectives, and domestic and 
international policy measures in specifically defined areas. Fourth, it 
represents both a reaffirmation that the ultimate responsibility for their 
development rests with the developing countries themselves, and a commitment 
from other countries to support these efforts through policies designed to 
improve the international political and economic environment so as to make 
it more conducive to development and through international co-operation 
designed to reduce the gap between developed and developing countries. The 
successful implementation of the Strategy will contribute to the establishment 
of a new international economic order.11 
The report later goes on to say in paragraph 9: 
"... countries reaffirm the continuing validity of the goals and objectives 
of the Strategy and renew the commitment they undertook to give effect to 
the policy measures for their attainment. They also recognize that the 
reactivation of the development process in the developing countries is 
essential for the sustained recovery of the world economy. In the light of 
evolving needs and developments, countries are convinced of the urgent need 
for substantially greater efforts towards the implementation of the Strategy 
and have accordingly considered how best the necessary political impulses 
might be generated and the required policy measures intensified or adjusted." 
In these circumstances, the present meeting of CEGAN acquires special 
importance. It will be the occasion for a review of the economic and social 
evolution of the countries of the region, and an appraisal of the degree of 
implementation of the Strategy and the Regional Programme of Action during the first 
five years of the present decade, when the countries of the region are labouring 
under the weight of a profound depression, and the course of economic and financial 
events, both on the national and on the international plane, has shown, in essential 
respects, characteristics and orientations totally different from those indicated 
or proposed in the Strategy and the Regional Programme of Action. 
The Secretariat has prepared the present document as a contribution to the 
deliberations of this meeting of CEGAN. 
/I. ECONOMIC 
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I. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND ITS APPRAISAL 
A. THE PHASES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH DURING THE PAST FIFTEEN YEARS 
1 .• The phases 
A brief review of the course of economic growth in the countries of the 
region from the beginning of the 1970s to the present will do a great deal to clarify 
the nature and scope of the economic and financial crisis besetting the countries' 
economies and will also help to provide a frame of reference for the analysis of 
the possible prospects and implications of the subsequent evolution of those factors 
which have played a part in the stagnation and contraction of the economic process. 
In a number of important respects, the problems being experienced have originated 
or built up as a result of sweeping structural and conjunctural changes, both 
internal and external in nature, which have occurred during the past decade. 
Four phases of this process can be identified: the culmination of the rapid 
economic growth experienced during the first half of the 1970s; the sharp decrease 
in the rate of growth seen in the mid-1970s; the moderate recovery occurring during 
the second half of that decade; and, finally, the economic and financial crisis of 
recent years, which still holds the countries in its grasp. 
In overall terms these phases have with a certain time-lag, generally matched 
the phases of economic growth in the industrial countries and, to a certain extent, 
the evolution of international trade as well. 
The fifth phase, which will come after the crisis, is still an unknown 
quantity. The upturn in economic activity seen in 1984, although very slight, gave 
the impression that it might be the harbinger of the beginning of a recovery from 
the crisis, as was occurring in the industrial countries. However, the available 
economic indicators for 1985 demonstrate that, with very few exceptions, the 
countries' economic and social situation continues to deteriorate and that the 
economic growth of the region as a whole has been only slightly greater than its 
population growth. 
2. The peak of economic vitality: 1970-1974 
During the first four years of the 1970s, the region as a whole achieved a 
rapid rate of growth of the gross domestic product, averaging somewhat more than 
7% per year. This was the highest rate of the entire postwar period. Nevertheless, 
not all the countries of the region showed the same amount of dynamism. Brazil's 
economic growth (11% on average) carried great weight in the regional average; 
the rates of Ecuador and the Dominican Republic were also high. Other countries 
whose growth rates were lower than the regional average nonetheless managed to 
improve upon their performance of previous years. 
In addition, Venezuela —and, to a lesser extent, other oil-exporting 
countries— benefited from rising oil prices in 1973 and 1974 and these increases 
had a significant impact on the expansion of real national income in such countries. 
/Various factors 
Various factors played a part in this regional economic boom, including the 
following; the intense economic dynamism of the industrial countries, which reached 
its peak, in 1973; the improvement in the terms of trade, particularly during the 
period 1972-1973; national economic policies designed to further economic development 
the promotion of the expansion and diversification of exports; and a greater degree 
of external openness in the economies of the countries of the region. 
3. Changes in internal and external conditions and a slowdown 
in thè rate of economic growth; 1974-1975 
External conditions changed substantially in 1974: the oil-importing countries 
were faced with higher petroleum prices, but continued to expand their imports and 
achieved a high rate of economic growth. Under these conditions, greater use was 
made of external financing, which in large part was obtained from private foreign 
banks. Although it is true that, in absolute terms, most of this financing was 
concentrated in a very few countries (Brazil and Mexico), it is no less true that 
this phenomenon tended to spread to all the countries. This was the beginning of 
the process of indebtedness which was to take on greater proportions in the years 
to come, until it finally spawned the external debt crisis that is now one of the 
main problems hindering the economic reactivation. 
By 1974 the non-oil-exporting countries were already suffering from the effects 
of the worldwide economic depression (the growth in the domestic product of the 
industrial countries had come to a standstill). These effects included the 
slackening of demand for Latin American exports and a deterioration in the region's 
terms of trade which was due partly to the increase in oil prices and partly to 
declining commodity prices. 
These external factors' recessionary impact on the region intensified in 1975. 
Here, too, the weakness of external demand for Latin American exports can largely 
be explained by the recession in the industrial countries, inasmuch as the gross 
domestic product of the seven main industrial countries (as denominated by the OECD 
secretariat) as a group, after having shown no growth in 1974, headed towards a 
decline in 1975. In some cases the Latin American countries' exports of goods and 
services held at the same level, while in other cases they decreased. The situation 
worsened as a result of a more marked: deterioration of the terms of trade and began 
to affect the oil-exporting countries as well. The volume of the imports of goods 
and services of non-oil-exporting countries diminished, and the rate of economic 
growth in the region as a whole was only 3.7%, whereas it had averaged 7.5% in 
earlier years. 
Despite this slowdown in economic growth and the decrease in imports, the 
countries' deficits on their halance-of^payments current accounts rose further, 
especially in the cases of Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Peru and other countries with 
smaller economies and populations. The country recording the largest deficit on 
its external current account for the period 1974-1975, however, was Brazil. 
It is interesting to note that two-thirds of the amount of net external 
financing (US$ 12 billion in 1975) obtained by the non-oil^exporting countries as a 
group was used to cover the countries' trade deficits and the remaining third to pay 
for their net external commitments in respect of interest and profits. 
/The course 
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The cqurse taken by the oil-exporting countries (Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela) 
was substantially different. The volume of their exports dropped off steeply and 
their terms of trade also declined, although to levels that were still much higher 
than those of the other countries. They nonetheless continued to expand their 
imports, and their gross domestic product grew at an average rate of a little under 
6% annually during the period 1974-1975. Venezuela's surplus on its balance-of-
payments current account diminished, while Bolivia and Ecuador recorded deficits 
on their current transactions. 
4. A moderate recovery of economic growth; 1976-1980 
a) The pace of growth 
After the decline in the economic growth rates seen in 1975, a moderate 
recovery took place during the second half of the 1970s; this recovery was frequently 
subject to factors which engendered a great deal of instability and was marked by 
major changes in basic features of the countries' economic structures and operations 
which were in step with the changes occurring in the world economy, particularly as 
regards capital movements and financing for developing countries. 
This recovery of economic growth was far from attaining the intense dynamism 
seen during the early 1970s. The gross domestic product is estimated to have grown 
by approximately 5.5% per year during the second half of the 1970s whereas, as 
mentioned earlier, its rate of expansion was somewhat over 7% annually during the 
period 1970-1974. Growth rates varied widely from one country to another, however 
(see table 1). Brazil and Mexico, which had high rates of growth, had a preponderant 
influence on the regional picture. In contrast, six of the 19 countries under 
consideration had a very slow average growth rate —less than 4% annually^— and some 
of these countries' gross domestic products actually decreased. All in all, 
however, the average growth rates of the vast majority of the countries were higher 
than they had been in 1975. 
b) The outstanding features of this period. 
There is no doubt that the economic and financial process occurring during 
the second half of the 1970s exhibited, a number of distinctive features; the 
countries' economies functioned within a context of major domestic and external 
changes which were later to lead to the economic and financial crisis and, 
particularly, to the external debt crisis now weighing down the economy of the 
countries of the region. 
Among the various factors and circumstances which distinguish this, phase of 
the economic evolution of the countries of the region, mention may be made of the 
following: the economic recovery of the industrial countries and of world trade 
following the 1974-1975 crisis; major changes in connection with external financing, 
both at the institutional level and as regards the availability of resources, 
interest rates, and lending terms and conditions; the expansion of foreign trade; 




LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (19 COUNTRIES): ANNUAL GROWTH 
RATES OF THE GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, AT 1975 PRICES 
(Percentages) 
Countries 1970-1974 1975 1976 1977-1980 1981-1985 
Large countries 8.2 4.6 6.2 6.2 1.2 
Argentina 3.6 -0.5 -0.5 2.6 -2.4 
Brazil 11.1 5.5 9.7 6.3 1.6 
Mexico 6.7 5.6 4.2 7.3 1.7 
Medium-sized countries 3.6 0.3 5.0 3.3 -0.1 
Colombia 6.8 2.3 4.4 4.9 2.3 
Chile 1.1 -11.9 3.3 9.2 -0.8 
Peru 4.9 4.4 3.0 1.7 -0.3 
Venezuela 2.4 0.9 6.8 1.7 -1.2 
Small countries 6.4 6.1 7.3 5.7 0.1 
Bolivia 5.4 7.4 6.4 2.6 -4.1 
Costa Rica 7.0 2.1 5.5 5.2 -0.4 
Ecuador 13.3 5.2 10. 0 6.0 2.7 
El Salvador 5.4 5.5 4.2 0.1 -2.5 
Guatemala 6.5 2.2 7.4 5.2 -1.4 
Haiti 4.7 2.3 7.0 5.2 0.0 
Honduras 3.8 -3.5 6.7 7.1 0.7 
Nicaragua 6.2 1.4 6.0 -5.1 1.1 
Panama 6.4 2.2 2.0 7.3 1.9 
Paraguay 7.2 7.6 6.9 11.1 2.4 
Dominican Republic 9.3 4.6 6.3 4.5 1.9 
Uruguay 0.5 5.8 4.8 4.9 -3.2 
Latin America 7.1 3.7 6.0 5.5 0.9 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
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i) The econgmjc recovery jri the industrial countries 
The economic recovery in the industrial countries was relatively intense at 
the start, after two years of stagnation. In 1976 the economic growth rate for the 
seven largest OECD countries as a group rose by 5%; this recovery took place in all 
the countries in that group, although it varied in degree. Subsequently, the 
strength of the recovery tended to decline, but an average growth rate of 
approximately 4% per year was maintained, during the period 1977-1979. 
Beginning in 1980, a recessionary trend emerged which was to persist in the 
following years, as will be discussed below-. The gross domestic product of the 
seven main industrial countries grew by only 1% that year; unemployment began to 
rise, and inflation —using the consumer price index as a yardstick— expanded 
over 12%. The second worldwide increase in oil. prices heightened the inflationary 
process already underway in the industrial countries. 
The repercussions of the recession in the industrial countries are generally 
reflected, with some distortions, by the economic indexes of the countries of the 
region. The truth of the matter is that the crisis of the mid-1970s was deeper 
and more extensive in the industrial countries than in the region as whole. Judging 
from the overall variations in the gross domestic product, in the industrial 
countries the crisis took the form of a process of stagnation and contraction which 
lasted for two years, whereas in Latin America the decline was less intense and 
was confined to the year 1975. Furthermore, as already noted, in 1980 the growth 
rate of the gross domestic product of the industrial countries and of world trade 
slowed down markedly, while the gross domestic product of the region as a whole 
expanded by 6%. Although there were major differences from one country to another, 
the industrial nations embarked upon a recovery from the crisis in 1983 which 
gathered steam in 1984; the countries of the region, however, only showed slight 
signs of a weak upturn which, with very few exceptions, did not take hold the 
following year. 
It is clear that external financing has been one of the factor which has 
cushioned the region, at least in some years., from the negative effects of the 
recession in the industrial nations, just as it has served to intensify economic 
upturns during other periods, 
ii) External financing 
The changes taking place with regard to external financing were the most 
distinctive features of the economic and financial situation during this period. 
The private international banking system was assuming increasing importance 
as a new source of external financing. These banks made it easier for the countries 
of the region to gain access to the abundant international supply of resources, 
which had been augmented by the surplus funds of the oil-exporting countries. The 
proportion of the region's net capital inflows represented by direct investment and 
the share provided by public financial institutions declined, while an increased 
percentage of financing came from private, sources. 
/Net external 
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Net external financing tended, to increase more than the gross domestic 
product in jraal terms; by 1980, such financing had come to represent 3.9% of the 
gross domestic product, which was a significantly greater percentage than had 
generally- been recorded in the past. External savings also tended to represent 
an increasing proportion of gross domestic investment, Furthermore, net capital 
inflows were often larger than the countries' deficits on current account, and 
international monetary reserves therefore tended, to rise during this period. 
At first, the use of external financing was boosted not only by the expansion 
of the international supply of resources, but also by low interest rates, which 
were negative in real terms. Beginning in 1978, however, floating interest rates 
rose considerably and began to be a factor in the increase in remittances of profits 
and interest abroad. This upward movement of interest rates coincided with the 
second increase in oil prices; in consequence, the oil-importing countries were 
faced with worsening balance-of-payments deficits, which in turn created a need for 
more external financing. 
iii) The expansion of foreign trade 
Exports of goods and services by the region as a whole grew more rapidly during 
this period than they had at any other time since the end of the war. Their volume 
expanded by approximately 8% per year during the period 1977-1980, this overall 
increase being primarily the result of the export performance of Brazil, Mexico, 
Chile, Peru and Argentina, as well as of some small countries whose exports of goods 
and services exhibited a rate of increase higher than the regional average. However, 
the exports of nine of the 19 countries considered either remained at roughly the 
same level or even diminished. 
The expansion of imports (10% annually) was a more widespread phenomenon, 
although there were still differences to be observed from one country to another. 
At least eight countries' imports increased at an overall annual rate of less than 
4% and there were some countries in this group whose imports showed no growth 
or decreased, in absolute terms. 
iv) Changes in the countries' economic structure and manner of operation 
During this period, the countries of the region generally followed a policy 
of relative openness to the exterior and of domestic expansion whose application 
largely relied upon the availability and use o£ external financing, accompanied 
of course by the indebtedness that this involved. On the whole, the countries 
maintained deficits on their trade balances for goods and services, this being 
the means by which they were able to expand the supply of goods and services 
available for consumption and investment over and above the increase in their gross 
domestic products. The oil-exporting countries were in a relatively more comfortable 
position, particularly during the late 1970s, because their terms of trade were 
improving and their real income was increasing faster than their gross domestic 
product. The oil-importing countries, however, saw their balance-of-payments 
deficits grow, their terms of trade deteriorate, and the level of interest payments 
soar as a result of the increase in interest rates and their growing external 
indebtedness. Obviously, a process of this sort is an extremely vulnerable one 
and places real limitations on the autonomy which should surround development 
strategy and policy decisions. . 
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5. The crisis in the countries' economies during the period 1981-1985 
Beginning in 1981, the countries of the region were engulfed by the severe 
economic and financial crisis from which, they have still not managed to free 
themselves. In a later section of this document an analysis is made of the scope 
of the crisis, the factors which played a part in its onset and the adjustments that 
have been made in the countries' economies. Here, the discussion will be confined 
to the course taken by the countries' economies and the enormous gap which exists 
between the growth targets set forth in the Regional Programme of Action and the 
stagnation actually being observed. 
During the last two years of the past decade, the annual rate of economic 
growth for the region as a whole was approximately 5.5%, The rate dropped to less 
than 2.0% in 1981, decreased in the following two years by a cumulative percentage 
of approximately 4% and then showed an upturn of 3.3% in 1984. Preliminary estimates 
indicate that the increase during 1985 will have been somewhat less than 3%. If 
Brazil is excluded from the calculations, however, the region's economic growth rate 
will have only been 0.8%. This largely contradicts the interpretation whereby the 
upward trend seen in 1984, though weak, in comparison to what the countries of the 
region had experienced prior to the crisis, might presage the beginnings of a 
recovery. The fact is that, in absolute terms, the gross domestic product of 1984 
was barely equal to the gross domestic product of 1980. Moreover it is estimated 
that in 1985, after four years of stagnation, the level of the gross domestic 
product (excluding Brazil) was only 2.1% higher than it was at the beginning of 
the decade. What is more, the per capita product is estimated to have dropped by 
around 10%. Unlike what had occurred in earlier periods, the trends seen with 
respect to the gross domestic products of most of the. countries in the region haye 
been more similar during this crisis, as regards both slumps and upturns in 
economic activity. This would indicate that analogous or regionwide factors are 
at work which have determined the nature of the main economic trends seen during 
this crisis. Over the past two years, however, one or two countries have once 
again begun to have a disproportionate impact on the aggregate figures for the 
region. Brazil is a case in point, inasmuch as its more rapid economic growth in 
1985 has, had a significant influence on the regional average. 
6. The outlook and economic growth targets for the 1980s 
s,et forth in the Regional Programme of Action 
a) The outlook for the 1980s 
The Regional Programme of Action for Latin America in the 1980s (RPA) f/ 
contains an appraisal of the development problems to be faced by the countries of 
the region during this decade. With respect to the prospects for the 1980s (see 
paragraphs 19 to 23), it was stated in the RPA that the majority of the countries 
would begin the 1980s in adverse conditions of extreme vulnerability as regards 
*/ This Programme was approved in ECLAG resolution 422 (XIX), For its text, 
see Cuadernos de la CEPAL, No. 40, Santiago, Chile, 1981. /external variables. 
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external variables.. It went on to say that this situation was particularly serious 
for some Centra,l American and Caribbean countries and that these nations' 
possibilities of raising their growth rates in the 1980s would thus depend on the 
degree of financial support they could receive on concessionary terms. The problems 
to be faced included, inter alia, the high level of indebtedness and the heavy 
burden of servicing external debts; the problems affecting the continuation of 
financing through the private international banks; prospects as regards the economic 
growth of the industrialized countries and their impact on Latin American exports; 
the effects which the intensification of protectionist measures in those countries 
might have; and the persistent increase anticipated in the real prices of imports. 
It was also stated in the RPA that important changes must therefore take place in 
the structure, operation, policies and institutional organization of the world 
economy and in national policies. In this connection, it was added that in the 
short term there was no sign that basic factors were at work which might play a 
spontaneous part in bringing about a significant improvement in this situation, 
and that strategies and policies had to be adopted which would lead towards a new 
orientation of the development process with a view to achieving specified economic 
and social goals. In this regard, it was noted that in the preparation of a 
regional programme of action or in the preparation of national development plans, 
the aim was to propose the changes in both internal and external conditions and 
policies which would be necessary in order to deal with social problems and speed 
up economic development. The task was therefore seen as being a matter of 
establishing objectives and goals of a normative or indicative nature which would 
be reasonably feasible if structural and institutional changes were promoted, along 
with the implementation of policy measures forming an integrated programme of 
action. 
These internal and external changes were the framework for the objectives 
and goals set forth in the International Development Strategy (these being of a 
general nature and applying to all developing countries as group) and in the RPA 
(concerning the application of that Strategy in the countries of the region). 
It is also important to note that, bearing in mind the report of the Committee 
for the Review and Appraisal of the Implementation of the International Development 
Strategy, the General Assembly agreed (decision 40/438 of 17 December 1985) that 
the goals and objectives established in the Strategy remain valid and have not lost 
their significance. Clearly, this is also true of the goals and objectives put 
forward in the Regional Programme of Action which, as stated previously, is the 
regional instrument adopted by ECLAC for the implementation of the International 
Development Strategy. 
b) Economic growth targets 
It is useful to compare, even if only in outline, the goals of the Regional 
Programme of Action with the actual situation as it stands at the end of the fifth 
year of the Programme. Such a comparison not only points up the enormous gap which 
exists between the actual situation and the legitimate aspirations expressed by 
the countries with respect to their growth and development during this third 
Development Decade, but also testifies to the depth and scope of the economic and 
financial crisis affecting the countries of the region. 
/The quantitative 
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The quantitative goals of the Regional Programme of Action are as follows: 
i) To double, the per capita gross domestic product within a period of no more 
than 15 years. This would be equivalent to an overall annual growth rate 
for the gross domestic product of 7% per year, which is the target set 
forth in the International Development Strategy. During the past five 
years, according to a comparison of the data for the beginning and the end 
of this period, the gross domestic product for the region as a whole grew 
at an average of less than 1% per year. The product of over half the 
countries either showed no growth or declined in absolute terms, and 
in those countries whose product did grow, the increase was very slight. 
The exception to this rule was Brazil, which recorded significant expansion 
in 1985. 
ii) The approximate target for the agricultural sector was 4.8% per year; the 
actual increase has been only 2.3% annually. 
iii) The target set for the manufacturing sector was 8.5%; in fact, the sector 
has suffered an average decrease of approximately 1% per year. 
iv) The volume of exports was to have grown by 8% annually; the actual rate 
of increase was 3.7% per year, on average. 
v) The volume of imports was to have grown by the same amount as exports, 
i.e., at an annual rate of 8%. In fact, imports have dropped by 
approximately 10% per year. 
vi) Gross domestic investment was to have represented 29% of the total product. 
The average coefficient for the period 1981-1984 was slightly over 20%, 
however, and was showing a downward trend: in 1984, it was around 17%. 
vii) The target for national savings was set at 26%; in the first four years of 
the 1980s, the coefficient actually registered, was only 17.4%. 
viii) The targeted coefficient for net external financing was 3% of the total 
product. The average coefficient far the first four years of the Decade 
was indeed virtually the same as this target, but it should be borne in 
mind that the coefficient given in the Regional Programme of Action was 
based on expectations of a highly dynamic economy, whereas the actual 
coefficient was recorded during a period of stagnation or of feeble 
upturns in the economic activity of the countries of the region. Moreover, 
during the period 1983-1985 large volumes of resources were transferred 
to the exterior. 
/B. DOMESTIC 
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B. DOMESTIC INVESTMENT, SAVING AND EXTERNAL FINANCING 
1. The contraction in gross domestic investment 
The trend followed by domestic investment, as was to be expected., was similar 
to that of the domestic product, which was considered above. 
In the opening years of the last decade, when the highest rates of economic 
growth since the war were recorded, investment received a strong impetus too and 
grew much faster than the domestic product. In no less than ten countries out of 
the 19 countries considered, gross domestic investment increased by an annual 
average of 10% or more. Towards the middle of the decade (1975), at a time of 
marked decline in the rate of economic growth, investment continued to rise faster 
than the gross domestic product, although less vigorously than in previous years. 
Later on, during the second half of the last decade, the slight recovery in economic 
growth was accompanied by a moderate increase in domestic investment. During the 
most recent years of the crisis, however, investment has stagnated in many countries 
or even shrunk at a faster rate than the domestic product. In these circumstances, 
the coefficient of investment (the ratio between this and the gross domestic 
product), which had shown a tendency to rise, underwent a marked decline after 1980; 
i.e., this coefficient grew during boom periods and declined during slumps. The 
scale of these changes is an extremely significant index, reflecting the depth 
reached by the crisis in the countries of the region. 
Aggregated statistical information on the coefficients of gross domestic 
investment in petroleum-exporting countries and non-petroleum-exporting countries 
reveals the remarkable shrinkage which has affected gross domestic investment 
during these crisis years: as far as the region as a whole is concerned the 
coefficient declined from 26.1% in 1980 to 17.1% in 1984 (see table 2), and a 
similar trend is apparent in each of the two groups of countries examined. A 
country-by-country analysis reveals that in no less than 15 of the 19 countries 
considered, the coefficients of gross investment for 1984 were lower than in 1980; 
in nine countries the fall in the coefficients reached the surprising amount of 
8 to 14 percentage points. Consequently, in 1984 only two countries recorded an 
investment coefficient of 24% or slightly more; the coefficients of 10 countries 
were between 15% and 20%, and seven displayed coefficients below 15%. 
If it is borne in mind that these coefficients reflect gross capital 
formation and consequently do not subtract depreciation or replacement of capital 
goods, and that moreover they include variations in stocks of goods as well as total 
public and private investment, it is easy to understand how the crisis has 
aggravated the traditional problem of the scale of investment as well as its 
composition and destination. In the case of many countries, these investment 
coefficients were already considered to be too low and of unsuitable composition 
and purpose to satisfy the requirements of a more dynamic productive process and 
achieve specific social aims. In the present circumstances, far greater efforts are 
required to increase domestic saving and face the social problems •—especially 
unemployment, poverty and a fair distribution of wealth— which now affect a larger 
section of the population than before the crisis are far more complex. 
/Table 10 
Table 2 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (19 COUNTRIES);a/ GROSS DOMESTIC INVESTMENT 









1971-1974 22.5 25.0 24.1 
1975 22.5 27.5 26.8 
1976-1980 25.9 25.6 25.7 
1981-1984 20.6 20.1 20.3 
1981 27.8 23.3 25.0 
1982 22.0 21.0 21.4 
1983 16.0 18.4 17.5 
1984 16.0 17.8 17.1 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
aj Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
b/ Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela. 
c./ Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 




2. Domestic resources for investment: domestic saving and its erosion 
a) Domestic saving 
A measure of the effort made by a society to increase its productive capacity 
is provided, at the macroeconomic level, by the difference between the gross 
domestic product and total public and private consumption: i.e., by the surplus of 
production over total consumption. This represents what may be called gross 
domestic saving, and defines the volume of resources generated by the economic 
system which are available for investment. 
The coefficient of domestic saving has proved comparatively less unstable 
than the coefficient of domestic investment, particularly during the crisis (see 
table 3). At the beginning of the last decade the coefficient of domestic saving 
rose in line with the coefficient of investment, although at a lower level. 
Generally speaking this situation continued after the decline in the rate of 
economic growth in 1975, within a context which, although less vigorous, saw a 
slight revival during the second half of the previous decade, lasting until 1980 
or 1981 depending on the country. 
In these recent crisis years, during which a substantial decline has been 
recorded in the coefficient of investment, the coefficient of domestic saving has 
evolved in the opposite direction: it has declined less than the coefficient of 
domestic investment, and remained at a higher level than the latter. 
These disparities between gross domestic saving and gross domestic investment 
may be attributed to the trend followed by real transfers of external resources, 
i.e., the differences between imports and exports of goods and services at constant 
prices. Generally speaking, before the crisis the countries increased their 
investment resources through the net contribution of real transfers generated by a 
surplus of imports over exports; they are now feeling the effects of the opposite 
phenomenon, and find themselves obliged to generate a volume of domestic saving 
which, in addition to covering domestic investment, has to finance a transfer of 
real resources abroad resulting from the surplus of exports over imports. 
Nevertheless, the path followed by domestic saving and its ratio in comparison 
with other variables is far from being uniform in all the countries of the region. 
Thus, the three largest countries show higher coefficients of gross domestic saving 
than the majority of the other countries. Generally speaking, it may be asserted 
that within this group of countries the coefficients of such saving tended to rise 
during the second half of the last decade, and have remained relatively high 
throughout the crisis. The coefficient of gross domestic investment, for its part, 
began to decline as from 1982, when the transfer of real resources changed direction; 
the surplus of exports over imports came to exceed 7% of the gross domestic product 
of this group of countries. 
The four medium-sized countries (Chile, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela) present 
differing features which render an overall analysis difficult. Consequently, it is 
desirable to consider each of them separately. Colombia has a rather low- coefficient 
of gross domestic saving; this continued to decline during the last decade, and in 




LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (19 COUNTRIES) :a/ GROSS DOMESTIC SAVING 









1971-1974 30.5 21.7 24.8 
1975 25.2 23.8 24.3 
1976-1980 23.3 24.0 23.7 
1981-1984 21.3 23.4 22.6 
1981 22.2 23.2 22.8 
1982 19.8 23.1 21.9 
1983 21.7 23.2 22.7 
1984 21.4 24.1 23.1 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
a./ Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
bj Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela. 
c_/ Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 




real resources, expressed in terms of the import surplus, for their part, came to 
10% of the gross domestic product. In Chile, the coefficient of domestic saving 
tended to rise during the second half of the last decade, and an average coefficient 
of 20.5% has been recorded during the crisis. However, the investment: coefficient 
fell to 14.8%, and a net outflow of real resources equal to approximately 6% of 
the gross domestic product occurred. The coefficients of saving and investment 
in Peru have been comparatively low. In recent years (1981-1984), domestic saving 
was estimated at an average of 13.9% of the gross domestic product, i.e., virtually 
the same as domestic investment. Since the beginning of the last decade there has 
been a clear decline in domestic saving in Venezuela, and in recent years an average 
index of 18.3% has been recorded; the coefficient of gross domestic investment is 
somewhat higher (21.1%). 
The small countries present a variety of situations. Generally speaking, it 
may be said that the coefficient of domestic saving is lower than that of the large 
countries, but that there is a positive transfer of real resources, with the result 
that the investment coefficient is somewhat higher than the coefficient of domestic 
saving. So far this decade, the coefficient of saving is close to 17%, while the 
import surplus represents 2% of gross domestic product; the investment coefficient, 
for its part, is close to 19% of the gross domestic product. 
b) The erosion of investment resources 
Within the analytical framework which has been adopted, and at the macro-
economic level, two factors of particular importance in determining the level of 
domestic saving affect the resources available for investment. These are the 
terms-of-trade effect and net external transfers of interest and profits on foreign 
capital. 
It is easy to understand that a gain in the purchasing power of exports of 
goods and services may be considered as an increase in the resources available for 
investment, while a loss diminishes the real value of such resources. Similarly, 
net payments of interest and profits on foreign capital directly reduce the resources 
which could be used for investment. If domestic saving is adjusted by these two 
factors, this gives national saving, which is the notion used in conventional 
analysis. 
In, the present analysis, the terms-of^trade effect has been calculated on 
the basis of 1975 prices. 
The scale of the erosion affecting the resources available for investment, 
caused by the joint action of the deterioration in the terms of trade and net 
payments of interest and profits, is quite striking (see table 4). The non-petroleum-
exporting countries as a whole suffered an erosion of their investment resources 
equal to approximately 3% of the gross domestic product in 1980 and to more than 
8% in 1984. This meant the erosion of one-third of gross domestic saving as far as 
this group of countries was concerned. The erosion of investment resources has not 
been so severe in the case o£ the petroleum-exporting countries; in 1984 these 
countries still enjoyed a positive terms-of-trade effect. However, this group of 
countries also shows a tendency towards a growing deterioration in its terms of 
trade and towards an increase in external transfers of profits and interest on 
foreign capital. 
Table 4 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (19 COUNTRIES):a/ TERMS-OF-TRADE 
EFFECT AND NET EXTERNAL FACTOR PAYMENTS 
























1971-1974 2.0 -6.2 1.7 1.5 1.8 -1.2 
1075 1.5 0.0 1.7 0.0 1.6 0.0 
1976-1980 2.0 1.4 2.3 0.3 2.2 0.7 
1981-1984 3.7 3.3 4.6 -3.2 4.3 -0.8 
1981 3.6 5.1 3.6 -2.1 3.6 0.6 
1982 4.9 3.4 4.9 -3.2 4.9 -0.7 
1983 4.6 2.2 4.9 -3.8 4.8 -1.6 
1984 4.8 2.4 5.0 -3.6 4.9 -1.4 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data, 
a/ Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela, 
b/ Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela. 
cj Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 




Not only is there a difference between the two groups of countries under 
consideration, in the degree of erosion of investment resources but there are also 
variations between the countries in each group. Thus, in 1984 the joint incidence 
of the two factors was as follows: up to 5% of the gross domestic product in Mexico 
and Guatemala; between 5% and 10% of the gross domestic product in Brazil, Peru, 
Bolivia, Ecuador, Uruguay, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua, and more than 10% 
in Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Panama and the Dominican Republic. There was no 
erosion, or there was even an increase, in Colombia, Haiti, Paraguay and Venezuela. 
c) The impact of changes in the terms of trade 
As may be seen from the figures set out in table 4, the terms-of-trade effect, 
expressed as a percentage of the gross domestic product, is extremely significant 
and varies according to whether the countries concerned are petroleum-exporting 
countries or not. 
In the case of petroleum-exporting countries, the terms-of-trade effect has 
always been positive. Since the base year 1975, its size has varied considerably; 
in 1981 it represented rather more than 5% of the gross domestic product. Since 
then it has declined, and in 1984 corresponded to 2.4% of the product, i.e., rather 
more than 10% of domestic saving. 
In non-petroleum-exporting countries, since 1980 the external terms of trade 
have been below their 1975 level. In 1984 the effect of the deterioration 
corresponded to 3.6% of the gross domestic product and approximately 15% of gross 
domestic saving in this group of countries. 
d) Net payments of interest and profits on foreign capital 
Net payments of interest and profits on foreign capital have grown continually 
since the middle of the last decade, and as a percentage of the gross domestic 
product they are remarkably similar in the two groups of countries under 
consideration. As far as the region as a whole is concerned, in the second half of 
the 1970s net payments of interest and profits corresponded to 2.2% of the gross 
domestic product; in 1984 this proportion was almost 5%, i.e., these external 
payments meant a more than 20% erosion of gross domestic saving. 
3. National saving and net external financing 
a) National saving 
For the reasons described above, the magnitude of gross national saving is 
in principle lower than that of domestic saving. There are very few exceptions 
to this rule and they concern a few countries which have enjoyed a positive 
terms-of-trade effect which outweighs external payments of interest and profits. 
This is the case, as already mentioned, in Colombia, Haiti, Paraguay and Venezuela, 




The coefficients of national saving of the non—petroleum-exporting countries 
have followed a declining trend in recent years, which has accompanied the decline 
in the coefficient of domestic investment (see table 5). 
National saving in the petroleum-exporting countries has also declined during 
the crisis, but to a lesser extent than in the other countries. This is because 
in the 1983-1984 biennium the petroleum-exporting countries recorded a current 
account surplus estimated at approximately 3% of their domestic product. 
b) Net external financing 
In the case of the non-petroleum-exporting countries net external financing 
(defined as the current account balance of the balance of payments, of opposite 
sign), grew until it reached the high coefficient of 5.8% of the gross domestic 
product in 1982 (see table 5). In the following three years this coefficient 
declined so much that in 1985 it is estimated to have been less than 2%, a far lower 
figure than that reflected by the external accounts of this group of countries in 
the first years of the last decade. In this respect, it should be mentioned that 
those years were characterized by vigorous expansion, in marked contrast with the 
stagnation displayed by economic activity during the present crisis. 
The group of petroleum-exporting countries was also affected by a process 
which led to a growing balance-of-payments deficit. During 1981 and 1982 this 
deficit was 4.0% of the gross domestic product, and had to be covered at least in 
part from the reserves. However, what distinguishes the evolution of the external 
financing of this group of countries is, as already noted, the surplus registered 
on the external current accounts during 1983 and 1984. 
c) The shares of national saving and external saving in investment financing 
In the group of non-petroleum-exparting countries, significant changes took 
place in the share of external saving in investment financing (see table 6). 
During the second half of the last decade, external saving represented slightly more 
than 13% of domestic investment in this group of countries; this proportion rose to 
28% in 1982, but declined to 12% in 1984. In other words, the share of national 
saving declined up to 1982 and then rose during 1983 and 1984. 
The group of petroleum-exporting countries, for its part, shows significant 
differences as regards the shares of national saving and external saving in 
investment financing. During the second half of the 1970s, external saving 
represented approximately 13% of investment; i.e., a similar proportion to that 
registered in the group of non-petroleum-exporting countries. This share increased 
in 1981 and 1982, although it remained, below that of the other group of countries. 
However, the most important divergences were recorded in 1983 and 1984, when the 
petroleum-exporting countries as a whole recorded a surplus on their external 
current account, with the result that the coefficient of national saving was 
higher than that of domestic investment by an annual average of more than 20%, 




LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (19 COUNTRIES):a/ GROSS NATIONAL 
SAVING AND NET EXTERNAL FINANCING 
(As a percentage of gross domestic product) 
Petroleum-exporting 
countries b/ 
Non-p etr o leuni-expor t ing 


















f inane ing 
1971-1974 22.3 0.2 21.5 3.5 21.8 2.3 
1975 23.7 1.8 22.2 5.4 22.7 4.1 
1976-1980 22.6 3.3 22.2 3.4 22.3 3.4 
1981-1984 20.8 -0.2 15.8 4.3 17.6 2.7 
1981 23.7 4.1 17.6 5.7 19.9 5.1 
1982 18.0 4.0 15.2 5.8 16.2 5.1 
1983 15.5 -3.3 14.7 3.7 15.0 1.1 
1984 19.0 -2.9 15.7 2.1 16.9 0.3 
Source; ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
a/ Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
bj Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela. 
cj Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 





LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (19 COUNTRIES):a/ SHARE 
OF NATIONAL SAVING AND NET EXTERNAL SAVING IN 
THE FINANCING OF GROSS DOMESTIC INVESTMENT 
(Percentages) 
_ , ^. Non-petroleum-Petroleum-exportxng . t„*-„i _ . ,/ exporting Total countries b/ * . , Period ~~ countries c/ 
National Net external National Net External National Net External 
saving financing saving financing saving financing 
1971-1974 99.1 0.9 86.0 14.0 90.5 9.5 
1975 92.9 7.1 80.4 19.6 84.7 15.3 
1976-1980 87.3 12.7 86.7 13.3 86.8 13.2 
1981-1984 101.0 -1.0 78.6 21.4 86.7 13.3 
1981 85.3 14.7 75.5 24.5 79.6 20.4 
1982 81.8 18.2 72.4 27.6 76.1 23.9 
1983 127.0 -27.0 79.9 20.1 93.2 6.8 
1984 118.0 -18.0 88.2 11.8 98.3 1.7 
Source; ECLA.C, on the hasis of official data. 
a./ Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela, 
b/ Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela. 
~cj Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa, Dominican Republic, 




C. THE SOCIAL PROBLEM 
1. RPA pronouncements on social development 
The Regional Programme of Action devotes special care to the identification of 
the economic and social development problems with which the countries of the region 
are confronted, and indicates targets and objectives for development strategies and 
policies. It draws attention to the significant process of economic growth and 
social change which the region has undergone since the Second World War, but stresses 
the fact that the nature of this process has led and is still leading to the 
formation of extremely inequitable societies. The economic structure is characterized 
by a very high degree of concentration of wealth and income in small segments of 
the population, while at the time broad masses have struggled along in conditions of 
extreme poverty and even of abject destitution; simultaneously, there has been a 
frequently rapid expansion of intermediate social sectors, and this has had 
important economic, social and political implications. 
The factors determining these structures or inherent in them —adds the RPA— 
relate to the lack of social participation, the concentrative tendencies of the 
prevailing economic system and the appropriation of a large proportion of income by 
small social groups, in so far as this income is used to increase superfluous and 
constantly diversified consumption, and the type of consumer investment which 
follows the patterns of industrial countries with higher levels of per capita 
income. 
With regard to development strategies and policies, the following are among 
the aspects to which the RPA gives consideration: 
a) development must be conceived as an integrated process characterized by 
the attainment of economic and social objectives and targets which will 
ensure the effective participation of the population in the development 
process and in the distribution of its benefits; 
b) the central problems of development concern aspects of the structure 
and functioning of the economic and social process; they are inherent 
in this process, and their solution calls for institutional and 
structural changes, at the internal level and in the sphere of the 
world economy, such as will alter the functioning of the economy and 
society with a view to attaining specific economic growth and social 
welfare objectives in the framework of equitable societies; 
c) economic growth is a necessary, but not in itself a sufficient, 
condition for ensuring full social and human development. To reach 
this goal it is indispensable to promote more equitable income 
distribution and greater participation of all social groups, with 
the aim of shaping fairer and better-integrated societies. 
/2. Central 
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2. Central themes of economic and social development 
In the framework of these RPA pronouncements, four central themes can be 
identified, which are interrelated and are of special significance for the social 
dimension of development: economic dynamism or lack of dynamism, and its social 
repercussions; the unemployment problem; personal income distribution; and 
situations of poverty. 
a) Five years of economic stagnation and contraction of the per capita product 
It is true that, as the.Secretariat has emphasized in earlier appraisals, 
economic growth must be accompanied by deliberate action to promote employment 
and more equitable income distribution. In a situation like the present, however, 
in which there is no economic growth, and given the atmosphere of recession and 
uncertainty overshadowing the economic and social scenario of the countries of the 
region, it is equally true that social pressures become even more acute, the 
sectors that would necessarily have to give way harden their resistance to change, 
and yet more prejudicial effects are produced on the broad masses of the population 
that are low down on the ladder of personal distribution of wealth and income. 
It is useful to analyse the evolution of the per capita gross domestic 
product, which may be regarded as a macroeconomic indicator of the course followed 
by the average living conditions of society as a whole. The relevant information 
is presented in terms of annual rates of variation of the per capita gross 
domestic product in the different periods that were defined when the phases of 
global economic evolution during the last three five-year periods were reviewed 
(see table 7). 
In the early 1970s, a time of high economic dynamism, the per capita gross 
domestic product showed the highest growth rate in the whole of the period under 
analysis (2.6% per annum). In 1975,.when the global rate of economic growth 
declined appreciably, the per capita product of the region as a whole virtually 
stagnated. During the second half of that decade, characterized by a modest 
recovery of economic growth, the rate of increase of the per capita product also 
recovered; but even so the average rate of growth (2.0%) was lower than in the 
early years of the decade. In the period of crisis a drop in the per capita 
product during the first three years of the 1980s was followed by a very weak 
upturn in the two-year period 1984-1985. Very few countries made a favourable 
contribution to this recent evolution; outstanding among them is Brazil, by 
reason of the relatively high increase recorded in 1985. In short, the per capita 
product of the region as a whole fell between 1980 and 1985 by an annual rate of 
-1.5%. This experience presents one uncommon feature: in each and all of the 19 
countries under consideration the per capita product declined during this period, 
albeit the decreases may differ in size. For the region as a whole, the per capita 
product for 1985 is almost 10% lower than in 1980; for many countries the difference 




LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (19 COUNTRIES): ANNUAL GROWTH 
RATES OF THE PER CAPITA GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 
AT 1975 PRICES 
(Percentages) 
Countries 1971-1974 1975 1976 1977-1980 1981-1985 
Large countries 4.0 0.8 1.6 3.1 -1.1 
Argentina 1.9 -2.1 -2.1 1.0 -4.0 
Brazil 8.5 3.0 7.2 3.9 -0.6 
Mexico 3.3 2.2 1.1 4.3 -0.9 
Medium-sized countries 0.2 -0.8 0.5 0.7 -2.4 
Colombia 4.5 0.1 2.2 2.7 0.1 
Chile -0.7 -13.5 1.7 7.6 -2.3 
Peru 2.0 1.5 0.3 -0.9 -2.8 
Venezuela -1.2 -2.6 3.1 -1.7 -4.0 
Small countries 3.2 4.4 4.6 3.9 -2.6 
Bolivia 2.9 4.8 3.7 -0.1 -6.6 
Costa Rica 4.3 -0.4 2.6 2.1 -3.0 
Ecuador 10.0 2.1 6.8 3.0 -0.2 
El Salvador 2.4 2.5 1.2 -2.8 -5.3 
Guatemala 3.6 -0.5 4.5 2.3 -4.1 
Haiti 2.4 0.0 4.5 2.7 -2.4 
Honduras 0.6 -6.5 3.1 3.3 -2.7 
Nicaragua 2.8 -1.7 3.0 -7.7 -2.2 
Panama 3.5 -0.5 -0.6 4.3 -0.3 
Paraguay 3.8 4.2 3.5 7.5 -0.7 
Dominican Republic 6.4 1.8 3.7 2.0 -0.5 
Uruguay 0.3 5.6 4.3 4.3 -3.9 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean (19 countries) 2.6 -0.1 2.5 2.0 -1.5 
Source : ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
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b) The unemployment problem 
The crisis has seriously aggravated the unemployment problem. In the first 
place, the labour force has tended to grow larger owing to the increase in the 
economically active population and the rise in rates of participation, and also, 
as regards the urban labour force, because of rural migration. Secondly, the 
economic growth rate prior to the crisis and the policies then adopted were 
inadequate to absorb the constant increment in the manpower supply in the modern 
sector and even in traditional activities. These situations have become much 
worse during the long period of contraction and economic stagnation through which 
the national economies are currently passing. In these conditions, the possibilities 
of absorbing manpower in modern activities have indubitably been limited, and a 
very appreciable increase in occupation in marginal or traditional activities has 
taken place. Furthermore, it must be emphasized that at the present time the 
unemployment problem affects not only the wage-earners, but also social segments 
situated in the intermediate personal income distribution brackets. Later on, 
in the conclusions of chapter II, which deals with the future economic growth 
scenarios of the countries of the region, a quantitative study of this problem is 
made, which clearly reveals the very unfavourable prospects envisaged for the 
attainment of specific employment targets within reasonable periods. 
c) Extreme concentration and personal income distribution 
Personal income distribution is extremely concentrated in the countries of 
the region, although they differ widely from one to another as regards per capita 
income and the modalities of distribution. The usual indicators of inequality 
place the countries of the region in an intermediate position in comparison with 
other countries; they show that.the inequality existing in the region is higher 
than that found in other developing countries with a lower per capita product, 
and also higher than that characterizing the market-economy industrial countries. 
On family income distribution in the region, the RPA presented the following 
data: 44% and more of total income was concentrated in 10% of families, while 40% 
of the families at the lower end of the scale received only 8% of total personal 
income. 
Obviously, the crisis, far from contributing to an improvement of income 
distribution, has accentuated inequality, in conditions even more prejudicial to 
the broad masses of the population in the lower income distribution brackets. This 
has happened in consequence of the increase in unemployment, the fall in real 
wages and the limitations imposed on social services, all of which has undoubtedly 
reduced the share of wage-earners and increased the proportion corresponding to 
other social groups. In this connection, it is highly likely that the relative 
position of upper income groups on the distribution scale has varied, inasmuch as 
some groups, for example, those connected with financial activities, have improved 
their position more than others. It should be noted, moreover, that the changes 
have come about in the framework of a process of stagnation and constraint, in 
which the per capita product has shown relatively large decreases in many countries; 
consequently, the modification of distribution patterns has an economic and social 
significance different from that which would stem from similar changes within a 
more dynamic process of economic growth. In any event, it is clear that the social 
cost of the crisis has been very unfairly distributed. 
/d) Situations 
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d) Situations of poverty 
It is estimated that at the beginning of the last decade 40% of families in 
the region as a whole lived in conditions of poverty; that is, their income was not 
big enough to cover the expenditure required to meet minimum standards of living. 
Furthermore, it was considered that in all likelihood half of these families lived 
in conditions of extreme poverty, in indubitable contrast with the high level of 
consumption which is found among the social segments situated in the upper 
distribution brackets, and which tends to spread to the upper middle sectors as 
well. 
The proportion of the population in conditions of poverty has shown a 
significant downward trend in the past decade or two, if situations of poverty are 
defined in relation to the amount of income that families should receive in order 
to meet the needs of specific living conditions. It is estimated, however, that this 
decrease in the percentage is not enough to reduce the quantity of poor families 
in absolute terms. 
Obviously, the crisis of recent years, through its concrete manifestations 
in the decline of the per capita product, the fall in real wages and the increase 
in unemployment, has done much to raise the proportion of families living in 
conditions of poverty. 
/D. THE 
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D. THE CRISIS AND THE EXTERNAL BOTTLENECK 
1. The scale of the crisis 
a) Contraction and stagnation of the national economies 
The crisis has overshadowed the region throughout the first half of the present 
decade. It might be said to have begun in 1981, albeit the storm had been brewing 
for some time, and it has not yet been weathered. Nor, up to now, can some positive 
movements noted in the last two years be diagnosed as symptoms of gradual recovery. 
In 1981, the region's gross domestic product grew by less than 2%, after 
having done so at a rate of 6% in 1980; gross domestic investment followed a downward 
trend; the terms of trade deteriorated significantly, cancelling out the increase 
recorded in the volume of exports, so that the external purchasing power of exports 
remained practically static in absolute terms; and imports of goods showed an 
appreciable slackening of the high growth rate noted in previous years. 
In 1985, according to provisional estimates, the gross domestic product of the 
region as a whole increased less than in 1984, notwithstanding Brazil's high growth 
rate and its incidence on the aggregate figure. The volume of exports and imports of 
goods contracted in 1985, and the terms of trade deteriorated yet further, as a result 
of which the purchasing power of exports of goods was considerably reduced. The 
balance-of-payments deficit on current account increased, and so did the net inflow 
of capital; and the global balance, in the context of stagnation, instability and 
uncertainty indicated in general terms by the macroeconomic variables studied, was 
apparently stabilized. 
In brief, the gross domestic product of the region as a whole (19 countries) in 
1985 exceeded by only 4.5% the figure for 1980, five years before. Inter-country 
differences are noteworthy, however. If Brazil is excluded of gross domestic 
product, the rest of the countries as a whole would be virtually the same in 1985 as 
it had been in 1980. From analysis of the data in table 1, it can be inferred that 
in nine of the 19 countries considered in the table, the domestic product would be 
lower than in 1980; in another nine it would be higher; and in one it would have 
undergone no variation at all (still in relation to 1980). 
Mention has already been made in the preceding section of the fall in the per 
capita gross domestic product during the crisis and of the unusual circumstance 
that this deterioration was recorded in practically all the countries under 
consideration (see table 7). 
b) The fall in domestic investment 
The course followed by gross domestic investment affords another eloquent 
indicator of the extent and depth of the crisis in the Latin American and Caribbean 
economies. For the region as a whole, gross domestic investment remained virtually 
stationary in 1981, fell by 10% in 1982, dropped still more steeply (20%) in 1983, 
/and then 
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and then stagnated again in 1984. This evolution is fairly representative of the 
trend of gross domestic investment in the different groups of countries in the 
region. 
The sharp reductions in investment during the two-year period 1982-1983 were 
linked with the contractions undergone during those years by the gross domestic 
product and yet more closely with the decreases in imports that occurred in both 
years. The explanation of this lies in the recession burdening the national 
economies and also in the high imported content of domestic investment. 
Furthermore, the gross domestic investment/gross domestic product percentage 
coefficient is associated with capital formation and therefore with the rate of 
economic growth. In this connection, two observations may be made: one is that the 
decline in the investment coefficient from 26% in 1980 to 17% in 1984 is consistent 
with the recession and stagnation of the national economies; the other is that 
after a relatively long period of low accumulation in real terms, the reactivation 
of economic life will require short-term impetus to be given to a process of saving 
and investment which will substantially raise the coefficients in question. In the 
analyses of two economic growth scenarios for the countries of the region which are 
presented in chapter II, it is estimated that the investment coefficient should 
climb to 20.4% by 1990, in a scenario of slow recovery, and to 22.7% in a scenario 
of accelerated economic growth. These considerations give an idea of the inadequacy 
of investment at the present time, and, in addition, highlight the greater domestic 
saving effort which would be called for, especially if it is taken into account that 
the proportion of the said investment financed by domestic saving will have to be 
higher than in the past. Obviously this situation may vary from one country to 
another, because of factors peculiar to each, and in particular by reason of the 
degree of idle capacity that each has at its disposal. 
c) Exports and the terms of trade 
The volume of exports of goods and services pursued an irregular course, with 
marked inter-country differences in its fluctuations. For the region as a whole, 
the annual growth rate during the period of crisis ranged from 7 to 8%, except in 
1982 and 1985, in which years the volume of exports declined. The most notable 
increases were recorded in the group of large countries. In most of the others the 
volume of exports showed a tendency to contract or remain static. Consequently, 
figures for the region as a whole mask substantial differences between the various 
groups of countries. 
The exports of goods and serviees/gross domestic product coefficient followed 
an upward trend in the region as a whole: from 13.3% in 1980 it went up to 16.1% in 
1984. These figures were preponderantly influenced by the large countries, where the 
coefficient in question rose from 10 to 14%; in the other groups of countries, it 
dropped or remained relatively constant. 
The effect of the variation in the terms of trade in relation to the base year 
1975 was different according to whether petroleum-exporting or non-petroleum-
exporting countries were concerned. In the latter it showed a progressive 




In the petroleum-exporting countries the effect was positive, but markedly 
declining. It is estimated at an annual average of 3.3% of the gross domestic 
product for this group of countries as a whole. 
Provisional estimates show that in 1985 the terms of trade deteriorated in 
both groups of countries. 
d) Imports of goods and services 
Imports have undergone radical and peculiarly significant changes since the 
beginning of the last decade. During the early years of the present decade, they 
tended to rise more than the domestic product. Their dynamism culminated in 19 74 
and was reduced in 19 75, when the rate of economic growth declined. During the 
second half of the 19 70s, characterized by moderate economic growth, imports again 
increased faster than the domestic product in a large number of countries, although 
there were cases in which the import coefficient tended to remain constant or to 
fall to some extent. 
During the crisis years, alongside the process of contraction and stagnation 
of economic activity which spread to all the countries of the region, imports 
underwent a severe adjustment in their volume and composition. They decreased 
drastically during the years 1982 and 1983,.when their volume, for the region as a 
whole, contracted by over 20% per annum. In the other crisis years the variations 
were, broadly speaking, much less significant. In general terms, in all the groups 
of countries imports evolved on lines similar to these. 
In these conditions, the imports/gross domestic product percentage coefficient 
drastically decreased in the various groups of countries. Thus, in 1980 the region 
as a whole recorded a coefficient of 16.3%, which dropped to 10.1% in 1984, and in 
all probability underwent no significant changes in 1985. 
A particularly important aspect of these ratios is that they reveal the 
extreme dependence of the reactivation of economic life and of the growth process 
on supplies of imported goods. A major proportion of imports (in some countries, 
almost all of them) consists of three main items: essential intermediate products, 
fuels and capital goods. Whatever the share of other items, the undeniable fact 
is that the reactivation of the economies depends to a very high degree upon larger 
supplies of intermediate products and fuels as well as of capital goods, to expand 
production capacity. In this sense, the limited availability of goods that have to 
be imported represents a severe constraint on the supply side which must be taken 
into consideration in the programming of reactivation and of subsequent economic 
growth. The two economic growth scenarios for the countries of the region, presented 
in chapter II, are characterized precisely by the high elasticity of import require-
ments, especially in the initial phase of the economic reactivation process. 
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2. Changes in the structure and functioning of the national 
economies in consequence of the crisis 
a) Changes in the non-petroleum—exporting countries 
In the early 1970s, when economic growth was flourishing and net external 
financing was beginning to increase (balance-of-payments current account position 
with opposite sign), a substantial part of this financing had as its counterpart a 
net transfer of real resources, in the sense that imports exceeded exports, 
expressed in terms of constant prices. During the second half of that decade, and 
to the years 1980 or 1981 — a period of moderate economic growth—, this structure 
persisted, with fairly important modifications: transfers of real resources decreased 
in relation to the gross domestic product and at the same time the amount of interest 
and profits on foreign capital went up (see tables 8 and 9). 
Thus, during the decade in question this group of countries evolved within a 
structural framework whose essential characteristics were the following: 
i) Net external financing stood relatively high; 3.6% of the gross domestic 
product, which represented almost 15% of gross domestic investment; 
ii) Interest and profits on foreign capital followed an upward trend throughout 
the decade; 
iii) Nevertheless, the figure for the net inflow of external financial resources 
obtained by deducting interest and profits from net external financing 
signified a positive transfer of resources which, account being taken of 
the terms-of-trade effect, was reflected in a transfer of real resources. 
These, although they decreased, represented 2.4% of the gross domestic 
product, and approximately 10% of gross domestic investment; 
iv) Goods and services available for consumption and investment exceeded the 
magnitude of the gross domestic product, which, in its turn, followed an 
upward trend, albeit with varying degrees of dynamism, throughout the 
decade. 
In consequence of the changes that took place in the external sector in 1981 
or 1982, according to the country concerned, a process with opposite characteristics 
began, which affected the structure and functioning of the national economies. Its 
most outstanding features may be summarized as follows: 
i) Proportionally, net external financing stayed relatively high in the 
1981-1982 biennium, since it represented almost 6% of the gross domestic 
product, signifying 30% of gross domestic investment; 
ii) Net external financing dropped sharply in the two-subsequent years; 
iii) Interest and profits on capital, for their part, continued to represent a 
relatively high proportion of the domestic product (5% per annum); 
iv) In such circumstances, the net inflow resulting from subtracting net 
remittances of interest and profits from current balance-of-payments 
financing was negative. In other words, net external financing was less 
than the resources spent on net payments of profits and interest. This 
happened while the group of countries in question were suffering the 
serious adverse effects of an unfavourable evolution of the terms of trade; 
/Table 10 
Table 8 
LATIN AMERICA (19 COUNTRIES):a/ EXTERNAL FINANCING AND 
REAL TRANSFERS OF RESOURCES 
(Percentage coefficients in relation tó gross domestic 
product at 1975 prices) 





Real transfers of 
resources c/ 
1971-1974 2.3 1.8 -1.2 -0.7 
1975 4.1 1.6 0.0 2.5 
1976-1980 3.4 2.2 0.7 2.0 
1981-1984 2.7 4.3 -0.8 -2.3 
1980 3.8 2.5 1.6 3.0 
1981 5.1 3.6 0.6 2.2 
1982 5.1 4.9 -0.7 -0.5 
1983 1.1 4.8 -1.6 -5.2 
1984 0.3 4.9 -1.4 -6.0 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
a/ Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
Jb/ Including net private transfer payments. 




NON-PETROLEUM-EXPORTING COUNTRIES:a/ EXTERNAL FINANCING AND 
REAL TRANSFERS OF RESOURCES 
(Percentage coefficients in relation to the gross domestic 
product at 1975 prices) 
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-4.8 
-6.4 
Source : ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
a/ Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru 
and Uruguay, 
b/ Including net private transfer payments. 
c/ Imports of goods and services minus exports of goods and services. 
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v) In short, these countries had to generate a favourable balance on trade 
flows in order to offset the negative impact of the terms-of-trade effect 
and of the external resources deficit; 
vi) These countries' inverse real transfer payments had been growing rapidly 
and came to represent over 6% of the gross domestic product, an excep-
tionally high figure. Goods and services available for domestic 
consumption and investment were that much less than the product. 
b) Changes in petroleum-exporting countries 
In this analysis, the group of petroleums-exporting countries comprises Ecuador, 
Mexico and Venezuela. Obviously, this grouping incorporates a high degree of 
heterogeneity in long-term analyses, but the heterogeneity would seem to be somewhat 
less in analyses covering recent years, at least as regards the directional change 
in the variables under consideration. 
The evolution of this group of countries presents a very different picture 
from that just outlined for the non-petroleum-exporting countries. Moreover, it 
must be stressed that the concept of net external financing used here (as throughout 
the document) is equivalent to the balance-of-payments position on current account, 
with opposite sign, in accordance with conventional practice, and does not distin-
guish the share in that financing that may correspond to movements of capital or 
variations in reserves. 
As can be seen in table 10, net external financing increased during the first 
two years of the present decade until it came to represent as high a proportion as 
4% of the gross domestic product. Subsequently, and still on the basis of the 
aggregate data for this group of countries, the balance-of-payments position on 
current account showed a surplus estimated as averaging over 3% of the gross domestic 
product. It is of interest to note that these substantial changes in the balance-
of-payments position on current account are associated with a similar evolution in 
real transfers of resources. In the first two years of the decade, this group of 
countries recorded a transfer of resources which helped to increase the mass of 
goods and services available for domestic consumption and investment. In contrast, 
during the 1983-1984 biennium there was an inverse transfer, in which exports 
significantly exceeded imports and the difference came to represent over 5% of the 
gross domestic product, a figure similar to that recorded for the non-petroleum-
exporting countries as a whole. 
Net payments of profits and interest, as in the non-petroleum-exporting group, 
also followed a rising trend during the crisis, and approached 5% of the gross 
domestic product, which suggests a process similar to that characterizing the other 
group of countries. 
Lastly, the terms-of-trade effect has been favourable for this group of 
countries, still in comparison with the terms of trade in 1975. It must be 





PETROLEUM-EXPORTING COUNTRIES:a/ EXTERNAL FINANCING AND 
REAL TRANSFERS OF RESOURCES 
(Percentage coefficients in relation to the gross 
domestic product at 1975 prices) 





Real transfers of 
resources c/ 
1971-1974 0.2 2.0 -6.2 -8.0 
1975 1.8 1.5 0.0 0.3 
1976-1980 3.3 2.0 1.4 2.6 
1981-1984 -0.2 3.7 3.3 -0.7 
1980 1.8 2.7 5.3 4.3 
1981 4.1 3.6 5.1 5.6 
1982 4.0 4.9 3.4 2.3 
1983 -3.3 4.6 2.2 -5.7 
1984 -2.9 4.8 2.4 -5.4 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
a/ Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela. 
bj Including net private transfer payments. 
oj Imports of goods and services minus exports of goods and services. 
/II. THE 
II. THE ECONOMIC GROWTH SCENARIOS 
A.. TWO SCENARIOS OF REACTIVATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
In order to undertake a closer examination of the internal and external 
problems relating to the recovery and economic development of the countries of 
the region, two scenarios have been devised for the period 1985-1995: one 
scenario (1.0) projects a slow recovery of economic growth, while the other (2.0) 
assumes greater dynamism and ah acceleration of economic growth. 
The basic characteristics of the scenario assuming a slow recovery of 
economic growth are as follows: 
a) Its objectives and goals are divided into two phases: the first covers 
the period 1985-1990 and posits a target for the economic growth of each 
country which, by 1990, would bring its per capita gross domestic product 
back up to its 1980 level. In the second phase, which corresponds to the 
period 1991-1995, the target set is 3.5% annual growth of each country's 
per capita gross domestic product; 
b) The scenario is examined in relation to a basic solution, plus two variants 
reflecting the effects and implications of certain changes in variables 
of particular significance in the context of this scenario; 
c) This scenario corresponds to a scenario involving a slow recovery by the 
world economy and international trade. 
Scenario (2.0) of more rapid economic growth is by nature essentially a normative 
one. Its economic growth targets are higher than those envisaged in scenario 1.0. 
After five years of contraction and stagnation of the per capita gross domestic 
product, it is extremely useful to analyse the implications, in terms of domestic 
and external resource requirements and the nature of the national policy objectives, 
that can be inferred from a scenario of more dynamic economic development. 
Furthermore, for the purposes of this document it is also essential to analyse a 
scenario of a type that would tend to incorporate the basic objectives and goals 
of the International Development Strategy, as incorporated in the Regional Programme 
of Action adopted by ECLAC at its nineteenth session as an action tool for promoting 
the application of the International Development Strategy at the regional level. 
In this respect, it should be borne in mind that the General Assembly Committee 
which was formed to appraise the application of the Strategy approved a document 
reaffirming, by consensus, its objectives and goals. 
Some of the specific characteristics of the scenario are: 
a) Like scenario 1.0, this scenario also comprises two phases: during the 
first phase, which extends until the end of this decade, the per capita 
gross domestic product would expand at a rate of 3.5% per year, while the 
rate would rise to 4.5% per year during the period 1991-1995, which 
corresponds to the second phase; 
/b) The 
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b) The scenario is analysed in relation to a basic solution, plus two 
variants, using the same methodology employed in scenario 1,0; and 
c) This scenario would correspond to a more dynamic scenario of the world 
economy than in the case of scenario 1.0 and should give rise to effective 
external co-operation, particularly as regards the solution of the debt 
crisis, greater access to sources of fresh financing, an increase in 
exports from the countries of the. region and stable terms of trade at 
suitably remunerative levels. 
An analysis of each scenario in relation to various factors will be presented 
below. 
Firstly, an attempt will be made to shed light on some important elements 
which define the nature and scope of the scenarios; secondly, dynamism will be 
discussed in terms of economic growth and the evolution of foreign trade; thirdly, 
the requirements of each scenario will be specified in so far as they relate to 
domestic investment, saving and external resources; fourthly, the balance-of-payments 
projections will be summarized ; fifthly, requirements with respect to capital 
inflows and their net contribution will be established; sixthly, the evolution of 
the external debt and the relationship it bears to export earnings will be discussed; 
and lastly, the effects and repercussions of certain variations introduced into each 
scenario will be examined. 
B. SCENARIO 1.0: A SLOW RECOVERY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 
1. The nature of the scenario: its objectives 
and basic assumptions 
The intensity and persistence of the crisis, the steep drop in the per capita 
domestic product, the decrease in investment for capital formation, the heavy 
liabilities represented by the financial servicing of the accumulated debt and 
the limitations affecting the countries' access to fresh financing, especially 
from the private banking system, give rise to severe external constraints which, 
in combination with structural and short-term factors of an internal nature, pose 
an obstacle to an economic revival in the countries of the region. Although it is 
true that such a revival essentially depends upon the implementation of appropriate 
measures to carry out national strategies and policies, it is no less true that 
the region's economic reativation also depends to a great extent upon external 
decisions and events such as negotiations and agreements concerning the debt, 
the setting of interest rates, access to new credits, changes in the terms of trade, 
the dynamism of the world economy and the orientation of international economic 
policy. 
The slow-recovery scenario has been formulated in order to permit the 
immediate and future impacts of these various factors to be analysed. 
This is in no way a forecast, but rather a hypothesis or a scenario which 
may be inferred from the prevailing situation and which, if it is to become a 
reality, will also require a significant degree of international co-operation, 
despite the apparently modest nature of the objectives that are set out,- especially 
the first phase. /This scenario 
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This scenario has been constructed on the basis of a number of assumptions 
and macroeconomic relationships, including the following: 
a) The overall economic growth of each country depends upon the targets 
established as regards the growth of the per capita gross domestic 
product during the first and second phases of the scenario and upon the 
country's population growth rates. 
b) Import requirements depend upon overall economic growth and, particularly, 
upon domestic investment trends, as well as upon certain hypotheses 
concerning the behaviour of the import coefficient with respect to the 
gross domestic product which provide some indication of the process of 
import substitution or containment. 
c) Two main factors have been taken into consideration in the export projections: 
one, of an internal nature, concerns the structural relationship which 
should be maintained between this variable and the trend and structure 
of the gross domestic product; the other, of an external nature, relates 
to the outlook and projections of external demand. With regard to this 
latter consideration, the assumption is that the growth of the world 
economy and international trade will be slow, i.e., that what has been 
called a process of "recessionary growth" will occur which will be an 
influential factor in the sluggishness of demand for exports from the 
countries of the region, as well as in the stability of the terms of trade. 
It is postulated that the terms of trade will remain at the levels recorded 
in 1984 for the main sectoral components of exports and imports. In one 
variant of this scenario, the alternative assumption is made that the 
prices of primary products will rise 2% per year over and above the 
projected overall inflation rate. 
d) For the purposes of preparing projections regarding the balance of payments, 
capital movements and the trend of the external debt, an overall and uniform 
rate of inflation of 6% annually is posited. 
e) Interest rates, including costs, commissions and spreads, have been set 
at between 11.5% and 12% for private operations and between 6.5% and 
8.0% for operations with public institutions, according to the prevailing 
conditions in each country. A variation is also considered in which it is 
postulated that interest rates will drop by two percentage points in each 
country. 
2. Economic growth and the evolution of foreign trade 
a) Economic growth 
As noted previously, the main targets of economic growth in this scenario 
are such that by 1990 each country would have brought its per capita gross domestic 
product backup to its 1980 level, while during the second phase the per capita 
gross domestic product would expand by 3.5% annually. Hence, if growth were to 
continue at this rate, the total product of the region as a whole would not double 
until the year 2000. The rate of overall economic growth during the first phase 




a) From 2.0% to 3.5% in six countries (two large, one medium-sized and 
three small countries). 
b) From 3.6% to 4.5% in six countries (one large, one medium-sized and 
four small countries). 
c) From 4.6% to 7.0% in seven countries (two medium-sized and five small 
countries). 
This research brings out the striking differences in the growth rates which 
the countries of the region would need in order to achieve the above-mentioned 
targets. As is well known, these differences are the result of the varying degrees 
to which the countries' gross domestic products have contracted or stagnated since 
1980 and of the significant differences to be found among national rates of 
population growth. 
In short, whereas the growth requirements in relation to these targets are 
relatively low in the case of some countries —particularly large nations, as well 
as some medium-sized and small countries— most of the small countries would need 
to attain higher rates; in some cases, the required growth rates would be so high 
that they would be difficult to achieve in the context of this scenario. In other 
words, a number of countries are faced with the deplorable prospect of not being 
able to bring their per capita gross domestic product back up to its 1980 level 
by the end of the decade. This is especially the case for countries in which the 
prevailing situation is one of marked social tension and even conflict. 
The second phase of this scenario corresponds to a more dynamic process, which 
would take place during the period 1991-1995; the growth target for the per capita 
gross domestic product was set at 3.5% per year for this phase. Here, too, there 
are differences in the overall national growth rates as a result of differences in 
population growth rates. The group of large countries would grow more slowly than 
their past trends, while the medium-sized countries' growth rate would be 5.8% 
annually and the rate for most of the small countries would be over 6% annually. 
Thus, the pace of growth in the region as a whole during the second phase would be 
5.5%; at this rate, it would come close to regaining its traditional rate of 
economic growth. 
b) Export trends and import requirements 
In this scenario, the volume of exports would expand at what might be regarded 
as a relatively low rate. In this regard, however, it must be remembered that 
this scenario is based on a projection of a slow recovery in which the growth of 
the domestic product would be slow as well, and that, in addition, it is associated 
with a scenario of little dynamism in the world economy and international trade, 
especially during the first phase. As a whole, the countries included in the 
scenario would expand their exports at an annual rate of slightly over 4% during 
the first phase, with the rate rising to somewhat over 5% during the second 
(see table 11). 
Import requirements would be significantly more dynamic, expanding more than 
the domestic product and more than exports. A number of factors would play a 




LAIIN AHERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (19 COUNTRIES)a/: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCI, EXPORTS AND IMPORTS 
OF GOODS AND SERVICES, AND GROSS DOMESTIC INVESTMENT 
I Scenario 1.0 | Scenario 2.0 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 | 1 
11985-1990 1991-1995 |1985-1990 1991-1995 
Gross domestic product 6.0 1.7 -0.9 -3.3 3.3 3.8 5.5 5.0 6.4 
Exports of goods and services 4.2 7.8 -2.4 7.2 7.8 4.1 5.1 5.1 6.2 
Imports of goods and services 12.9 1.7 -18.4 -26.1 ' 1.6 8.5 7.0 10.1 7.7 
Gross domestic investment 6.8 -2.2 -10.7 -20.1 1.1 6.3 8.0 9.6 8.2 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
a/ Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, 
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay 3nd Venezuela. 
/import levels 
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import levels during recent years, import volumes are now abnormally low in 
relation to the level of economic activity. The decline shown by the import 
coefficient vis-a-vis the product cannot be attributed or at least not entirely, 
to an effective import substitution process: in large measure, this decline stems 
from the decrease in supply associated with the stagnation and growth setbacks 
brought on by the crisis. Under these conditions, a recovery of economic growth, 
even if it were not very rapid initially, would necessarily involve a sharp upturn 
in imports. It is true that, prior to the crisis, situations of outright over-
liberality existed in which imports of non-essential items increased or in which 
the expansion of imports was excessive; in some instances this occurred to such 
an extent that a process of inverse substitution tended to occur whereby imports 
replaced domestic products. Nonetheless, these cases do not invalidate the 
argument that imports currently represent a severe constraint on economic growth. 
In view of the above, the heavy demand for imports is partially accounted for by 
its present low levels. 
Another more specific factor involved in the increase of imports is the 
expansion of investment occurring in the economic growth process, the import 
content of which is greater, in relative terms, than that of the domestic product. 
Past experience and the projections made in this scenario clearly illustrate 
the main features of the process under examination. Imports of goods and services 
would increase at a rate of somewhat over 8% per year during the first phase, 
when the domestic product would be growing at an average annual rate of 3.8%. 
During the second phase, imports would expand at a rate of 7% per year, while the 
domestic product would grow by 5.5%. The increase in gross domestic investment 
would gain speed in the course of the two phases of the scenario, and this 
acceleration would be more intense than that associated with the domestic product. 
During the crisis years, and especially between 1980 and 1984, the volume of 
the gross domestic product was relatively stagnant, although it did show some 
fluctuations; against the background of this stagnation, imports declined to 
such an extent that the volume of imports in 1984 was only half that of 1981. 
It may well be said that the high growth rates for imports entailed by this scenario 
would partly be due to the low levels of external supply seen at the present time. 
The evolution of the import coefficient with respect to the domestic product 
provides some additional data to be considered in evaluating the significance of 
these macroeconomic aspects in the scenario in question. This coefficient, which 
was 16.3% in 1980, had dropped to 10.1% by 1984. According to the projections 
of this scenario, the coefficient would rise to 12.9% in 1990 and to 13.8% in 1995, 
i.e., it would still be lower than it was during the early 1980s (see table 12). 
3. Investment, saving and external resources 
a) Gross domestic investment 
One of the most significant features of the crisis is the trend observed as 
regards gross domestic investment for capital formation. In absolute terms, such 




LATIN AHERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (19 COUNTSIES>3/: EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES 
AND GROSS DOHESTIC INVESTHENT 
(Coefficients with .respect to GDP and percentages) 
I Scenario 1.0 | Scenario 2.0 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 | 1 
I 1990 1995 I 1990 1995 
Exports of goods and services 
Imports of goods and services 
Gross domestic investment 
13.3 14.1 13.9 
16.3 16.3 13.4 
26.1 25.0 21.4 
15.4 16.1 16.5 
10.2 10.1 12.9 
17.5 17.1 20.4 
16.2 16.3 16.1 
13.8 13.2 14.0 
22.9 22.7 24.7 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
a/ Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, 
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
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In order for there to be a reactivation of economic growth, gross domestic 
investment must expand more rapidly than the domestic product. For the region as 
a whole, the corresponding coefficient, which stood at 17% in 1984 (considered a 
low level), should rise to over 20% in 1990 and to around 23% in 1995 (see table 12). 
With some slight differences, the trend would be similar in the various groups of 
countries. 
b) Saving and external resources 
In this scenario, the coefficient of domestic saving vis-a-Vis the gross 
domestic product would be relatively high: 24.0% during the first phase and over 
25.0% during the second phase, which would put it above its 1980 level (see table 13). 
One particularly interesting feature of this scenario is the persistence of the 
structural change which began in 1982 with the reversal in the direction of 
transfers. Exports would continue to exceed imports by an amount equivalent to 
between 2.3% and 3.6% of the gross domestic product throughout the period covered 
by this scenario. This coefficient of inverse transfers was higher during the 
period 1983-1984. 
In view of this process, the coefficient of domestic saving must necessarily 
be greater than the coefficient of gross domestic investment, the difference 
between the two being equivalent to the inverse transfers in question. 
It should also be noted that in this scenario there would be some decrease 
in the relative magnitude of the erosion of investable resources caused by the 
adverse impact of the deterioration in the terms of trade and by payments of 
profits and interest on foreign capital. The coefficient corresponding to the 
terms-of-trade effect would remain more or less constant owing, in part, to the 
assumption of stability incorporated in this scenario; the coefficient of the 
external payment of profits and interest would tend to drop from its 1984 level 
of 4.9% to an average of slightly over 3% in this scenario. Under these conditions 
the coefficient of national saving would rise from 16.9% in 1984 to 18.6% in 1990 
and to 20.5% by around 1995. Consequently, gross national saving would tend to 
play a larger part in the financing of gross domestic investment than it did 
in 1980. The coefficient of net external financing would be around 2% in this 
scenario, which would be far below the level it reached in the early 1980s, but 
somewhat higher than what it has been in recent years. 
This overall regional trend tends to reflect the experience and projections 
of the large countries and some of the medium-sized ones, due to the great 
weight carried by the large countries in the regional sphere. Actually, some 
medium-sized countries and most of the small countries would show marked differences, 
in comparison to other groups of countries, with respect to the pattern of 
evolution of their own scenarios. Thus, in the scenario for the small countries as 
a group, the coefficient of gross domestic saving (19.0%) would be significantly 
lower than the coefficient for the large countries as a group; in addition, this 
coefficient would also be lower than the coefficient of gross domestic investment. 
This is because the small countries would again begin to receive transfers of 
real resources, in terms of import surpluses, thus experiencing the opposite process 




LATIN AMERICA AND IHE CARIBBEAN (19 COUNTRIES»!/; INVESTMENT, SAVINGS AND EXTERNAL RESOURCES 
(Coef f icients_with_r(^ ) 
Scenario 1.0 | Scenario 2.0 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 I-
1 1990 1995 
I 
1 1990 1995 
Gross domestic investment 26.1 25.0 21.4 17.5 17.1 20.4 22.9 22.7 24.7 
Gross domestic saving 23.1 22.8 21.9 22.7 23.1 24.0 25.2 25.8 26.8 
Net external factor payments 2.5 3.6 4.9 4.8 4.9 3.6 2.8 3.5 2.8 
Terms-of-trade effect 1.6 0.6 -0.7 -1.6 -1.4 -1.9 -1.9 -1.9 -1.9 
Gross national saving b/ 22 a 2 19.9 16.2 16.4 16.9 18.6 20.5 20.5 22.1 
Net external financing b/ 3.8 5.1 5.1 1.1 0.3 1.8 2.3 2.2 2.5 
Source; ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
a/ Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, 
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venesuela. 
b/ Including net private transfer payments. 
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4. Projections of balance-of-payments components 
Sweeping changes occurred in the structure of the external variables of the 
countries in the region during the crisis. The main impact of these changes has 
been a sharp drop in the value of imports and an even more pronounced increase 
in transfers of profits and interest on foreign capital, while the trend in the 
value of exports of goods and services has been very uneven, with a tendency to 
contraction and stagnation in some years. Thus, for example, their value rose 
significantly in 1984, only to drop once again in 1985. What is certain is that 
since 1982 or 1983 a trade surplus has been generated which has primarily been 
due to the decrease in imports of goods and services; this surplus has provided 
an increasing amount of the resources needed to cover net payments of profits and 
interest. In the light of these adjustments, net external financing declined 
considerably. It is quite clear, however, that this readjustment was accomplished 
at the cost of recession and decline in activity in the countries' economies, and 
that it had an extremely high social cost. 
The projections made in this scenario (see table 14) for all the countries 
as a whole would indicate a tendency towards a gradual decline in the trade 
surplus measured in dollars at current prices, at the same time that net payments 
of profits and interest on foreign capital would continue to rise. This would 
give rise to an increasing need for net external financing to cover the deficits 
on the balance-of-payments current account. In terms of dollars at current prices, 
net external financing (US$ 1.8 billion in 1984) would climb to approximately 
US$ 25 billion in 1990 and this figure would more than double by 1995. It is 
important to note that these figures are expressed in dollars at current prices 
and therefore incorporate the overall rate of inflation, which was assumed to be 
6% annually in this scenario. As a percentage of export earnings (again at 
current prices), these needs for net external financing would not reach the high 
levels of the early 1980s. Throughout the period covered by this scenario, net 
external financing would average 15%, whereas this proportion was 40% in 1982. 
Not all the countries fit into the picture which has just been described, 
however. The small countries would once again increase their trade deficit as 
well as their net payments of profits and interest to the exterior, while the 
need for fresh external financing to cover the deficit on the blance-of-payments 
current account would represent over 40% of export earnings (at current prices) 
from goods and services in this scenario. 
5. Gross capital inflow requirements and their net contribution 
a) Gross capital inflow requirements 
An estimate was made of the gross capital inflows that would be needed in 
order to finance amortization payments on the debt and the deficit on the balance-
of-payments current account and to provide the additional resources required to 
maintain an adequate level of international monetary reserves. An outline of 
amortization payments was prepared for this purpose which represents an attempt 





LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (19 COUNTRIES)a/: BALANCE ON CURRENT ACCOUNT 
I Scenario L O | Scenario 2.0 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 | — 
1 1990 1995 
1 
1 1990 1995 
< !1Ûii9DI_9Î_dollars_at_çurrent_priçes ) 
Exports of goods and services 105770 114076 101956 100650 112239 194593 332490 205933 369770 
Imports of goods and services 115900 126603 104332 75222 7721B 172014 322331 1BB7B4 364B17 
Trade surplus (+) -10130 -12527 -2376 25428 35021 225B0 10160 17149 4953 Net external factor payments 1B411 2B393 3B432 34869 37628 48001 6580B 50276 73234 Net external financing 28087 40347 40717 8793 1878 25085 55026 32791 67659 
(Coefficients with respect to exports of goods and services and percentages) 
Imports of goods and services 
Irade surplus (+) 
Net external factor payments 
Net external financing 
109.6 111.0 102,3 74,7 68,8 88,4 96,9 91,7 98.7 -9,6 -11,0 -2,3 25,3 31,2 11,6 3.1 8.3 1,3 17.4 24,9 37,7 34,6 33,5 24,7 19.8 24.4 19,8 26.5 35,4 39,9 8,7 1,7 12,9 16,5 15.9 18,3 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official dat3. 
a/ Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, 
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
/These gross 
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These gross capital requirements for the 18 countries as ^ group (see table 15) 
would rise to an average of approximately US$ 70 billion annually for the next 
three years; in 1990 requirements would total.US$ 90 billion and they would be 
far greater in 1995. With respect to the scope of these figurés, it must be noted 
that in large measure they refer to nominal capital inflows, due to the already 
mentioned fact that the total amount of amortization payments to be paid has been 
computed; thus, in the next three years amortization payments would be somewhat 
over US$ 50 billion annually rising to approximately US$ 60 billion in 1990. The 
difference between these figures and those given for gross capital inflows would 
correspond to fresh financing for the balance-of-payments current account and the 
adjustment of reserves in order to maintain a given ratio with respect to the value 
of imports. These gross capital requirements would represent a large proportion 
of the current-price value of exports, estimated at 50% throughout the period 
covered by this scenario. 
b) The net contributions of foreign capital 
An analysis of what is referred to in this document as "the net contribution 
of foreign capital" provides a very good illustration of the degree of instability 
and the expansionary forces sparked off by a process of indebtedness such as that 
which has been occurring in the countries of the region. The level of foreign 
capital contribution can be ascertained by subtracting amortization payments and 
net payments of profits and interest on foreign capital from the gross capital 
inflow requirements. Viewed from a different angle, this net contribution is 
equivalent to the sum total of import surpluses with respect to exports and the 
increase in monetary reserves. 
At present, and particularly during the period 1982-1985, the net contribution 
has been negative to an extent rising from approximately US$ -»f7 billion in 1982 
(see table 15) to an average of around US$-28 billion in the three following 
years, thus totalling some US$ -100 billion for the period 1982-1985. The trend is 
associated, inter alia, with three factors: one is the decrease in capital inflows 
and the difficulty experienced in obtaining fresh financing (particularly private 
international funding), due to the reaction of credit sources to the high cumulative 
level of indebtedness and the difficulty the countries have had in making financial 
service payments on a regular basis; a second factor, which is linked to the above, 
has been the changes in policy (made either voluntarily or imposed by circumstances) 
aimed at modifying the countries' trade balance position by creating a surplus 
based on a reduction of imports; while a third factor is the increase in the 
financial service on the external debt and, particularly, in payments of profits 
and interest on foreign capital. 
As a whole, the region would continue to record a negative net contribution 
during the first phase of this scenario; the level of this negative flow would 
decline, however, and during the second phase it would tend to be cancelled out. 
The trends or structures reflected by these data for the region as a whole 
would not apply to all the countries. Throughout the entire period covered by 
the scenario, the large countries as a group would continue to suffer a negative 
net contribution (of over US$-20 billion in 1990 and in 1995). In contrast, 
according to these projections the small countries would receive a considerable 




LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (18 COUNTRIES).3/: EVOLUTION OF THE EXTERNAL DEBT AND ITS FINANCIAL SERVICING 
I Scenario 1.0 | Scenario 2.0 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 j 1 
I 1990 1995 I 1990 1995 
( MiIlio[!5_gLdoll3rs_3t_cyrrent_jrices ) 
Interest paid on the external debt 21031 31483 39567 35550 39479 48709 67589 51562 76487 
Payments of principal on the 
external debt 18244 21433 22208 23838 23864 56269 77239 38177 51033 
Total servicing of the external debt 39275 52916 61775 59388 63343 104978 144828 89739 127520 
Gross inflow of foreign capital 48204 59603 43407 28460 33865 88091 144951 79333 133829 
Net contribution of foreign capital 11692 10000 -17002 -29947 -27316 -15486 3535 -8692 10728 
External debt 220231 275322 315610 340638 355431 474429 692151 500162 779318 
(Coefficients with respect to exports of goods and services and percentages) 
Interest paid on the external debt 20.2 28.0 39.4 35.9 35.7 25.3 20.6 25.4 21.0 
Payments of principal on the 
external debt 17.5 19.1 22.1 24.1 21.6 29.3 23.5 18.8 14.0 
Total servicing of the external debt 37.7 47.1 61.5 60.0 57.3 54.6 44.1 44.2 35.0 
Gross inflow of foreign capital 46.2 53,0 43.3 28.8 30.6 45.8 44.2 39.0 36.7 
Net contribution of foreign capital 11.2 8.9 -16.9 -30.3 -24.7 -8.1 1.1 -4.3 2.9 
External debt 209.9 242.8 311.4 341.1 322.5 246.8 210.8 246.1 213.7 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
a/ Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, 
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
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6. Thé external deb t and thé nét contribution from external loans 
a) Thé éxtèrnàl debt 
Estimates regarding the external debt for the entire period covered by this 
scenario have been based on the current debt level plus the financing of projected 
annual balance-of-payments deficits and the increase in monetary reserves, minus 
capital inflows from direct investment. 
Based on these factors, the estimates indicate an overall increase in the 
external debt. For the countries covered by the scenario as a group, the external 
debt would rise (in dollars at current prices) from about US$ 360 billion in 1984 
to US$ 475 billion in 1990 and to US$ 700 billion in 1995 (see table 15). 
Comparing the debt with the flow of earnings from exports of goods and 
services provides one criterion to be considered in evaluating the countries' 
situation and prospects in relation to their borrowing and debt-service capacities. 
It is of interest to note in this regard that the Latin American countries have 
the highest index of debt/export ratio of all the debtor countries. In 1984 the 
index reached the high level of 323; according to this scenario, the index would 
improve, dropping to 247 by around 1990 and declining still further, to 211, in 1995. 
b) The net contributions of external loans 
Capital movements and financial services, excluding the amounts corresponding 
to direct investments and profits on it, and to interest received, indicate what 
might be called the net contribution of external loans. For a determined period, 
this contribution is the difference between the increase in the external debt and 
the interest paid in the said period. In this scenario the external debt would 
increase by some US$ 337 billion in the period 1985-1995 (see table 16) and the 
accumulated interest paid would amount to some US$ 560 billion. This represents 
a negative net contribution of external loans amounting to US$ -222 billion, which 
means that the new net loans would be more than offset by the large amount of 
interest paid, or that the external remittances in respect of interest would be 
higher than the net loans that this scenario requires. 
C. VARIANTS OF SCENARIO (1.0) OF SLOW RECOVERY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 
With a view to analysing the effects and repercussions on the macro-economic 
variables of this scenario that would be produced by certain modifications of 
some of its basic assumptions two variants have been considered: one variant (1.1) 
considers an interest rate reduced by two percentage points and the other (1.2) 
incorporates the hypothesis that export prices of basic commodities will rise by 
2% per year above global inflation during the whole period of the scenario. 
A reduction in the interest rate, with the economic growth rate and the other 
basic assumptions of this scenario remaining constant, would have cumulative effects 
on the balance of payments, movements of capital and the distribution of domestic 
resources, as can be seen in tables 17, 18 and 19. In fact, taking as a reference 
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T a b l e 16 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (18 COUNTRIES)a/: EXTERNAL DEBT AND NET CONTRIBUTION 
OF EXTERNAL LOANS, 1985-1995 
Scenario 1.0 | Scenario 2.0 
1 
1 Basic 1.1 
1 
1.2 1 [ Basic 2.1 2.2 
External debt at 31 December 1984 355.4 355.4 355.4 355.4 355.4 355.4 
External debt at 31 December 1995 692.1 547.7 543.5 779.3 628.5 619.7 
Increase in external debt, 
31 December 1984-31 December 1995 336.7 192.3 188.1 423.9 273.1 264.3 
Interest paid, 1985-1995 558.6 414.2 520.7 596.5 445.7 556.7 
Net contribution of external loans, 
1985-1995 -221.9 -221.9 -332.6 -172.6 -172.6 -292.4 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
a/ Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and 
Venezuela. 
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Table 17 
COUNTRIES)a/: BALANCE ON CURRENT ACCOUNT 
1 S c e n a r i o 1 . 0 b / 1 S c e n a r i 0 2 . OJì/ I 
1984 1 1 9 9 0 1 1 9 9 1 1 1 9 9 0 1 1 
1 9 9 5 I 
1 
1 Basic 1 1.1 
1 
i 1.2 1 Basic 1 1.1 1 1.2 1 Basic 1 1 2.1 1 
1 
2.2 1 Basici 2.1 1 
1 
2.2 1 
(Hillions of dollars at current pri ices) 
Exports of goods 
and services 112239 194593 194593 202264 332490 332490 358676 205933 205933 214069 369770 369770 398857 
laports of goods 
and services 77218 172014 172014 172014 322331 322331 322331 188784 188784 188784 364817 364817 364817 
Trade 
surplus (+) 35021 22580 22580 30250 10160 10160 36345 17149 17149 25286 4953 4953 34040 
Net external 
factor payaents 37628 48001 34916 45477 65808 41752 51373 50276 36780 47652 73234 47343 57624 
Net external 
financing 1878 25085 12000 14891 55026 30970 14406 32791 19295 22030 67659 41768 22962 
(Coefficients with respect to exports of goods and services and percentages) 
laports of goods 
and services 68.8 88.7 88.4 85.0 96.9 96.9 89.9 91.7 91.7 88.2 98.7 98.7 91.5 
Trade 
surplus (+) 31.2 11.6 11.6 15.0 3.1 3.1 10.1 8.3 8.3 11.8 1.3 1.3 8.5 
Net external 
factor payaents 33.5 24.7 17.9 22.5 19.8 12.6 14.3 24.4 17.9 22.3 19.8 12.8 14.4 
Net external 
financing 1.7 12.9 6.2 7.4 16.5 9.3 4.0 15.9 9.4 10.3 18.3 11.3 5.8 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
3/ Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Chile, Calonbia, Costa Rica, Doainican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guateaala, Haiti, 
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panaaa, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela, 
b/ Includes the basic scenario and its tuo variants. 
/Table 10 
Table 18 
LAIIN AHERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (18 COUNTRIES)?./: EVOLUTION OF THE EXTERNAL DEBT AND ITS FINANCIAL SERVICING 
1 S c e n a r i o 1 • 0 1 S c e n a r i o 2 . 0 b/ 1 1984 i 1 9 9 0 i 1 9*9 5 1 1 9 9 0 1 1 9 9 5 1 
1 
1 Basic 1 1.1 1 1 1.2 1 Basic 1 1.1 1 1.2 
1 
1 Basic 1 2.1 1 2.2 1 Basic 1 1 2.1 1 
1 
2.2 ! 
* IÌÌÌÌÌ9D5_Qf_dollars_3t_current_grice5 ) 
Interest paid on the 
external debt 39479 48709 36549 46873 67589 45245 55689 51562 38999 49677 76487 52338 63748 
Payments of principal 
on the external debt 23864 56269 50642 54149 77239 61659 63536 38177 34392 36827 51033 40995 42608 
Total servicing of 
the external debt 63343 104978 87191 101021 144828 106904 119224 89739 73391 86504 127520 93333 106356 
Gross inflow of 
foreign capital 33865 88091 70304 76390 144951 107027 92841 79333 62986 67910 133829 99641 83313 
Net contribution 
of foreign capital -27316 -15486 -15486 -22916 3535 3535 -21815 -8692 -8692 -16554 10728 10728 -17355 
External debt 355431 474429 416778 445874 692151 547786 543528 500162 443815 472762 779318 628461 619733 
(Coefficients with respect to exports of c|oods and services and percentages) 
Interest paid on the 
external debt 35.7 25.3 19.0 23.5 20.6 13.8 15.7 25.4 19.2 23.5 21.0 14.4 16.2 
Payments of principal 
on the external debt 21.6 29.3 26.3 27.1 23.5 18.8 18.0 18.8 16.9 17.5 14.0 11.2 10.9 
Total servicing of 
the external debt 57.3 54.6 45.4 50.6 44.1 32.6 33.7 44.2 36.1 41.0 35.0 25.6 27.1 
Gross inflow of 
foreign capital 30.6 45.8 36.6 38.3 44.2 32.6 26.2 39.0 31.0 00 0 36.7 27.3 21.2 
Net contribution of 
foreign capital -24.7 -8.1 -8.1 -11.5 1.1 1.1 -6.2 -4.3 -4.3 -7.8 2.9 3.0 -4.4 
External debt 322.5 246.8 216.8 223.3 210.8 166.9 153.7 246.1 218.4 224.0 213.7 172.3 157.8 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
a/ Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, 
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venesuela. 
b/ Includes the basic scenario and its two variants. 
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Table 19 
LATIN AMERICA AND IHE CARIBBEAN (19 COUNTRIES)*/: INVESTMENT, SAVINGS AND EXIERNAL RESOURCES 
< Coe? t i £ i§Dt§_w i th_r espect_t o_GDP j, _and_gercent ages) 
1 S c e n a r i o 1 . 0 b / 1 S c e n a r i o 2 . Oli/ 1 
1934 1 1 9 9 0 1 1 9 9 5 1 1 9 9 0 1 1 9 9 5 1 
1 
¡Basic 1 1.1 1 1.2 
'1 
1 Basic 1 1.1 
r 
1 1.2 ¡Basic 1 2.1 1 2.2 
"1 
¡Basic 1 2.1 1 2.2 1 
Gross dosestic investaent 17.1 20.4 20.4 20.4 22.9 22.9 22.9 22.7 22.7 22.7 24.7 24.7 24.7 
Gross domestic saving 23.1 24.0 24.0 24.0 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.8 25.8 25.8 26.8 26.8 26.8 
Net external factor payments 4.9 3.6 2.6 3.4 2.8 1.8 2.2 3.5 2.5 3.3 2.8 1.8 2.2 
Teras-of-trade effect -1.4 -1.9 -1.9 -1.3 -1.9 -1.9 -0.8 -1.9 -1.9 -1.3 -1.9 -1.9 -0.7 
Gross national 
saving c/ 16.9 18.6 19.5 19.3 20.5 21.6 22.3 20.5 21.4 21.2 22.1 23.1 23.8 
Net external 
financing c/ 0.3 1.8 0.9 1.1 2.3 1.3 0.6 2.2 1.3 1.5 2.5 1.6 0.8 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
a/ Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatesala, Haiti, 
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela, 
b/ Includes the basic scenario and its two variants, 
ç/ Includes net private transfer payments. 
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the data of the basic scenario, the following modifications in the corresponding 
variables are observed. 
a) In the balance of payments: an immediate reduction would take place 
in the amount of interest, and this would simultaneously result in a fall 
in the deficit on the balance of payments (or in an increase in its 
surplus). Hence there would also be a fall in the accumulated indebtedness, 
which in its turn would be a further factor in the reduction of the amount 
of interest. 
b) In the movement of capital: there would also be a fall in the requirements 
in respect of gross capital inflows and the amount of the external debt. 
c) In the allocation of domestic resources: the fall in the amount of 
interest would diminish the erosion of investment resources as compared 
with the results of the basic scenario, and would increase the coefficient 
of national saving as a proportion of the gross domestic product, while 
reducing the coefficient of external saving by the same amount. 
Around the year 1990 the differences between this variant (1.1) and the basic 
scenario (1.0) would be as follows for the group of countries in question: 
a) There could be a reduction in the net external factor payments and in the 
net external financing of US$ 13 billion, which would be equivalent to 
6.7% of the total income from exports of goods and services for the year 
1990. 
b) There would be a decline in requirements for gross capital inflows of 
US$ 19 billion, which represents 9.8% of the income from exports of goods 
and services. 
c) The total debt would fall by US$ 60 billion, which would represent something 
over 10% of the debt recorded for that year in the basic scenario. 
d) The index of the debt/exports ratio would drop from 263 to 232. 
e) The coefficient of national saving would increase by an amount equal to 
the diminution of the coefficient of net external financing: i.e., one 
percentage point of the coefficients with regard to the gross domestic 
product. 
The second variant (1.2) assumes the incorporation into the basic scenario 
of an annual rise of 2% in the export prices of primary products, over and above 
the global inflation assumed in this scenario. The effects and repercussions 
of this alternative, as compared with the basic solution (1.0), would be as follows: 
a) On the balance of payments: the value of exports would rise and the 
deficit on the external current account would be reduced (or the surplus 
increased). This would result in a lower external indebtedness, which in 
its turn would reduce the amount of interest to be paid. 
b) On movements of capital: the requirements in respect of gross capital 
inflows, along with the amount of the debt, would be lower than those 
corresponding to the basic solution. 
c) On the distribution of domestic resources: there would be less deterioration 
in the terms of trade in comparison with that of the basic solution, 
owing to the rise in the prices of primary products. At the same time, 
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external transfers would be reduced in relation to the amount of interest 
and, in consequence, the erosion of investment resources yould be smaller 
than that of the basic solution, this being reflected in a larger 
coefficient of gross national saving. 
The most notable differences that would occur in relation to the basic scenario 
around the year 1990 are the following: 
a) An increase in the value of exports amounting to US$ 7.7 billion and a 
fall in the deficit on the balance-of-payments current account amounting to 
US$ 10.2 billion; these changes represent 4.0% and 5.2% of the projected 
export income, respectively. 
b) A reduction in the requirements for gross capital inflows by US$ 12.4 billio 
which represents 6.4% of export income. 
c) A reduction in the total external debt by US$ 28.2 billion, which 
represents 5.6% less than in the basic solution. 
d) An increase in the coefficient of gross national saving from 18.6% in the 
basic scenario to 19.3% in this variant. This difference would tend to 
increase with the passage of time. Thus, for the year 1995 the projected 
coefficient of national saving would be 20.5% in the basic scenario and 
would rise to 22.3% in this variant of the scenario. 
D. SCENARIO (2.0): ACCELERATION OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 
1. The nature of this scenario: its objectives and basic assumptions 
In the initial paragraphs of this chapter consideration was given to the 
essential aspects characterizing the nature and purpose of this scenario (2.0) 
which assumes an acceleration of economic growth. Among other aspects emphasis 
was laid on the essentially normative character of this scenario and the greater 
dynamism required to achieve the established goals of a growth of the per capita 
gross domestic product by 3.5% and 4.5% on average during the first and second 
phases of its course. 
As regards basic assumptions and relations, both scenarios maintain those 
which determine the requirements for domestic investment; the demand for imports; 
the course of exports; the interest rates on the external debt, and the stability 
of the terms of trade. This scenario incorporates another basic assumption 
related to the reprogramming of the debt: that the pending debt and the new debt 
contracted will be amortized in 10 years and will have a grace period of five years. 
As in the analysis of scenario (1.0), the effects and repercussions of two 
variants of scenario (2.0) are examined. One variant (2.1) incorporates the 
hypothesis that interest rates will fall by two percentage points, while the 
other variant (2.2) assumes that the export prices of basic commodities will rise 
by 2% per year over and above the global inflation rate established. 
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2. Economic growth ànd thé évolution of foreign trade 
a) Economic growth 
The total growth deriving from the goals established for the per capita 
gross domestic product shows some differences among the countries, owing to the 
different rates of population growth. 
During the first phase the total growth would be 5% per year for the group 
of countries as a whole: in seven countries it would be somewhat lower than this 
average and in the 12 remaining countries somewhat higher (see table n ) . During 
the second phase there would be less dispersion in the rates of growth with 
respect to the regional average of 6.4% per year. Hence, in the period 1985-1995 
which covers the course of this scenario, there would be an average growth of 
somewhat less than 6% per year, that is, a rate similar to that recorded by the 
region as a whole during the past decade and lower than the goals established in 
the International Development Strategy and the Regional Plan of Action. 
b) The evolution of exports and the requirements for imports 
Exports would grow at a rate very similar to that of the gross domestic 
product. For the region as a whole, they would rise by an average of 5.1% during 
the first five years and 6.2% during the second five -years. The growth of the 
exports of the large and medium-sized countries would be a little below the 
average and only the group of smaller countries would record a greater dynamism 
in the expansion of their exports, owing partly to a greater growth in overall 
economic activity. 
As in scenario (1.0), import requirements would grow at a considerably 
greater rate than that of the gross domestic product, especially during the 
first phase of the scenario. For the region as a whole import requirements 
would rise by an average of around 10% per year during the first five years and 
7.7% per year during the second five years. 
This high import requirement should not be interpreted as an indication of 
changes in economic policy in the sense of an indiscriminate opening up of the 
economic process like that which was effected in some countries of the region 
and which seriously aggravated the later stage of the crisis and now impedes 
economic reactivation. On the contrary, the basic postulates of the two 
scenarios assume that the expansion of exports and an adequate and consistent 
policy of import substitution are two complementary instruments of the strategy 
of reactivation and growth. As was indicated in relation to scenario (1.0), this 
high import elasticity is due, inter alia, to the very low level of supplies of 
imported goods following the stagnation and drastic contractions suffered by 
imports from 1981, and to the intense dynamism to be fostered in domestic 
investment, which will need to increase more than the domestic product and which 
also has a high import content. It must be borne In mind that, notwithstanding 
the intense growth, the volume of imports which would be required in 1990 would 
be only 8% higher than that recorded in 1980. Moreover, the import coefficients 
with respect to the gross domestic product would be 13.2% in 1990 and 14% in 1995, 
which are lower than the coefficients of 1980 or 1981. 
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3. Investment, saving arid external resources 
a) Gross domestic investment 
In this scenario of faster economic growth, domestic gross investment grows 
more rapidly than in the scenario of slow recovery, especially during the first 
phase. For the countries as a whole this growth in investment would be 
approximately 10% per year during the first phase, while it would continue 
increasing during the second phase at a rate of 8% per year. Obviously, the 
coefficients of gross domestic investment would have to increase appreciably in 
comparison with the depressed coefficients of today. Thus, for the region as a whole, 
this coefficient would rise from 17.1% in 1984 to 22.7% in 1990 and to 24.7% in 1995. 
b) Saving and external resources 
The relations that would arise between saving and domestic investment, and 
the share of saving and external resources in the financing of domestic investment, 
vary substantially from country to country, reflecting major changes in the 
structure and functioning of the national economies in respect of their relations 
with the external variables. 
The indexes for the countries as a group reveal aspects which are of 
particular importance in the development of this scenario (see table 13). The 
coefficients of gross domestic saving would be higher than those recorded in the 
previous scenario, reflecting the need for an intense effort of saving in order 
to realize this scenario. The coefficient of gross domestic saving, in relation 
to the gross domestic product, would rise from 23.1% in 1984 to an average of 
26.0% in the course of the scenario. Net payments of interest and profits 
abroad, however, would have a lower coefficient than that of recent years, and 
this, added to the relative stability assumed in the terms of trade, would to 
some extent reduce the erosion of investment resources. Nonetheless, this erosion 
would be equivalent to more than 5% of the gross domestic product during the 
first phase of the scenario. The coefficient of net external financing would be 
higher than the present coefficient, but markedly lower than that registered in 
the early years of the decade. This financing would represent 10% of gross 
domestic investment, so that the 90% remaining would correspond to national saving. 
Hence, there would be an increase in the share of external resources as compared 
with the present situation; but it would remain below the percentages of the 
early years of the decade. 
It is the large countries and some of medium size that impose these special 
features on the trends and structure of the variables in this scenario for the 
group of countries as a whole. In effect, in the group of large countries the 
domestic saving coefficient would exceed the coefficient for gross domestic 
investment by approximately 4.5% of the gross domestic product. This is equivalent 
to the amount of the real inverse transfers due to the greater volume which exports 
would continue to record in relation to imports. This means that in the period 
of this scenario the volume of goods and services available for consumption and 
investment would be almost 5% lower than the volume of the gross domestic product. 
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The other characteristic of this scenario of acceleration is the low 
coefficient of net external financing, since it would not he more than 1% of the 
gross domestic product: similar to the level observed in recent years, but 
notably lower than the coefficient of external saving during the early years of 
the decade. 
In contrast, the group of smaller countries would have a diametrically 
opposed scenario of evolution. In this group of countries the coefficient of 
gross domestic investment would have to increase significantly: from 16.7% in 
1984 to an average of 23.0% for the whole period of this scenario. This increment 
would be mainly financed by an increase in the coefficient of external financing, 
which would rise from 5.2% in 1984 to an average of 10% during the course of the 
scenario. 
4. Projections of the components of the balance of payments 
The macro-economic structure of the main components of current balance-of-
payments transactions would be similar to that given in the scenario of slow 
recovery of economic growth. It would naturally differ in the absolute magnitude 
of the variables, owing to the greater dynamism of this scenario (see table 14). 
The trade balance would continue to show a surplus, but is would be smaller and 
would tend to taper off more rapidly in comparison with the slow recovery 
scenario. This is explained by the greater import needs, even though the export 
projections are also greater. The growth of net external factor payments is 
also higher than in scenario (1.0), and this, linked with the lower trade surplus, 
leads to a current deficit on the balance of payments greater than that recorded 
in the other scenario. 
In this scenario, net external financing would represent from 16% to 18% of 
the value of exports; this means that, although it would indeed be proportionately 
higher than at present, its share in the context of the external accounts would 
nevertheless be markedly lower than that recorded in the early years of this 
decade. 
5. The requirements for gross capital inflows and their 
net contribution 
a) The requirements for gross capital inflows 
The requirements for gross capital inflows in this scenario of greater 
dynamism would be somewhat lower than those in the slow recovery scenario 
(see table 15). This apparent inconsistency is explained in essence by the basic 
assumptions of this scenario, which postulates, as indicated above, a rescheduling 
of the debt with a grace period of five years and an amortization period of ten 
years, to be applied both to the outstanding debt and to the new debt contracted 
during the whole period of the scenario. In contrast, in the slow recovery 
scenario it is assumed that the debt will be refinanced year by year, in accordance 
with its maturities. In this scenario the gross capital inflow would be some 
US$ 79 billion in 1990 and would tend to increase by 1995. It would represent 
less than 40% of current export revenues, which signifies less dependence than that 
observed in the early years of the decade. .. 
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b) Thé nét contributions of foreign capital 
Despite the magnitude of the gross inflows of foreign capital involved, its 
net contribution would continue to be negative for the countries as a whole until 
the early years of the next decade (see table ). Subsequently, and up to 1995, 
the net contribution would be positive. A similar process was foreseen in the 
slower growth scenario. This means that in the first stage the amount of the 
net payments of profits and interest would be higher than the net capital inflows, 
while in the second stage the opposite would be true. 
From another equivalent standpoint, a negative contribution would mean that 
the current value of exports, during part of the course of this scenario, would 
remain higher than the sum of total imports plus the increases foreseen in the 
international monetary reserves in order to keep a fixed relation with import 
needs. For the region as a whole, the net negative contribution around 1990 
would be close on US$ 8.5 billion at current prices, while around 1995 the 
scenario would show a net positive contribution of some US$ 10 billion. 
As happened with other variables, this picture of the trend of net foreign 
capital contributions is largely determined by what would happen in the large 
countries. In reality, the group of large countries would record negative 
contributions during the whole course of the scenario. In contrast, the medium-
sized and smaller countries, considered as groups, would have a positive net 
contribution during the whole of the course of this scenario. 
An idea of the relative importance of these net contributions in the external 
accounts and in the balance of movements of financial resources can be inferred 
from their relations with current export income. In the large countries the 
negative contribution would represent around 15% of the value of exports; in the 
smaller countries, in contrast, there would be a positive net contribution 
representing over 20% of the value of exports. 
6. The evolution of the debt and the net contributions 
of external loans 
a) The evolution of the external debt 
The external debt would continue to grow throughout the whole course of 
this scenario and would reach amounts very close to those of the slower growth 
scenario. The debt of the countries as a whole was some US$ 350 billion in 1984 
and would rise to around US$ 500 billion in 1990, reaching US$ 780 billion by 
1995, which would mean that the external debt would tend to double its current 
value in the next ten years. 
b) The net contributions of loans 
The net loans accumulated during the whole period of the scenario (1985-1995), 
equivalent to the increase in the external debt, are estimated at some US$ 420 
billion in this scenario of faster economic growth, and the accumulated interest which 
would accrue is estimated at some US$ 595 billion. Consequently, the financial 
resources sent abroad exceed the net loans received by some US$ 175 billion. 
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A reduction in the interest rate would diminish both the debt and the 
interest paid, and therefore would not affect the net contribution of the loans. 
This is the point illustrated in table 16 in respect of variant (.2.1) of this 
scenario, which assumes a reduction of two percentage points in the interest 
rates. 
In contrast, an improvement in the external terms of trade would increase 
the negative contribution of the external loans owing to the resulting smaller 
increase in the debt with respect to the difference produced in the amount of 
interest paid. This analysis is illustrated by variant (2.2) of this scenario, 
in which it is assumed that the prices of primary commodities exported increase 
by an annual average of 2% above the general inflation rate during the whole 
period of the scenario (see table 16). 
E. VARIANTS OF SCENARIO (2.0): ACCELERATION OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 
Two variants of scenario (2.0) have been analysed, as in the case of 
scenario (1.0): variant (2.1) examines the effects of a fall of two percentage 
points in interest rates, while variant (2.2) determines the implications of an 
improvement in the terms-of-trade effect as a result of an annual increase of 
2% in the prices of export commodities. From a qualitative standpoint, the 
effects and repercussions of each of these two variants on the structure and 
functioning of this scenario are the same as those described in the analysis of 
scenario (1.0). The differences between the two scenarios lie rather in the 
scale of the variations, and obviously also in the conceptual interpretation 
of the process, in view of the greater dynamism of scenario (2.0). It should be 
noted that in the analysis of this variable no account has been taken of the 
negative effects of this rise in the prices of commodities on other countries of 
the area which import these products. 
To avoid repeating aspects already considered in earlier pages, emphasis 
will be placed here on the most outstanding modifications introduced by each of 
the variants described. 
As regards the reduction of two percentage points in interest rates, variant 
(2.1) of this scenario differs from the basic scenario (2.0) in the following 
main respects around 1990: 
a) Net external factor payments would go down by some US$ 13.5 billion, while 
net external financing would fall by the same amount (see table 17). 
b) There would be a fall of US$ 16.3 billion in the gross capital inflow 
requirements (see table 18). 
c) There would be a reduction of US$ 56.3 billion in the external debt 
(see table ), making it less than the external debt recorded in the 
basic scenario, while the indexes of the debt/exports ratio would go down 
from 246 in the basic scenario to 218 in this variant. 
d) There would be no variation in the net contribution of foreign capital. 
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e) The coefficient of national saving in relation to the gross domestic 
product would go up from 20.5% to 21.4%, while the cpefficient of net 
external factor payments would fall from 3.5% to 2,5% of the gross domestic 
product (see table 16). 
The effects of a rise of 2% per year in the price of export commodities 
would be as follows around 1990: 
a) There would be an increase of US$ 8.1 billion in the value of exports, with 
an ensuing rise in the trade surplus and a decline in net external factor 
payments. In brief, the effect would be a fall of the order of US$ 10.7 
billion in the amount of net external financing (see table 17). 
b) The gross capital inflow requirements would diminish from US$ 79 billion 
in the basic scenario to US$ 68 billion in variant (2.2). The net 
negative contribution of foreign capital would increase and the external 
debt would fall from US$ 500 billion in the basic scenario to US$ 470 
billion in this variant. 
c) The coefficient of national saving, in relation to the gross domestic 
product, would tend to rise from 20.5 to 21.2. The coefficient of the 
effect of the deterioration in the terms of trade would fall from 1.9% 
in the basic scenario to 1.3% in this variant, while that of net external 
financing would fall from 2.2% in the basic scenario to 1.5% in this 
variant (see table 16). 
F. SOME CONCLUSIONS 
The main conclusions on the central aspects of development which can be 
drawn from an analysis of the scenarios described in the preceding sections are 
as follows: 
Although in the scenarios considered no explicit analysis of the degree of 
employment of the labour force is made, it is important to note that even in the 
case of the scenario providing for greatest economic growth such employment would 
not be sufficiently dynamic to cause the employment problem to resolve itself 
in a reasonable length of time. 
Thus, even if the growth rate per person employed in the period 1980-1990 
were only 2.6% per year (equal to the levels of the decade 1970-1980 and below 
the average of 2.9% registered in the last three decades), in the scenario with 
the highest growth rate productive employment would increase by only 0.4% per 
year, which is a much lower rate than that of the growth of the labour force 
(estimated at 2.8% per year). In view of this, about 87% of the labour force 
incorporated during the decade would be without productive employment in 1990. 
Although there may be transfers between the old and new labour force in the 
occupation of job vacancies, there can be no doubt that an appreciable percentage 
of the young people reaching economically active age would not find work. In these 
circumstances, the 1980 figures for unemployment and underemployment would have 
increased by 1990 by around 32 million persons. 
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In 1995, although the situation would have improved in relative terms, it 
would continue to be dramatic, since in that year the 1990 unemployment figures 
would have gone down by only 2 million persons. 
It is interesting to note that in order for the persons entering the labour 
force for the first time in the period 1985-1995 to be provided with productive 
employment by 1995, assuming that productivity grew at the rate of 2.6 per year 
already mentioned, it would be necessary for the gross domestic product to grow 
at an annual rate of slightly over 6%_1/ during the decade. It should be borne 
in mind that this means that the 1985 levels of underemployment and unemployment 
would be maintained until 1995. 
Over the whole period, up to 1995, the physical movement of exports and 
imports would register a surplus in the direction of the develbped countries, so 
that the region would be transferring real resources. The amount of this real 
transfer over the period 1985—1995 would be approximately US$ 215 billion and 
US$ 221 billion at 1975 prices in the two scenarios (figures representing 27% 
of the region's volume of imports of goods and services in the slow growth scenario 
and 24% in the scenario of greater dynamism). This means a severe erosion of the 
resources available for investment, to the detriment of domestic investment, which 
would have to increase significantly after a long period of contraction and 
stagnation. 
In order to recover the economic growth rate a high volume of imports is 
required, particularly in the present conditions in which the adjustment policies 
applied by the countries in order to tackle the crisis have caused imports to 
become a restrictive factor in economic growth. This greater dynamism of imports 
should not mean a return to the indiscriminate policies applied before the crisis, 
however, and there should be substantial changes from the past behaviour in this 
respect. 
An aspect of particular importance brought out in these scenarios is that 
in order to promote economic reactivation new external financing is needed, for 
the payments of interest commitments on the present and future external debt 
(and net factor payments in the broader sense) significantly exceed the trade 
surplus and additional resources will be needed to cover them. 'Thus, the net 
external financing that would be needed in the slow growth scenario would amount to 
US$ 25 billion and US$ 55 billion in 1990 and 1995, respectively, with these 
figures rising to US$ 33 billion and US$ 67 billion in the scenario of greater 
dynamism. In the period 1985-1990, these needs would average US$ 19 billion and 
US$ 23 billion per year, respectively, in the two scenarios. The significance 
of these figures is clear when they are compared with the US$ 4.2 billion per 
year obtained by the region in the period 1983-1985. These requirements could 
be reduced if nominal interest rates went down: thus, for example, a reduction in 
the average interest rate in the period 1985-1990 from 11.2% to 9.2% per year 
would reduce the amount of new external resources needed by 50%. 
The net contribution of foreign capital, that is to say, the difference 
between the inflow of capital and the payments of principal and profits and 
interest on foreign capital, would be negative. In the period 1982-1985, the 
Latin American countries had to transfer US$ 106 billion in this respect. 
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In the scenarios analysed, during the period 1985-1990 the region would have a 
net negative contribution of foreign capital of US$ 117 billion in the slow 
growth scenario and US$ 93 billion in the scenario of greater dynamism. The 
magnitude of these figures shows that the commitments in respect of profits and 
interest on foreign capital have become so large that their reduction must be a 
central element in trying to dynamize the economies of the countries of the region. 
The servicing of the debt would continue to account for high percentages 
of the value of exports. Thus, although there would be a steady reduction in 
relative terms, it would continue to absorb a substantial proportion of export 
income (55% towards 1990 and 44% towards 1995 in the slow growth scenario). This 
high proportion —resulting from the conditions prevailing at present— would 
oblige the countries to engage in an ongoing renegotiation exercise which would 
undoubtedly adversely affect their degree of autonomy in managing their domestic 
policies. Thus, any change in these conditions which involved a reduction in the 
size of these commitments would help to reduce the pressures on the balance of 
payments and to increase the degree of autonomy in applying these policies. 
This is shown by the figures of the scenario of greater dynamism, which provides 
for a reprogramming of the external debt and in which the debt servicing would 
represent smaller percentages of the value of exports (44% towards 1990 and 35% 
towards 1995) than in the slow growth scenario. Even with the reprogramming of 
amortization payments, however, the amount of interest to be paid, of itself, 
would continue to absorb a high proportion of the current income from exports. 
One of the positive consequences of the effort implicit in the scenarios 
is that although the external debt would continue to increase, it would go down 
in relative terms with respect to exports. Thus, the debt for the region as a 
whole 2./ —which would amount to US$ 475 billion in 1990 and US$ 692 billion in 
1995 in the slow growth scenario, thus arriving at a level practically double that 
of the end of 1984— would go down in relative terms with respect to exports from 
323% in 1984 to 211% in 1995. It is important to note that the increase in the 
external debt would be similar to the inflation postulated in the scenario: this 
means that the debt would remain at its real end - 1984 value. The level of 
risk in respect of their loans would go down for creditors. 
Export income is a key variable in trying to handle the problem of the 
external bottleneck. This means that the factors affecting the evolution of the 
region's purchasing power are of fundamental importance for the development 
process: thus, the dynamism of the economies of the industrialized countries, 
access to export markets, the prices of export products and the evolution of the 
external terms of trade are elements which would have to undergo substantial 
changes if the external situation of the countries of the region is to be 
improved. 
The examination of these conclusions with respect to various aspects of the 
development process enables some general conclusions to be drawn. In the 
scenarios under consideration, the goals fixed are below those set in the 
Regional Programme of Action as regards the. process of economic growth and change. 
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Thus, the growth rate provided for in the scenario which assumes an increase in 
that rate (already described earlier) would bring the per capita product in 1990 up 
to a level representing only two-thirds of the target level laid down in the 
Regional Programme of Action. The deterioration reflected in the present situation 
is so great that it calls into question such goals as the doubling of the global 
product by the year 2000 which forms part of the scenario assuming a slow recovery 
of growth, and which is even further from the goals of the Regional Programme of 
Action. Furthermore, it should be noted that in order to reach by 1990 the level 
of global product implied by the target of the Regional Programme of Action 
(involving growth of 7% per year in the ten-year period 1980-1990), the annual 
growth rate for the rest of the decade would have to be around 14%. 
In the economic and social field, with the present patterns of production 
and distribution, it would be very difficult to achieve a solution for situations 
of extreme poverty by 1990. As the 1990 per capita product remains at the 1980 
levels in one of the scenarios and increases by less than 1% per year in the other, 
it does not appear that there can be any reasonable advances in this respect. 
What is worse, so far everything indicates that income distribution has been 
deteriorating in recent years, which shows that if the prevailing tendencies are 
maintained the situation of the poorest sector of the population would grow still 
worse. 
In the field of external relations, the degree of autonomy of national 
decisions would have been reduced over the period and the region would continue to 
depend to a large extent on external resources. The fact is that the limitations 
imposed by these resources and the prevailing external conditions make it unlikely 
that these economic growth rates can be achieved without substantially changing 
the conditions prevailing at present. 
The projections made in connection with the scenarios described show that 
the prospects for an acceleration of the economic growth of the countries of the 
region, considered as a whole, are not promising, at least as regards reaching 
a goal that would permit the countries to solve the main development problems 
which they are facing. This is not so much because of domestic restrictions, 
although it must be acknowledged that these are very important, but rather because 
of the bottlenecks and vulnerability deriving from the external variables. In 
particular, the problem of the external debt has become the most important 
recessionary element for the economies of the region. This means that the strategy 
for finding a solution must start from the principle that debt servicing must be 
compatible with the economic and social development needs of the debtors and must 
not become a factor of economic stagnation or social regression. There is an 
evident need to seek solutions which reduce the external constraints through 
substantial changes in the currently prevailing external trade and financial 
conditions. 
Whatever the solution adopted, it is essential to try to find new forms of 
insertion into the international economy, of regional co-operation and of 
domestic economic and social change. The new forms of insertion into the 
international economy must correct the all-too-familiar prevailing asymmetry of 
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international trade and financing. In order to correct the trade asymmetry it is 
essential to establish a greater balance between production and domestic demand. 
To the extent that changes in domestic production can give rise to a structure which 
makes possible greater symmetry between exports and imports, external trade will 
be able to play a more important role in the total supply and demand of the 
economies. To this end, it will be necessary to stimulate the production of 
manufactures for export and to defend the manufacture of products for which 
markets have been won and must be retained. A certain length of time will naturally 
be needed in order for this strategy to bear fruit. At present, a high percentage 
of exports consists of basic commodities of different degrees of processing, and 
fuels. 
The correction of the asymmetries in international finance calls for a 
change in the policies which the creditor countries have been pursuing in dealing 
with the debt problem. In this respect, recent experience has shown the total 
asymmetry which exists as regards decision-making power and the sharing of the 
costs of the policies adopted. The burden of the adjustment has been borne by the 
debtor countries —with all the severe recessive effects that this involves— 
without the creditor countries making any contribution. Furthermore, the situation 
which has arisen has caused a severe contraction in the net flows of capital to 
Latin America. The creditor countries must share responsibility for solving the 
problem, taking account not only of its financial aspects but also its more general 
economic, social and political implications. 
Notes 
JV It should be noted that it is very difficult to see how a growth rate 
of the gross domestic product of this magnitude could be associated with such 
a low rate of productivity. 
2/ Comprising the following 18 countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, 
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
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III. REGIONAL CO-OPERATION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
A. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
With respect to the fulfilment of the objectives of regional co-operation and 
integration set forth in the Regional Programme of Action, there can be no doubt 
that the Latin American Economic Conference (Quito, 9-13 January 1984) and a series 
of subsequent meetings attended by Latin American Presidents represented a major 
new development as regards the political will of the governments of the region. 
The Quito Declaration and Plan of Action gave rise to a number of mandates for 
overcoming the economic crisis through the revaluation of the regional market in 
order to revive the nations' economies and through renewed support for regional 
integration and co-operation processes. These mandates were also extended to 
regional and subregional bodies such as SELA, ALADI, the Andean Group, CACM and 
CARICOM, as well as organizations such as ECLAC. 
The main areas covered by the mandates contained in the Quito Plan of Action 
are: financing (in connection with the external debt, machinery to support intra-
regional trade, international economic relations and development financing), trade 
within Latin America, regional food security, co-operation in the field of energy 
and services. One of the results of the momentum generated at the Quito Conference 
has been an agreement to initiate a round of negotiations within ALADI in early 
1986 with a view to furthering trade within the zone. 
A number of different initiatives have been undertaken with the aim of 
alleviating the serious economic difficulties of the relatively less developed 
countries of the region. Some of the main steps which have been taken to improve 
their situation are the co-operation agreement regarding petroleum under which 
Mexico and Venezuela have been assisting the economies of the Central American and 
Caribbean countries; the schedules for the immediate opening of ALADI markets for 
the benefit of Bolivia, Ecuador and Paraguay; the Andean Group's extension of 
preferential treatment to Bolivia and Ecuador; and the partial-scope agreements 
signed by some ALADI member countries with countries in Central America and the 
Caribbean (Cuba). These last agreements help to give ALADI a regional character, 
in keeping with the spirit of the Montevideo Treaty of 1980. 
For its part, the Permanent Secretariat of SELA has promoted five meetings 
for the purpose of co-ordinating the integration and co-operation schemes functioning 
in Latin America and the Caribbean and has also acted as the secretariat for these 
meetings. All the specialized organizations and regional bodies have participated 
in these meetings as well. 
In its activities to encourage and strengthen intra-regional co-operation, 
ECLAC has made use of a number of elements of horizontal co-operation (TCDC and 
ECDC) which are incorporated in the programmes of work of the Secretariat's various 
substantive units. In practical terms, these elements involve the creation of 
suitable operating conditions to allow the expansion of contacts and links among 
the national actors, both in government and in the private sector, which are 
willing and able to participate in the process of exchange provided for by horizontal 
co-operation machinery. In this connection, special emphasis has been placed on 
/the promotion 
- 66 -
the promotion or revitalizatiqn of co-operation networks in the region for which 
ECLAC can serve as a support unit through the various activities included in its 
programme of work. Progress has also been made in developing information processing 
and exchange capabilities which are essential in order to ensure the provision of 
effective support for initiatives and opportunities for co-operation in spheres and 
sectors of interest to the countries, through the activities of the Latin American 
Centre for Economic and Social Documentation (CLADES). 
All in all, the environment in the region as regards integration and co-operation 
activities can be said to be more favourable now than it was in the first years of the 
1980s. There are various reasons for the greater unity shown by Latin America and 
the Caribbean, including: the increasing democratization of the countries in the region 
which has given rise to a marked personal rapprochement among presidents and political 
leaders; the elimination or easing of some geopolitical tensions in South America 
Peace and Friendship Treaty between Argentina and Chile, the visit of the Foreign 
Minister of Peru to Ecuador, etc.); the realization of binational initiatives and 
co-operation agreements (binational hydroelectric enterprises and agreements on 
nuclear energy between Argentina and Brazil, for example, which are highly significant 
in geopolitical terms); and, indeed, the needs created by the crisis and the external 
debt, which tend to create a bond of unity among the countries as a function of the 
efforts required to deal with them. 
B. INTRA-REGIONAL TRADE 
1. General features 
The Latin American crisis has been reflected in the decline of intra-regional 
exports from a value of US$ 16 228 million in 1981 to US$ 10 697 million in 1983 (a 
decrease of 34%). Trade within the region reached its peak in 1981, as did total 
exports from Latin America and the Caribbean (US$ 97 957 million). As a result of 
the US$ 5 531 million drop in intra-regional trade, the regional supply coefficient 
(i.e., the proportion of total Latin American and Caribbean exports represented by 
exports to the region) fell from 16.6 in 1981 to 11.8 in 1983. In 1984, it remained 
at virtually the same level (11.7). 
The deterioration in trade links reflected by the regression in this indicator 
affected all the integration schemes (see table 20). This situation is in sharp 
contrast with the role which integration processes should have played in dealing with 
the crisis, inasmuch as —given the shortage of external financial resources and 
the existence of idle production capacity in the economies of the region— some of 
the pressure for imports could have been channelled towards regional supply through 
the use of payments clearing arrangements. 
It was not until 13 January 1984 that, in response to the severity and length 
of the Latin American economic crisis, 27 Latin American and Caribbean countries 
signed the Quito Declaration and Plan of Action. 
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LATIN AMERICA: INTRA-REGIONAL AND TOTAL EXPORTS OF INTEGRATION SCHEMES 
( M i l l i o n s of d o l l a r s a t c u r r e n t p r i c e s , FOB) 
H sr fl> 
o 
c H* 
T o t a l exports 7 
Exports to L a t i n America 
Exports to L a t i n America as a p e r c e n t a g e of t o t a l 
Exports within ALADI 
Exports within ALADI as a p e r c e n t a g e of t o t a l 
Exports within ALADI as a p e r c e n t a g e of t o t a l 
expor ts to L a t i n America 
Andean Group b/ 
Total exports 3 
Exports to L a t i n America 
Exports to Lat in America as a p e r c e n t a g e of t o t a l 
Exports within the Andean Group 
Exports within Andean Group as a p e r c e n t a g e of t o t a l 
Exports within Andean Group as a p e r c e n t a g e of t o t a l 
e x p o r t s t o L a t i n America 
C e n t r a l American Common Market 
T o t a l expor ts 
Exports t o L a t i n America 
Exports to L a t i n America a s a percentage of t o t a l 
Exports within CACM 
Exports within CACM as a p e r c e n t a g e of t o t a l 
Exports within CACM as a percentage of t o t a l 
e x p o r t s to L a t i n America 
CARICOM c j 
T o t a l exports 
Exports to La t in America 
Exports to La t in America as a p e r c e n t a g e of t o t a l 
Exports within CARICOM 
Exports within CARICOM as a p e r c e n t a g e of t o t a l 
Exports within CARICOM as a p e r c e n t a g e of t o t a l 
e x p o r t s to L a t i n America 
La t in America d / 
T o t a l exports 8 
I n t r a - r e g i o n a l t r a d e 
I n t r a - r e g i o n a l t r a d e as a percentage of t o t a l 
I960 1965 1970 1975 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1 9 8 3 a / 1 9 8 4 a / 
3 4 4 . 8 9 388 . 7 13 786 .7 29 664 .2 44 630 . 1 60 729 . 0 79 569 . 1 87 040 .9 80 737 . 8 82 019 .7 88 5 1 2 . 1 
- - 1 583 . 5 5 031 . 2 7 174 .3 10 0 1 1 . 8 11 962 . 5 14 156 . 8 11 6 8 4 . 3 9 183 . 0 10 0 4 7 . 6 
- - 12 . 4 17 . 0 16 . 1 16 . 5 15 . 0 16 . 3 14 . 5 11 .2 1 1 . 4 
5 6 6 . 6 841 . 9 1 266 . 0 4 010 .2 5 838, . 4 8 574 . 6 10 879 .3 11 913 .2 9 758 . 5 7 053 . 8 8 0 4 6 . 6 
7 . 7 9 . 0 9 . 9 13 . 5 13 . 1 14 . 1 13 .7 13 .7 12 . 1 8 . 6 9 . 1 
- - 79 .9 79 .7 81 .4 85 . 6 90 .9 84 .2 83 . 5 76 . 8 8 0 . 1 
5 8 6 . 8 4 346 . 0 5 419 . 1 12 897 . 8 16 293 .4 23 937 . 5 30 064 . 5 29 758 .9 26 954 .0 24 813 .6 24 4 2 5 . 2 
- - 5 6 9 . 0 2 055 .3 2 404 .2 3 412 .9 3 922 . 8 4 854 .0 4 420 .2 3 428. .7 3 1 1 4 . 3 
- - 10 .5 15 .9 14. . 8 14 . 3 13 .0 16 .3 16 .4 13, . 8 1 2 . 8 
2 4 . 5 52 .7 91 .6 477 . 1 6 8 4 . 5 1 075 . 1 1 182, .6 1 195 .3 1 220 .2 843 .0 7 4 4 . 0 
0 . 7 1. . 2 1. .7 3 .7 4, .2 4 .5 3, .9 4 .0 4 .5 3, . 4 3 . 1 
- - 16. .1 23. .2 28. .5 31, .5 30, . 1 24 .6 27, .6 24. . 6 2 3 . 9 
4 4 4 . 2 762. .5 1 105, .4 2 309. .4 3 974. ,0 4 462 . .5 4 942 , .5 4 299, .2 3 393, .7 3 923 . .5 4 1 8 6 . 8 
- - 313. .7 645 . .9 965 . 7 1 0 3 4 . .2 1 172 . .0 1 260. ,4 969 . ,4 9 5 6 . 8 8 8 1 . 0 
- - 28. ,4 28. 0 24. 3 2 3 . .2 23 . ,7 29 . .3 28. 6 2 4 . 4 2 1 . 0 
3 0 . 9 132. 8 287 . 1 541 . 3 862 . 8 8 9 8 . 7 9 9 4 . 3 972 . 3 761. 2 755 . 1 6 9 6 . 2 
7 . 4 17. 4 26. 0 23. 4 21. 7 2 0 . 1 20 . 1 22. 6 22. 4 19 . 3 1 6 . 6 
- - 9 1 . 5 83 . 8 89 . 3 8 6 . 9 8 4 . 8 77. 1 78. 5 78 . 9 7 9 . 0 
5 4 3 . 7 750 . 2 1 0 0 0 . 1 3 0 2 8 . 5 3 190 . 2 3 9 0 8 . 1 5 4 9 8 . 4 5 113 . 0 4 406 . 7 3 6 8 3 . 4 3 5 8 0 . 5 
- - 6 3 . 2 259 . 7 297 . 6 4 3 9 . 6 5 9 3 . 9 6 7 7 . 0 728 . 3 4 8 0 . 3 4 4 0 . 0 
- - 6 . 3 8 . 6 9 . 3 1 1 . 2 10 . 8 13. 2 16. 5 13 . 0 1 2 . 3 
2 1 . 3 27 . 1 42 . 3 216 . 8 204 . 7 2 5 5 . 7 , 3 5 2 . 5 372 . 9 378 . 2 3 1 7 . 7 2 8 0 . 0 
3 . 9 3. 6 4. ,2 7. 2 6 . 4 6 . ,5 6 . .4 7. 2 8. 6 8 . 6 7 . 8 
- - 66 . 9 83. 5 6 8 . 8 58 . ,2 59 . .4 55 . 1 51 . 9 6 6 . 2 6 3 . 6 
5 3 2 . 5 11 5 1 8 . 6 15 212 . 2 36 182. 8 52 712. 2 70 2 6 5 . 6 91 3 2 5 . 7 97 956 . 8 89 858 . 4 90 8 9 5 . 4 97 . 6 3 6 . 1 
7 4 9 . 9 1 2 7 5 . 3 1 9 6 9 . 7 5 9 6 4 . 8 8 536 . 5 11 5 8 3 . 3 13 8 8 2 . 9 16 227 . 9 13 481 . 3 10 6 9 6 . 9 11 4 4 3 . 3 
8 . 8 11 . 1 12 . 9 16. 5 16. 2 1 6 . 5 15 . 2 16. 6 15. 0 11. 8 11 .7 
ON 
Source: ECLAC, on the b a s i s of o f f i c i a l f i g u r e s . 
a j E s t i m a t e s . 
b/ Does not include C h i l e . 
cj Includes only Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. 
dV Includes II ALADI c o u n t r i e s , 5 CACM c o u n t r i e s , 4 CARICOM c o u n t r i e s , Panama and the Dominican Republic . 
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The Quito Plan of Action sets forth a number of commitments with respect to 
regional trade, including: to refrain from introducing any additional non-tariff 
restrictions on imports originating from Latin America and the Caribbean, and to 
phase out existing barriers; to establish a regional tariff preference based on 
Article 5 of the 1980 Montevideo Treaty; to intensify bilateral or multilateral 
negotiations among the countries of the region with a view to speeding up the 
growth of intra-regional trade; to make use of State purchasing power by orienting 
it towards imports from regional suppliers; to utilize the regional demand for and 
supply of merchandise to facilitate purchases and sales in the region and in the 
international market, intensify the industrialization of Latin America and encourage 
regional enterprises to play a larger part in the provision of equipment; and, 
finally, to foster countertrade and economic complementation agreements. 
Following the Conference at Quito, the Second Meeting of the Council of Foreign 
Ministers of ALADI, held at Montevideo, Uruguay, on 26 and 27 April 1984, adopted 
a number of resolutions. Some of the principal ones concern the elimination of 
non-tariff barriers to intra-regional trade; the expansion of the schedules for the 
opening up of markets for the benefit of Bolivia, Ecuador and Paraguay; the 
strengthening of the system for financial and monetary co-operation; and the entry 
into force of the regional agreement on a regional tariff preference. 
Finally, the declarations issued at Lima and at the Montevideo Encounter 
(29 July 1985 and 2 March 1985, respectively) voiced the countries' firm resolve 
to make the processes of regional and subregional integration and co-operation more 
dynamic, and to undertake a round of negotiations within ALADI aimed at securing 
a greater share in regional supply for products from the member countries on the 
basis of equitable trading terms. This round of negotiations is scheduled to begin 
in March 1986. 
As of June 1985, 14 pacts had been signed with non-ALADI Latin American 
countries under the partial-scope agreements of the 1980 Montevideo Treaty. These 
agreements involve three ALADI member countries (Argentina, Colombia and Mexico) and 
seven Central American and Caribbean countries (Costa Rica, Cuba, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama). This is one means by which all the 
countries of the region may consolidate their integration efforts. 
With the support of SELA, five co-ordination meetings have been held among 
the secretariats of the organizations involved in promoting integration and 
co-operation in Latin America and the Caribbean; the regional and subregional 
specialized and advisory bodies concerned with these processes also attended. The 
last such meeting, which was held in March 1985 at Montevideo, provided an opportunity 
for reviewing the work done in pursuance of the mandates set forth in the Quito Plan 
of Action. Studies and technical proposals have been prepared in connection with 
the great majority of these mandates, and it only remains for them to be implemented 
by the relevant bodies. 
Thus, in the case of non-tariff barriers to intra-regional trade, for example, 
resolution 5 (II) was adopted by the Second Meeting of the Council of Foreign 
Ministers of ALADI, and specific proposals have been made for its implementation.1/ 
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Numerous studies have also been conducted in order to further the round of 
negotiations to be held within ALADI. It is hoped that this round, will mark the 
beginning of trade negotiations among all the countries of the region. 
With the aim of analysing the problems relating to trade both within and 
outside the region and of seeking solutions for these problems on a joint basis, 
ECLAC convened two meetings of foreign trade officials of Latin American countries 
(10-12 March 1983 and 28-30 January 1985) and a meeting of entrepreneurs from ALADI 
member countries on the subject of trade and financing (26-28 August 1985). This 
type of meeting may be repeated at fairly regular intervals in the future, particularly 
just prior to rounds of international negotiations. 
2. Commodities 
On many occasions the governments of the Latin American and Caribbean countries 
have expressed their interest in supporting commodity producer associations and 
promoting the creation of new associations. The Tenth Meeting of the Latin American 
Council of SELA was one such occasion. At that meeting, SELA's Second Two-Year 
Programme for Regional Co-operation covering the period 1985-1986 was adopted 
(Decision No. 199); some of the objectives laid down in Article 8 of this Programme, 
which concerns co-operation in foreign trade, are to strengthen the existing 
associations of commodity exporters in the region and to promote the creation of 
additional associations in connection with those products of interest to the member 
States of SELA. 
Nonetheless, for a variety of reasons no new associations have been created 
in the 1980s, while the existing ones (such as the Union of Banana Exporting 
Countries — U P E B — and the Group of Latin American and Caribbean Sugar Exporting 
Countries —GEPLACEA) have been faced with serious difficulties due, among other 
factors, to conflicts of interest within these groups or the failure of some major 
producers in the. region to participate in them. 
In addition, international trade in the commodities produced by the region is 
heavily dependent upon the behaviour of the industrialized countries' markets for 
such goods. Trade policies on commodities coming from the region should therefore 
be applied which will eliminate the overdependence, reduce the great vulnerability 
of such trade and, in the case of some goods, achieve a greater degree of regional 
self-sufficiency. One of the most viable options for accomplishing this would 
appear to be the expansion and strengthening of intra-regional commodity trade, and 
this is one of the issues to be dealt with at the ALADI round of negotiations. 
Many of the commodities which countries of the region export to the rest of 
the world are also imported by other Latin American and Caribbean countries from 
nations outside the region. This would seem to indicate that the region itself 
could provide a greater portion of the supply needed to meet regional demand. It is 
estimated that the total value of the imports of the 20 food products and agricultural 
raw materials that could most feasibly be supplied by the region itself amounts to 
US$ 3 billion. With respect to minerals and metals, there are 21 products which 
represent a possible US$ 1.3 billion expansion of regional trade. Finally, as regards 
fuels and lubricants, there are six products (representing US$ 11 billion) which 
could be bought within the region. 
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In order to make this intensification of regional commodity trade a reality 
where there is a margin of exportable supply (i.e., where no reduction in exports 
to the rest of the world would be involved), the necessary conditions for providing 
access to the markets of the Latin American and Caribbean countries must be created. 
To a great extent, these conditions involve mechanisms for State purchasing, tariff 
preferences and the elimination of non-tariff barriers, financing such trade on terms 
as similar as possible to those provided by the suppliers of developed countries, 
reliability of supply, and some degree of balance in such trade. 
Given the shortage of external means of payment, the use of commodities to 
increase intra-regional trade could contribute to a fuller utilization of installed 
production capacity and could help to create an opportunity for other regional 
integration and co-operation activities such as commodity producer and marketing 
associations. 
3. Export promotion 
Some Latin American countries have made considerable progress in export 
promotion since the beginning of the 1980s. The policies and tools they have used 
are largely in keeping with the basic points of the Regional Programme of Action. 
In the countries which have been most successful in this regard, co-operation 
between governments and entrepreneurs has been stressed. In this respect, they have 
refined the machinery for export promotion by promulgating regulations and legal standards 
designed to strengthen the structure underlying the various incentives and to make 
it more functional. The public and private sectors have jointly carried out advertising 
campaigns, fostered the creation of associations of producers of exportable merchandise 
and of domestic enterprises specializing in external marketing, and have promoted 
participation in international fairs and exhibitions. Looking at the overall picture, 
it can be seen that despite the severity of the worldwide economic crisis, co-operation 
between governments and entrepreneurs has enhanced the countries' commercial presence 
in an increasingly competitive international market subject to strong protectionist 
pressures from the industrialized centres. 
The last few years have also seen significant progress in the structuring of 
specialized organizations in the field of export promotion. Particular importance 
has been assigned to export financing and export credit insurance. It should 
nevertheless be noted that some countries still do not have an adequate infra-
structure to support the expansion of their external sales of manufactures and 
semi-manufactures. Sectoral associations of exporters and of joint marketing 
enterprises for finished products and inputs have almost always been national 
initiatives rather than subjects of regional co-operation. 
Notwithstanding the advances that have been achieved, it is imperative that 
action be initiated or reinforced in various fields. It might, for example, be 
useful to explore other forms of countertrade in which State purchasing could 
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serve as an effective means of promoting the placement of manufactures on the 
international market, as some Latin American countries are already doing. It 
will also be necessary to make more rapid progress in refining existing payments 
mechanisms in the region and systems for financing exports. Something similar 
might be done with respect to the development of export consortiums, international 
marketing ventures and other joint regional or subregional export schemes. 
Promoting the remodeling of commercial information services would also appear to 
be called for. Because of the concepts on which the creation of such services 
has been based, they have not been able to perform their basic and proper function; 
a new concept of their role would make it possible to heighten their multinational 
character through contacts among entrepreneurial associations, ensure that the 
information provided by such services is shared, and make other desirable changes 
as well. In the same way, the countries could jointly benefit from studies on 
the supply of exportable products which furnish the data needed to support 
promotional efforts on a selective basis, as well as providing useful reference 
material for trade negotiations. 
Meetings of government officials responsible for co-operation among national 
bodies concerned with the promotion of foreign trade have also been held. As a 
result of one such specialized meeting, the Latin American Association of Export 
Credit Insurance Institutions (ALASECE) was created in 1981. 
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C. JOINT ACTION TO EXPLOIT NATURAL RESOURCES AND MAKE UP 
FOR REGIONAL IMBALANCES 
Natural resources 
The problems faced by the region in connection with natural resource 
development have become more visible as a result of the crisis. The achievements 
in this field have been few and have primarily been directed towards creating a 
greater awareness of these problems rather than actually solving them. 
Thus, little progress has been made towards achieving regional self-
sufficiency in raw materials. Despite the efforts of the Latin American Energy 
Organization (OLADE), a substantial part of the petroleum used in the region is 
still imported. Although the region is a net exporter of petroleum and energy, 
many of the countries with oil deficits continue to import it from nations of 
other regions, while the large producers in the region sell the bulk of their 
output on the world market. A similar situation exists with respect to minerals. 
Even though the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean are major exporters 
in net terms (primarily to the United States, Europe and Japan), a number of the 
main export items, such as copper and iron ore, are also imported from countries 
outside the region. 
Similarly, progress in the rational use of natural resources and the 
conservation of the environment has been uneven and highly variable. On the one 
hand, a much better understanding of the importance of these issues is manifested 
in laws and regulations, development plans, the presence of agencies specializing 
in this area and the inclusion of environmental considerations in project 
appraisals. On the other hand, it cannot be said that the countries of Latin 
America and the Caribbean have put a stop to the degradation of natural resources 
in the region, and still less have they effected any significant reclamation of 
the resources which have already been allowed to deteriorate. 
Information is available, however, on a great deal of constructive work which 
has been done, albeit on a limited scale. Efforts have been made to further the 
efficient use and more flexible substitution of fuels in industries which are 
heavy consumers of such products (such as thermoelectric power plants and cement 
plants) and to promote soil conservation and reclamation and the preservation of 
flora ana fauna threatened by extinction. 
In future, the institutions responsible for managing these resources will 
have to be reinforced by giving them national coverage through the instrumentation 
of the operational units created for work in these areas (forestry, irrigation, 
parks and natural reserves, etc.) by providing them with the necessary means to 
ensure their continuity and the effectiveness of their operations and, above all, 
by investing them with the appropriate authority to fulfil their functions. 
Similarly, little or nothing has been accomplished with respect to the 
recommendation contained in the Regional Programme of Action concerning an 
improvement in the returns from commodity exports through an increase in the value 
added and higher prices. Minerals are a case in point: not only have efforts to 
increase the value added by mineral processing and manufacture met with very limited 
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success, but the income earned from their exploitation has been steadily declining 
due to the drop in prices occasioned by the lower demand for these products on 
the world market. In the period 1980-1984, world demand for 20 different minerals 
has fallen off in net terms; there has been a small increase in the demand for 
11 minerals, while only three show an increasing rate of expansion. These changes 
in the pattern of mineral consumption have been brought about by conditions in the 
world economy, input-saving technology and the substitution of other materials for 
the metals traditionally used in manufacturing. 
As a result of this new pattern and the inelasticity of supply, there has 
been a significant increase in stocks which has caused the prices of some minerals 
to drop by 40%, seriously affecting a number of Latin American countries. One 
means of counteracting this trend may be to increase the region's internal demand 
for minerals, but this course of action would be contingent upon a general economic 
recovery in the region. Per capita consumption in Latin America is only 10% of 
what it is in the OECD countries, and this would indicate that there is an enormous 
potential market which could in large part be supplied by expanding the metallurgical 
and metalworking industries of the region. If this is to be done, efforts will 
have to be made to promote integration and to encourage new investments in this 
area. 
In solving these problems, regional co-operation and vertical and horizontal 
integration will have to play a major role if the region is to win a more powerful 
position in the export market and boost the supply as well as the intra-regional 
trade of raw materials and manufactures containing goods based on them. 
In this connection, regional organizations and industrial associations such 
as the Regional Electricity Integration Commission (CIER), Latin American State 
Petroleum Enterprises Mutual Aid Association (ARPEL), Latin American Energy 
Organization (OLADE) and the Latin American Iron and Steel Institute (ILAFA) have 
continued to play an active role in promoting joint activities within the region. 
The most visible advances are the interconnection of gas pipelines and of electric 
power systems (the most notable case being that of Central America) and the 
generation of hydroelectricity on a binational basis. One recent achievement has 
been the establishment of the Latin American Mining Agency (OLAMI), whose objectives 
include promoting the vertical and horizontal integration of the mining and metal-
lurgical industry in order to permit economies of scale, to increase the value 
added and to improve the region's competitive position in the international market. 
2. Transport 
In response to the economic crisis besetting the region, the next few years 
may see a significant switch-over from the traditional pattern to mechanisms for 
economic co-operation which will allow the region to be more successful in meeting 
the technological and commercial challenges posed by the worldwide transport 
situation. 
The maintenance of all forms of transport is a long-standing problem which 
has become more severe as a result of the crisis. A lack of ongoing maintenance 
leads to the gradual destruction of transport facilities; given this situation, the 
trade-offs between new investments in infrastructure and the maintenance of existing 
infrastructure will have to be carefully considered. Similar complications exist 
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in connection with transport operations, since the shortage of resources and the 
increasing cost of spare parts tend to give rise to what is virtually a disinvestment 
in equipment which could have very serious consequences in the long run. 
Shipping is a particularly crucial factor in the development of the region. 
Over 85% of all the countries' foreign trade is transported by ocean-going vessels, 
and the sound management of this form of transport is therefore of great importance 
to the region's external economic relations. In view of this fact, the countries 
have recognized the need to lay the foundations for a greater degree of co-operation 
in this regard, especially through the establishment of two regional forums: the 
Operational Network for Regional Co-operation among Shipping Authorities (ROCRAM), 
which deals with technical matters involved in shipping, and the initiative undertaken 
within the framework of SELA to formulate joint economic and political strategies 
in this field. 
The maritime transport industry is increasingly being concentrated in an ever-
smaller number of shipping companies which use large vessels. Although it is 
true that this scale of operations tends to maximize the return on investments, a 
critical evaluation of its effects on the Latin American and Caribbean merchant 
marines is called for, inasmuch as such a scale can only be achieved by limiting 
direct service to the busiest ports and using feeder and transshipment services 
for the smaller ports. The shipping interests of this region may well adopt the 
tactic of forming their own consortiums or undertaking other types of joint operations 
in order to compete on an equal footing with the shipping concerns in other regions 
of the world. 
Freight rates are a problem which has existed for quite some time now, since 
shipping conferences usually set such rates unilaterally without taking the 
operational improvements made by some countries into consideration. In order to 
deal with this problem, urgent consideration should be given to the establishment 
of a regional body which could negotiate collectively with these conferences. This 
type of arrangement has worked successfully for the 25 countries of Western Africa 
since 1975. 
In so far as land transport is concerned, its limitations are not so much the 
result of insufficient infrastructure as of the lack of the necessary political will 
to overcome the traditional barriers to international commerce via truck and railway 
(e.g., problems relating to transport documents, the co-ordination of border services 
and the alignment of legal systems). A need exists for an institutional structure 
that will facilitate such commerce rather than hindering it and for transport 
companies with the necessary capabilities and experience to provide rapid and 
efficient service at the regional level. 
The countries are aware of these difficulties and for some time now have been 
trying to encourage the exchange of experiences and the co-ordination of activities 
in connection with both transport and customs matters through regional forums such 
as those sponsored by ALADI, the Board of the Cartagena Agreement (JUNAC), the Meeting 
of Ministers of Public Works and Transport of the Southern Cone Countries, and the 
Permanent Secretariat of the General Treaty for Central American Economic Integration 
(SIECA). With the advent of the economic crisis, there has been a still greater need 
for regional co-operation aimed at eliminating or reducing obstacles to this sort 
of transport and expanding land-based trade, which is a particularly effective way 
to reinforce economic integration. 
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A means of facilitating land transport which has not yet been utilized 
effectively is offered by the following United Nations agreements: the International 
Convention on the Harmonization of Frontier Controls of Goods, the Convention on 
the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road, and the Convention on 
the International Transport of Goods Under Cover of TIR Carnets (the TIR Convention). 
Despite its enormous advantages, the TIR Convention (which has been the object of 
a special effort by ECLAC in co-operation with ALADI) has still not been implemented 
due to the steadfast resistance of certain sectors in some countries. Accession to 
all these agreements in the near future by a majority of the Latin American and 
Caribbean countries would create particularly favourable conditions for the facili-
tation of international transport in the region. 
Air transport, like other forms of transport, has been affected by the economic 
crisis in a variety of ways. One example is the increasingly fierce competition 
among airlines for a larger share of dwindling air traffic which has caused fares 
to be set at unprofitable levels and aircraft to be used in ways which are economi-
cally unsound. The financial straits in which the airlines of the region consequently 
find themselves also make it difficult for them to gain access to more modern 
technologies which could help them to improve their competitive position. 
In order to stand a better chance of dealing with this situation successfully, 
it is vital for governments and airlines to co-operate more closely in order to 
formulate regional policy measures on exchange agreements and air traffic rights. 
The airlines should also work together to improve their management practices, the 
specification and selection of equipment, and the use of ground infrastructure. 
Traditionally, few co-operative efforts have been made among the countries 
of the region with respect to urban transport. During the past five years, however, 
some major co-operative activities have been undertaken concerning the operational 
aspects of public transport in cities as well as research into the problems of 
urban transport in general. These efforts constitute a particularly positive step 
in view of the rapid rates of urban growth in a number of the countries in the region. 
These activities must now be intensified through an active exchange of ideas, projects 
and systems which take the real conditions in Latin America and the Caribbean into 
account. 
D. ENERGY 
Co-operation in the field of energy, especially within the framework of OLADE, 
has become much more active since the Declaration of San Jose was issued in July 1979. 
On that occasion, 23 countries agreed upon a Latin American response to the instability 
in hydrocarbon markets and prices. 
Subsequently, the Bogota Commitment was adopted in late 1980, then the Council 
of Ministers of OLADE was created, and finally the Latin American Energy Co-operation 
Programme (PLACE) was formulated at Santo Domingo in November 1981. The programme 
under which Mexico and Venezuela are co-operating in the field of energy with 
Central America and the Caribbean is of special importance within this policy 
framework. 
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The San José Declaration establishes a policy and operational basis for 
intensifying co-operation in the field of energy. It contains an analysis of the 
world energy situation and possible responses at the national and regional levels, 
of measures to increase supply and rationalize demand for energy, and of the 
problems which exist concerning technology transfer, financial resources, marketing, 
transport, storage, distribution and refining. Subsequent advances have been 
largely in keeping with these policy guidelines, which are gradually being implemented. 
In August 1980 the programme under which Mexico and Venezuela are co-operating 
with Central America and the Caribbean in the field of energy entered into operation. 
This programme involves supply agreements, the granting of highly favourable financial 
terms for a certain proportion of imports, and even more preferential provisions 
for the financing of energy projects. By the time the programme had been in operation 
for five years, major changes had occurred in Mexico's and Venezuela's economic and 
financial positions. Nevertheless, both countries have agreed to extend the programme 
for another year, as they have done throughout the period. The main changes which 
have been made in the programme relate to reductions in supply levels in order to 
adjust them to the drop in demand caused by the recession. Furthermore, although 
the financial terms provided for under the programme are still of a concessionary 
nature, they are now closer to the terms generally extended in international markets. 
These modifications do not change the essential character of this important tool 
for regional co-operation, which continues to be one of the most significant examples 
of co-operation in this field. 
Towards the end of 1980, the international picture clearly reflected the 
intensity of the crisis, which began to have particularly forceful effects on the 
region. Oil prices continued to rise, reaching US$ 28 per barrel. The main concern 
of importing countries was to ensure their supply. The Bogota Commitment of 
November 1980 was an attempt to deal with this situation: the countries agreed upon 
guidelines for guaranteeing supply, procedures for rationalizing production and 
consumption, and measures for stepping up technical assistance; they also agreed 
to promote the increasing substitution of national and regional sources of energy 
for hydrocarbons obtained outside the region. The basic guidelines of the OLADE 
Strategy for the 1980s were also adopted. Within this framework, in November 1981 
the Latin American Energy Co-operation Programme (PLACE) was formed and the PLACE 
Account was created. The Programme's long-term goals are supported by activities 
and projects that are to be carried out immediately, to the extent that this is 
politically, technically and financially possible. Thus, a structure and framework 
to facilitate decision-making can be defined and attempts can be made to assess the 
progress that has been achieved, as well as the projects which have been completed 
or those which are in the design or execution phase. 
The purpose of the PLACE Account is to establish a simple and easily administered 
mechanism for putting the Programme into operation. The countries' contributions 
(US$ 7.5 million) serve as seed capital for the attraction of external resources. 
In early 1983, the Integral Programmes of PLACE were set into motion. These 
programmes cover the following fields: hydrocarbons, coal, hydropower, geothermal 
energy, bio-energy, solar energy and wind power, and planning and training in the 
field of energy. These programmes, and PLACE in general, have in practice defined 
the basic work carried out with respect to energy co-operation during the period 
1983-1985. The economic and financial position of most of the countries has certainly 
affected their ability to contribute to the PLACE Account, as well as the possibility 
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ai. attracting external resources and of furnishing the national inputs for the 
corresponding projects. The progress of OLADE's work has thus been limited by 
the prevailing economic situation. 
Achievements in the electricity subsector include the co-operation agreement 
signed in 1981 by Brazil, Costa Rica, Mexico and Venezuela, and the Central 
American agreement on electrical interconnection. 
The above-mentioned co-operation agreement, which is open to accession by 
the other member countries of OLADE, provides for a variety of forms of co-operation 
and technical assistance in connection with the generation, transmission, distribution 
and marketing of electric power. It also covers co-operation activities concerning 
research, planning, the construction and operation of hydroelectric plans and 
management in general. 
The Central American agreement on electrical interconnection represents a 
particularly significant effort to increase the links of interdependence among the 
Central American countries. The technical and economic preparations for this 
interconnection have been in progress for quite some time now. The recent start-up 
of some of the projects included in this initiative is an event of the utmost 
importance, especially in view of the political difficulties faced by the subregion. 
Finally, the role played by ARPEL and CIER as regards co-operation in the 
field of energy deserves mention. Both organizations have supported a variety of 
co-operation projects, with special emphasis on training as a means of helping to 
expand knowledge on a reciprocal basis and strengthen technical horizontal co-operation 
in the area. 
E. INDUSTRY 
The countries of the region face the manifold challenges of making the 
adjustments required by the crisis in external financing; bringing about a revival 
of economic growth on a more solid basis; reorienting development towards the 
objectives of equity, autonomy and participation; restructuring their production 
apparatus, and dealing with accumulated structural shortcomings, all within the 
framework of a world economy in which growth is slow, but a rapid transformation 
of the pattern of international specialization is taking place. 
Industrialization processes, which are decisive elements in the domestic and 
external dynamism of the Latin American economies and in the dissemination of 
technical progress, play a central role in the countries' responses to these 
challenges. The crisis, however, has caused the aggregate level of Latin American 
industrial activity to fall back to its 1980 level, has resulted in drastic declines 
in net private and public investment, has reversed the direction of net flows of 
external financing, and has caused the countries' import capacity to shrink. If 
the countries are to be able to respond to these challenges in a positive manner, 
adjustment policies will have to permit a reversal of this situation in the medium 
terms and promote the structural changes required in order to make possible sustained, 
competitive, autonomous and socially efficient industrial development. 
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In order to accomplish this, the design of development strategies, industrial 
policies and adjustment and stabilization policies must be closely co-ordinated. 
In so far as tariff, exchange, export-promotion, credit and fiscal policies set the 
key prices in the economy, encourage or discourage investment decisions or provide 
for the allocation of investment in ways that will generate external economies 
or provide infrastructure facilities, they will have a strong influence on the 
pace and orientation of industrial investment. The selective reservation of domestic 
markets and public-sector purchasing policies can ensure a scale of operation large 
enough to make it feasible to develop industrial activities capable of gradually 
acquiring comparative advantages. In turn, the reorientation and dynamization of 
the industrial apparatus can become key factors in economic revival if they result 
in increased competitiveness, permit the expansion of exports of manufactures, give 
rise to a phase of active investment and are directed towards covering potential 
segments of the domestic market seriously neglected during the previous phase of 
development as well as during the current recession. 
The industrial development strategies of the countries of the region can allow 
them to benefit from and consolidate their present comparative advantages based on 
their natural resources, manpower and existing technological capabilities. Their 
future patterns of specialization, however, must be based on the acquisition of new 
comparative advantages. The dynamic creation of such advantages can take place to 
the extent that the following conditions obtain: 
i) The industrialization process itself must be oriented towards generating 
external economies with respect to each activity (economies that will benefit other 
related activities) in terms of increasingly refined technological capabilities 
and the progressive upgrading of manpower skills at all levels of specialization; 
ii) International levels of excellence must be achieved on the basis of 
specialization in products and lines of technology and the full utilization of 
economies of scale; 
iii) In combination with such specialization, chains of interrelated activities 
must be created which generate and utilize external economies and which function as 
nuclei or core units that transmit their technological and entrepreneurial dynamism 
to the entire industrial complex; 
iv) The industrial complex must be developed in an organic and interdependent 
manner which includes links with agriculture and services, so that the most dynamic 
units can transmit their technical progress to the rest of the production apparatus 
and there can be a more comprehensive articulation of reciprocal intersectoral 
demand among branches of industry, among different types and sizes of companies and 
among regions. 
At the present stage of Latin American industrial development, a number of 
objectives must be attained simultaneously: the achievement of sufficient levels of 
competitiveness through the industrial apparatus, maximum use of local resources, 
the development of superior technological capabilities and the recovery and further 
growth of aggregate levels of activity. 
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To attain these objectives, industrial development strategies should establish 
the following priorities: 
i) an increase in productive investment, channelled towards activities with 
plenty of development potential and manifest social profitability; 
ii) sustained expansion of industrial exports, with an increasing value added 
content and progressive consolidation of penetration into world markets; 
iii) restructuring of activities whose structural limitations preclude the 
attainment of adequate levels of international competitiveness; 
iv) establishment and consolidation of permanent technological capacity in 
enterprises, in consonance with trends in world technological change and strengthened 
by development of the public and private technological infrastructure for research 
and development; 
v) competitive development of small and medium-sized industrial firms and of 
their capacity for adaptation, so that they may perform their strategic role in 
the industrial apparatus, by providing it with flexibility, dynamism, capacity for 
mobilization of human resources and regional articulation. 
A flexible, competitive and dynamic structure implies constant generation of 
new activities and new products. If these activities are to reach satisfactory 
levels of international competitiveness, processes of technological learning and 
of industrial maturation are required, of which the duration will vary, and which 
should be accompanied by protection tailored to these requirements and graduated 
in accordance with the foreseeable progress of the processes in question. Industrial 
policies, in the present phase of development, should link up in an appropriate 
combination protection of dynamic import substitution, and promotion of industrial 
exports. In both directions a positive influence can. be exerted, over the short 
and medium term, on the trade balance and the economy's level of activity, and 
the demand for productive resources can be modified, with a view to promoting full 
employment. If such policies are to guarantee, in the long run, satisfactory 
competitiveness in the industrial system as a whole and socially optimal resource 
allocation, the following requirements must be met: 
i) protection for import substitution activities should be selective and 
should progressively decrease, as the industrial learning process makes it possible 
to face up to international competition; 
ii) promotion of exports should be undertaken in the context of a long-term 
strategy for developing technological capacity and of enhancing the value and making 
full use of local resources, until levels of competitiveness are reached which 
make it unnecessary to allocate social resources to export promotion. 
The financial crisis and the recession have had an adverse impact on regional 
co-operation initiatives. Moreover, the surplus production capacity existing in 
world markets for some basic industries has militated against schemes for 
complementarity or joint programming. 
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Even so, the advantages associated with the development of capital goods 
industries have been promoted through a regional ECLAC/UNIDO project which has 
made possible a quantitative and qualitative assessment of the basic sectors' 
requirements of capital goods. Thus, ECLAC and the Regional Electricity Integration 
Commission (Comisión de Integración Eléctrica Regional - CIER) carried out a joint 
project whose results enabled them to formulate recommendations for slanting 
purchases of electrical equipment towards national and regional production, which 
were approved by the executive bodies of CIER. 
The major projects fot the basic sectors open up broad possibilities of 
industrial complementation through the use of underutilized production capacity, 
both in the larger countries of the region and in those of medium size, as well as 
in several of the small ones. These capacities have not been properly turned to 
account because: 
i) in most of the countries there is a lack of adequate financial machinery 
for the domestic sale of goods which are normally paid for on a long-term basis. 
This situation negatively affects both production in the individual countries and 
efforts at complementation; 
ii) regional industry is not sufficiently well-known, and there are not enough 
contacts between firms in different countries; tradition and custom impel buyers 
in the region to obtain their supplies from habitual sources, generally outside 
it. 
As regards the first obstacle, in some countries ad hoc funds or lines of 
credit have been established. The lack of contact and mutual knowledge which is 
the nucleus of the second of the difficulties described is beginning to be rectified 
with the birth of the Latin American Association of Capital Goods Industries 
(Asociación Latinoamericana de Industrias de Bienes de Capital - ALABIC), the aim 
of which is to further the development of the region's machinery and equipment 
industry through concerted action, complementation efforts and pledges of reciprocal 
technical support. 
F. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE 
Indicators of regional food security have dropped to the levels of the early 
1970s, thus exacerbating the food emergencies that several countries have had to 
face in the early years of the current decade. This has happened, paradoxically, 
after governments and the integration and co-operation organizations have on many 
occasions expressed their concern in this regard and have promoted measures to 
achieve a higher degree of food self-sufficiency and security in the region. 
In the framework of SELA, activities have been carried out since 1981 with 
a view to the establishment of a system capable of guaranteeing regional food 
security. To this end, in March 1983 an Action Committee on Food Security 
(Comité de Acciôn sobre Seguridad Alimentaria - CASAR) was set up, whose 
activities are connected with increasing production and productivity, improving 
supply, enhancing self-sufficiency and eliminating food and nutritional deficits 
in the region. In its initial phase, CASAR has concentrated on consultations 
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about food and food market strategies in Latin America, on horizontal technical 
co-operation in respect of national food policies and plans, on mechanisms for 
urgently needed food aid, and on the establishment of a regional information 
network. 
An outstanding achievement of CASAR in its first two years of activity is of 
a political nature: the establishment of food security as one of the top priorities 
in regional policy, and the creation of awareness that it can be better achieved 
by joint than by separate action. During the period 1986-1987, CASAR will 
concentrate its efforts on a small number of priorities and will endeavour to make 
them the foundation-stone of an effective Latin American food security system. 
These priorities are: support for national food plans; co-operation in and 
expansion of trade in basic foods; and emergency food protection. 
The "Jose Celestino Mutis" Andean System on agriculture, food security and 
environmental conservation, instituted by the Board of the Cartagena Agreement in 
June 1983, is the basic instrument for the execution of the Andean Agricultural 
Development and Integration Strategy, established in July 1983. A fundamental 
objective of the Andean System is the formulation and adoption of a set of measures 
making it possible to protect the member countries of the Agreement against 
risks of shortage of food supplies, and to meet the food and nutritional needs 
of the entire Andean population. The integrated approach to priority measures 
for the attainment of these ends is the result of a series of consultations and 
analyses organized by the Board of the Cartagena Agreement itself and reflecting 
the slant recently given to the development of the agricultural sector within the 
Andean integration process. The Board, with the support of FAO, has promoted 
activities among the member countries aimed at setting up the national food 
security systems envisaged as the instrumental basis of the Andean System. 
The products selected for the ALADI Round of Negotiations included food, 
beverages and agricultural raw materials. On the basis of analyses by products 
or groups of products, which cover the recent characteristics and trends of intra-
regional trade in these goods, the nature and relative importance of the main 
obstacles to the expansion of reciprocal trade, and proposals for policies, 
measures and machinery whereby these obstacles can be offset or overcome, the 
ALADI Secretariat is going ahead with the necessary preparations for putting the 
Round of Negotiations into effect. 
Furthermore, the third section of the Quito Plan of Action is devoted to 
regional food security. It exhorts all the member countries of CASAR to avoid 
duplication of effort and effectively co-ordinate their work, and to establish 
at the earliest possible date an efficient food information network and a system 
of co-operation among national food marketing bodies. The text underlines the 
need for each country to formulate national food plans which may serve as 
groundwork for the integration and consolidation of the regional food security 
system, whose effectiveness will also depend upon the efforts made at the subregional 
level. 
In the field of the preparation and execution of rural development projects, 
ECLAC, in conjunction with FAO and UNDP, has continued to support the countries' 
training activities, through the Regional Project for Training and Planning, 
/Programming, Agricultural 
- 82 -
Programming, Agricultural Projects and Rural Development (PROCADES). This 
last has entered upon a new phase, in which its work is mainly directed towards 
strengthening training networks based both on institutions belonging to the 
countries themselves and on entities of regional or subregional scope which can 
make an effective contribution to the development of these networks. The form of 
operation chosen for this purpose is basically that of horizontal co-operation. 
The Latin American Multinational Fertilizer Marketing Corporation (Empresa 
Multinacional Latinoamericana de Comercialización de Fertilizantes - MULTIFERT) 
is an outstanding example of intra-regional co-operation, which enables the 
participating countries to purchase this input on advantageous terms. 
Similarly, the creation of the Latin American Fishing Development Organization 
(Organización Latinoamericana de Desarrollo Pesquero - OLDEPESCA) is a clear 
indication of the advances made by the Action Committee on Marine and Fresh Water 
Products (Comité de Acción de Productos del Mar y de Agua Dulce - CAPMAD) in 
respect of fishing co-operation. This progress can indubitably contribute to 
the improvement of food security in the region. 
The foregoing group of co-operation efforts has not been accompanied by 
advances in the expansion of reciprocal trade in food and agricultural products. 
Regional exports to the region itself remained at about 10% of the region's total 
external sales between 1970-1972 and 1980-1982, although in absolute terms, 
measured in dollars at current prices, they increased by a factor of 3.7 (rising 
from US$ 855 million to US$ 3 214 million). Regional imports of food from the 
region decreased from 28% to 21% of the regional total in the same period. The 
shortage of exportable supplies available on conditions of regular delivery and 
competitiveness in respect of quality and prices, as well as the difficulties of 
effective access to markets, are the greatest internal stumbling-blocks to the 
expansion of agricultural trade. A third group of internal obstacles is constituted 
by financing, transport and communications difficulties and the inadequacy of 
marketing information. 
This review of the initiatives and efforts carried out by governments and 
by regional and subregional co-operation and integration organizations in connection 
with collective food security clearly indicates that there has been political 
will to make progress in this direction and that the relevant lines laid down 
in the Regional Plan of Action have been followed. The meagre results obtained 
have been strongly conditioned by the effects of the crisis, which is seriously 
affecting the development and stability of the region. 
Notwithstanding what has been said above, it should be emphasized that the 
advances made in integration and co-operation with respect to food and agriculture 
have been much slower and more modest than those achieved in other fields, owing 
to deficiencies of a conceptual and operational type. The fact that very little 
regional or subregional preference has been shown for agricultural products, 
together with the problems of financing, transport and competition from the 
subsidized exports of developed countries, accounts for the modest trade diversion 
effect achieved. The regional and subregional preferential tariffs have been 
applied for agroindustrial products, but have been very limited in their scope 
where food and agricultural products in their primary state are concerned. No 
country is willing to pay prices higher than the international market quotations 
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for the food it imports. Furthermore there is the strong protectionism applied by 
the developed countries. The agricultural policies of the United States and the 
EEC have altered the bases of international trade in agricultural products, by 
turning importer into exporter countries in respect of certain foods. 
Some major sectoral co-operation efforts have been seriously affected by the 
lack of a consistent policy on the part of the interested countries themselves, 
which have not given them long-term backing. The inconsistencies have stemmed 
both from the political instability that has affected several countries and 
exacerbates the conflicts between short- and long-term options and from the 
predominantly national character of the food and agriculture question. 
The adjustment programmes adopted by the countries have relatively common 
components and elements, which may come to constitute lasting frameworks for the 
formulation and application of organic and more permanent agricultural policies. 
These may be projected into the multilateral sphere, and serve as a basis for the 
collective structuring of a fresh conceptual, institutional and operational approach 
to food and agriculture questions. Such an approach will make it possible 
— i n the light of the experience gathered, riddled as it is with failures and 
limited successes— to define the variables on which the accent should be placed 
and review or renovate the methods to be applied. 
G. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
A regional microelectronics network for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(Red Regional de Microelectrónica para America Latina y el Caribe - REMLAC) was 
recently set up, on an experimental basis, under the auspices of UNIDO, ECLAC and 
SELA. The general objective of the network is to carry out joint activities with 
a view to strengthening the individual and collective technological capacity of the 
participant countries in the field of microelectronics, and to apply technology 
with a view to the satisfaction of their specific needs. To that end, it is 
envisaged that the network should undertake joint activities such as studies and 
exchanges of information, as well as research and development, training and 
industrial co-operation in specific areas such as the design of integrated circuits 
and the manufacture of semiconductors. 
Andean technological development projects have been formulated in several 
fields: staple foods, industrial utilization of tropical timber for the construction 
of low-cost housing, use of biotechnology for recovering low-grade ores —especially 
copper— and experiments in rural technological development mechanisms. 
The establishment and efficient operation of technological information systems 
in Latin America and the Caribbean is faced with problems relating to institutional 
matters, to the lack of resources and to the adaptation of the design of these 
systems to the requirements of the units taking decisions on selection of technology. 
The Andean Technological Information System (Sistema Andino de Información 
Tecnológica - SAIT), which began to function in 1982, is establishing data bases 
on foreign investment, contracts for the transfer of technology and prices of 
pharmaceutical and chemical products. The Latin American Technological Information 
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Network (Red de Información Tecnológica Latinoamericana - RITLA) has not yet 
entered operation because the corresponding agreement has not so far been ratified 
by a sufficient number of countries. 
Similarly, the establishment of a regional biotechnology network is a 
proposal that has repeatedly been put before the countries of the region, but up to 
now no steps have been taken towards its materialization. One suggestion among 
others has been that such a network should form part of the Latin American Regional 
Biotechnology Programme (Programa Regional Latinoamericana de Biotecnología), 
sponsored by UNDP, whose objectives are to promote the development of the basic 
sciences relating to biotechnology, to strengthen and create research groups and 
promote their co-operation, to pass on information from one participating centre to 
another, to execute research and development projects on priority problems, to 
formulate pre-investment proposals and to instrument projects for the optimization 
of industrial processes. Furthermore the countries of the region have sponsored 
the creation of an International Centre for Genetics and Biotechnology (Centro 
Internacional de Ingeniería Genética y Biotecnología), under the auspices of UNIDO, 
while three specialized Latin American centres form part of a network of micro-
biology reference centres (MIRCEN), sponsored by UNESCO. 
The Caribbean Council for Science and Tecnology (Consejo del Caribe para 
Ciencia y Tecnología - CCCT) is executing several projects on the evaluation of 
national capacities in the fields of science and technology, the preparation and 
exchange of audiovisual material for education in science and technology, and the 
conservation and exchange of germ plasm cultures. 
Lastly, in the field of training, UNESCO and ILPES plan to initiate a regional 
course on science and technology planning for development. 
H. MONETARY AND FINANCIAL QUESTIONS: PROGRAMME OF IMMEDIATE ACTION 
The extremely difficult external circumstances with which the region has been 
confronted in recent years have limited its possibilities, of advancing in the field 
of regional financial co-operation. ALADl's payments machinery has been perfected, 
and despite the delay on the part of some countries in clearing their balances, 
the system continues to operate efficiently and progress has been made in respect 
of the possibilities of obtaining external financing for the region to cover the 
balances to be cleared. The balance-of-payments support machinery (the Santo 
Domingo Agreement) has also been expanded, although only to a limited extent. 
The member countries of the Andean Group have established a unit of account and 
credit called the "Andean peso", with characteristics similar to those of Special 
Drawing Rights. Some headway has been made in collaboration in the area of 
export credit insurance and a body has been set up —ALASECE— in which institutions 
operating in the region in this field are grouped. The main debtor countries of 
Latin America meet regularly to evaluate the circumstances they face and to seek 
certain common measures through the Cartagena Consensus. 
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The difficult circumstances mentioned above have made it impossible to draw 
up a regional programme for Latin America and the Caribbean in the monetary and 
financial sphere, but appraisals and studies at the regional level are now available 
which will facilitate its formulation in the future. Both governments and regional 
organizations such as SELA and ECLAC are preparing studies in these fields. ECLAC 
and UNDP have carried out a joint work project in the financial and monetary area 
under which technical assistance has been given to some countries of the region and 
studies have been prepared on the effects produced by the situation of the 
international monetary system on Latin America and on external and internal debt 
problems in the region. 
The Sixth Replenishment of Funds of the Inter-American Development Bank will 
be completed in 1986, raising its ordinary capital by US$ 12 131 million, of which 
US$ 11 981 million is in convertible currencies. The Fund for Special Operations 
will also be increased by US$ 2 billion, with US$ 1 019 million in convertible 
currencies. Although this increment is considerable, it should be noted that the 
Fund, which is used for soft loans, at present has resources which are not being 
utilized, inasmuch as the difficult circumstances prevailing mean that the countries 
have not enough budgetary resources available for allocation to counterpart funds. 
The Inter-American Development Bank has also made the use of its resources 
more expeditious, and while it has not increased the margins of preference for 
national enterprises in bidding, it has raised the minimum amount above which 
international bidding is compulsory from US$ 100 000 to US$ 200 000. 
The machinery for regional co-operation in the financial field has been 
strengthened. The Latin American Association of Finance and Development Institutions 
(Asociación Latinoamericana de Instituciones Financieras de Desarrollo - ALIDE) 
and the Latin American Banking Federation (Federación Latinoamericana de Bancos -
FELABAN) have played an active part in making public opinion aware of the region's 
financial problems and have contributed to a lively interchange of ideas and 
information among the public and private financial institutions of the Latin 
American and Caribbean countries. The region's banking control agencies have 
likewise begun to meet and to exchange, experiences,, as have the. Central Banks of the 
region. The Centre for Latin American Monetary Studies (Centro de Estudios 
Monetarios Latinoamericanos - CEMLA), which acts as Secretariat to the Central 
Banks, has continued to hold training courses and seminars for the exchange of 
know-how for the staff of central banks and bank control agencies. The Latin 
American representatives on the governing bodies of the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank meet regularly to concert their positions vis-^-vis the 
multilateral financing agencies. 
The very difficulties encountered by the region in recent years, although they 
have complicated financial co-operation, have also acted as a spur to the search for 
new mechanisms whereby integration efforts can give a greater impetus to growth, and 
headway has been made in studies for the creation of regional multinational 
corporations in various fields, some of which are already in operation. These 
endeavours will, probably give rise in the future to the emergence of new areas of 
financial co-operation increasingly linked to trade. 
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I. TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION 
With the aim of helping to strengthen technical co-operation among the countries 
of the region, ECLAC has undertaken joint activities with other regional organizations, 
in particular SELA. These initiatives are in line with the Buenos Aires Plan of 
Action (1978) and the Caracas Programme of Action adopted by the Group of 77 in 1981. 
From this standpoint, a very significant product of collaboration between ECLAC 
and SELA was the above-mentioned Latin American Economic Conference (Quito, 12-13 
January 1984), convened at the instance of the President of Ecuador. The Conference 
adopted the Quito Declaration and Plan of Action, which represents a development of 
decisive significance for the strengthening of co-operation among the countries of 
the region, in those areas which the Plan itself indicates as being of urgent 
importance for facing up to the critical economic conjuncture which, in greater or 
lesser degree, is affecting the Latin American and Caribbean countries. 
It should also be mentioned that the activities of the ECLAC/RIAL programme on 
new patterns and agents of Latin American regional co-operation included the second 
meeting of sectoral associations of Latin American firms, held in Lima from 5-8 
December 1982 under the joint sponsorship of SELA and ALIDE. The associations which 
attended the meeting represented a broad spectrum of entrepreneurial activities in 
the region: the Latin American Shipowners' Association (Asociación Latinoamericana 
de Armadores - ALAMAR); the Latin American Railways Association (Asociación Latino-
americana de Ferrocarriles - ALAF); the Latin American Food Industries Association 
(Asociación Latinoamericana de Industriales y Cámaras de la Alimentación - ALICA); 
the Latin American Banking Federation (Federación Latinoamericana de Bancos - FELABAN); 
the Latin American Iron and Steel Institute (Instituto Latinoamericano del Fierro y el 
Acero - ILAFA) and the Latin American Association of Finance and Development 
Institutions (Asociación Latinoamericana de Instituciones Financieras de Desarrollo -
ALIDE). 
The main purpose of the meeting was to identify specific modes of co-operation 
among the above-mentioned regional associations. From this standpoint, the 
participants recommended the establishment of a liaison mechanism permitting fuller 
co-ordination and exchange of experience among sectoral associations of Latin American 
enterprises. 
In the sphere of financing, the Caracas Programme of Action, adopted by the 
Group of 77 in 1981, specifically drew attention to the topic of international 
investment project bidding and recommended that appropriate measures be taken to 
eliminate the disadvantages affecting firms in developing countries in this respect. 
J. CO-OPERATION WITH COUNTRIES IN SPECIAL SITUATIONS 
The stepping-up of integration and co-operation in the various subregions, and 
particularly with the countries facing special situations, is a permanent objective 
in the regional sphere. 
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The countries in which co-operation efforts have been concentrated are Bolivia, 
Haiti and Nicaragua. 
In relation to Bolivia, the problems faced by this country have led the 
intergovernmental agencies of the region to channel practical activities aimed at 
alleviating the gravity and intensity of the crisis. The most outstanding efforts 
have been made in ALADI, SELA, the Andean Group and the River Plate Basin System. 
In ALADI, the Committee of Representatives, through Resolution 24, established a 
programme of activities directed towards putting co-operation measures in favour of 
Bolivia into effect. By virtue of this resolution, Argentina and Brazil signed, 
during 1983, respective partial-scope agreements covering special measures in the 
field of trade, financial questions and payments. The member countries of the 
Association, for their part, following the lines laid down at the Second Meeting of 
the Council of Ministers (April 1984), decided to expand the schedules for the 
opening of markets in favour of Bolivian supply, and this decision was materialized 
through Agreement of Regional Scope No. 1. The foregoing measures were adopted 
concurrently with the normal work of the Association's system of support for the 
relatively less economically developed countries. 
The Latin American Council of SELA, in its turn, at its Tenth Ordinary Session 
held in October 1984, adopted decision 203 on "Co-operation with Bolivia". Under 
this resolution, this country was granted special treatment and a programme of 
co-ordination and co-operation with Bolivia was adopted, which comprises advisory 
assistance in the execution of the Rehabilitation and Development Plan formulated 
by its Government, as well as technical assistance and other forms of co-operation, 
together with support for the country's negotiations with international financial 
institutions. This decision also reiterates the need to intensify co-operation with 
Bolivia, already referred to in decisions 140 and 169, adopted in 1982 and 1983 
respectively. 
As regards the Andean Group, various measures have been taken within its 
sphere of competence, particularly in connection with technical assistance to 
promote diverse national projects. These have obtained increasing financial support 
from the Andean Development Corporation (Corporacion Andina de Fomento - CAF). 
Similarly, the Andean Reserve Fund (Fondo Andino de Reservas - FAR) has expanded 
its collaboration with Bolivia in the financial field. 
Lastly, the Development Financing Fund of the River Plate Basin has also 
concentrated its resources in Bolivia, thus making possible several infrastructure 
projects. 
With reference to Haiti, in 1982 SELA adopted its decision 147 on "Strengthening 
of Co-operation and Assistance for the Economic Development of Haiti". The 
application of this resolution gave rise to the adoption of decisions 168 and 202 at 
the next meetings of the Council. In these the countries are exhorted to take, in 
so far as in them lies, the measures referred to in article 2 of the first decision 
mentioned. This, in essence, promotes technical assistance on the part of interested 
countries with a view to "enriching the formulation of projects, ensuring their 




As regards Nicaragua, within the framework, of SELA the year 1984 witnessed 
the conclusion of the activities of the Action Committee for the Reconstruction of 
Nicaragua (Comité de Acción para la Reconstrucción de Nicaragua - CARN). This body 
was set up in August 1979 with the participation of 17 Latin American countries. 
Its basic objective was to support reconstruction programmes through regional 
technical and financial assistance, and to contribute to the strengthening of 
Nicaragua's bargaining capacity. The final balance-sheet of CARN's activities is, 
in general, satisfactory. It succeeded in channelling technical co-operation to 
the amount of more than 300 man/months in support of twelve different sectors. 
Conspicuous among these was the housing sector, mainly on account of the assistance 
afforded by Mexican technicians. With respect to the improvement of bargaining 
capacity, perhaps the most significant fact relates to the external debt. With the 
support of Mexico and of technicians from several other countries, Nicaragua 
succeeded, in 1980 and 1981, in restructuring the profile of its debt in the context 
of an original regional process. Some of the programmes which were in course of 
implementation at the end of the Committee's period of activity were absorbed by 
the Action Committee to Support the Economic and Social Development of Central 
America (Comité de Acción de Apoyo al Desarrollo Económico y Social de Centroamerica -
CADESCA). 
In addition, the Latin American Council of SELA, through, decision 188 (October 
1984), reiterated its "repudiation of the application of coercive measures" and 
reaffirmed its "deep concern at the United States' failure to comply with the 
recommendation of the Contracting Parties of GATT on Nicaragua's sugar quota". 
At the multilateral level, various initiatives have been launched with a view 
to co-operating with countries in special situations. A notable case in point is, 
the above-mentioned San Jose Agreement, which, establishes an "oil facility" granted 
by Mexico and Venezuela in favour of Barbados, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua and Panama. This Agreement, 
subject to renewal annually, has survived, as already stated, despite the economic 
and financial difficulties which all the countries, including Mexico and Venezuela, 
are experiencing. Its coverage has been reduced from 160 million to 130 million 
barrels daily, a figure which meets current needs. It provides for the automatic 
right of a buyer country to convert 30% of its account into five-year loans at an 
interest rate of 8%. In the event of the resources being used for energy projects;, 
the loan period can be extended to up to twenty years, and the annual interest rate 
is reduced to 6%. 
While the. original terms of the Agreement on the oil facility have altered 
because of the difficult economic situation, the maintenance of this undertaking 
undoubtedly represents an important precedent of regional solidarity which should 
be projected into other areas. 
It should be noted that the attitude of Mexico and Venezuela is not confined 
to the sphere of energy. In the financial field alone it is worth recalling that 
in March 1982 the Bank of Mexico increased its participation in the Central American 
Agreement on Reciprocal Credit from US$ 25 million to US$ 50 million, and that 
Venezuela has been a member of the Caribbean Development Bank for some years, while 
Mexico has participated since 1982. 
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Central America's economic and trade relations with the member countries of 
ALADI have also been promoted within the legal framework of the 1980 Montevideo 
Treaty. As was mentioned in the section on trade, Argentina, Mexico and Colombia 
have signed a total of 14 partial-scope agreements with the Central American countries, 
including Panama and Cuba. The said agreements are beginning to give impulse to a 
policy of regionalization on ALADI's part. In so far as this is intensified and 
projected to the other Caribbean countries, an important step forward will be taken in 
the field of regional trade co-operation. 
The Action Committee to Support the Economic and Social Development of Central 
America (Comité de Acción de Apoyo al Desarrollo Económico y Social de Centroamerica -
CADESCA) was set up by decision 173 of the Latin American Council of SELA. It was 
formally established in Panama, in December 1983, when the instrument setting it up 
was signed by nineteen countries. Its central objective is to mobilize funds from 
regional and extra-regional sources to meet the development priorities which have 
been fixed by the Central American countries themselves. In other words, it is a 
question of promoting and supporting the economy of these countries as a form of 
activity complementary to the peace efforts of the Contadora Group. CADESCA's 
programme of work includes items of special priority such as food security, support 
for the activities of the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (Banco 
Centroamericano de Integración Económica - BCIE), trade and payments, technical 
co-operation and the continuance of certain specific tasks deriving from the 
conclusion of CARN's operations. The extent to which these initiatives are carried 
out will depend essentially upon the effectiveness of the mobilization of the 
resources available to the participating countries. 
The Ninth Session of the Caribbean Development and Co-operation Committee was 
held in Port of Spain between 29 May and 4 June 1985. An analysis was made of the 
progress in the programme of work, broken down by its different components. With 
regard to relations between the Caribbean and Latin America it was noted that 
encouraging the improvement of relations between the English-speaking and non-English-
speaking countries of the Caribbean was a permanent activity which would subsequently 
be reflected in closer collaboration between the Caribbean and other regional and 
subregional groupings in Latin America. It was also foreseen that appreciable headway 
would be made in the coming year, inasmuch as the Secretariat had put into practice 
several initiatives with diverse organizations in Latin America, as well as with the 
individual countries. 
Moreover, the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean are carrying out 
various joint activities in connection with different sectoral co-operation agencies. 
The execution of the Latin American Energy Co-operation Programme (Programa Latino-
americano de Cooperación Energética - PLACE), and the work that is being done in the 
fishing sector, as well as with respect to fertilizers, sugar and bananas, to mention 
only the most outstanding instances, reflect the potentialities and prospects of these 
joint initiatives. Nevertheless, it must be recognized that these activities have 
been weakened in consequence of the problems which affect and limit the development of 
the organizations concerned and, in general, the difficulties, which the countries have 
to face. In order to make progress over the short term in forging ties of economic 
interdependence between all the countries of the region it would indubitably be useful 
to strengthen and redimension these practical modalities of co-operation. 
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From this point of view, a useful step would be a new review of the prospects 
for co-operation and the forms it has taken. In this connection it should be noted, 
for example, that some instruments which should carry special weight have not been 
able to gain a firm footing. What is more, others, like the Caribbean Multinational 
Shipping Corporation (Empresa Naviera Multinacional del Caribe - NAMUCAR) are 
considerably reducing their activities, which aggravates the problem of transport 
between the Caribbean and the rest of Latin America. 
In short, regional co-operation with countries in special situations has not 
proved quite as productive as would have been desirable in the present circumstances. 
It is true that the most serious problems of these countries are of a structural 
nature and are inherent in their relatively less developed conditions. But it is 
also true that intra-regional co-operation has not been projected consistently 
enough to tackle this situation. The gap between high-level declarations of policy 
and work on the operational plane is also a problem in this connection. 
Lastly, it should be recalled that ECLAC, in compliance with resolution 440 
(XIX) adopted at its Nineteenth Session (Montevideo, Uruguay, 4-15 May 1981), has 
carried out various studies on the rest of Latin America's relations with Central 
America and with the Caribbean. In this connection, the Secretariat presented at 
the Twentieth Session, held in Lima, Peru from 29 March to 6 April 1984, a document 
in which some of the main co-operation activities existing between the two groups of 
countries were reviewed and measures for forging closer links between them were 
identified. 
K. REGIONAL CO-OPERATION IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH 
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 
The "transnationalization" of the world economy has profoundly altered the 
rules of the economic game and is promoting among economic agents lines of behaviour 
which may run counter to government policies. In the future Latin America will 
assuredly continue to have to live with transnational corporations, and it is 
necessary to adopt a broad-ranging approach to the prospects of transnationalization 
which takes account of new growth patterns in the countries of the region. 
Latin America's style of development has been severely criticized for its 
tendency to a concentrated form of income distribution, for the persistence of 
extreme poverty, and for its inability to absorb productively large segments of the 
labour force, as well as for the external vulnerability and loss of national economic 
management capacity which are reflected in the handling of the external debt. In the 
post-crisis period and over the long term the development style of the Latin American 
economies will inescapably have to make radical changes in the current pattern of 
resource allocation. This implies profound transformations of the distributive 
structure, a real commitment on the part of governments to provide productive 
employment for large sectors of the population, and a quest for ways of appreciably 
relieving the external bottleneck. In other words, the trend will necessarily be 
towards a new development style whose impulses, incentives and economic growth 
dynamics will lie —in different degrees and forms and with different timing 
(depending upon the internal conditions proper to each country)— in the production 
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of essential consumer goods in general demand throughout the population; i.e., a 
development style at once more austere and more efficient, in terms of satisfaction 
of the basic needs of the Latin American population. 
The external projection of this new economic rationale, geared to the 
dynamization of a broader and more integrative domestic market, would be a more 
autonomous development pattern based on intra-regional integration schemes through 
which headway could be made in transforming production structures. Several questions 
would consequently be raised as to the role of the driving forces of development and, 
in particular, as to the action of the transnational corporations, involved in the 
process of world transnationalization of development. In this connection, there 
might be contradictions between the latter process and national objectives aiming at 
a more integrative and autonomous development style. In view of this, it is perhaps 
not only necessary but also urgent that the region, basing its approach on its level 
of development and its productive potential, should make full use of its substantial 
bargaining power to ensure that the increasing participation of transnational cor-
porations is in keeping with national development programmes. The insertion of the 
transnational corporations in a more social and democratic conception of development 
would certainly give them a higher degree of legitimacy, without of course this 
implying any renunciation of their entrepreneurial rationale. 
The increasing transnationalization of the world economy and the generalized 
crisis affecting Latin America demand the delineation of a form of insertion of 
transnational enterprises into the economies of the region which is compatible with 
the new modalities of development. 
Note 
U See document LC/R.367, dated 12 September 1984, entitled "Estudio sobre 




IV. TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AMONG THE 
COUNTRIES OF DEVELOPING REGIONS 
A. JOINT ACTION BY THE REGIONAL COMMISSIONS TO PROMOTE 
AND SUPPORT INTERREGIONAL CO-OPERATION 
Co-operation among developing countries at the interregional level has an 
important agent in the regional commissions, which, through their geographical 
location, the wide coverage of their mandates, the multidisciplinary nature of their 
activities, and the experience acquired in the formulation and execution of regional 
and subregional co-operation projects, are in a position to play a significant role 
in the promotion and support of technical and economic co-operation among developing 
countries. Consequently the growing use of links of co-operation, co-ordination and 
consultation and of joint programming among the regional commissions in recent years 
has come to be a key instrument for the work of promdtion and support of technical 
co-operation among developing countries (TCDC) and economic co-operation among 
developing countries (ECDC) on the interregional plane. 
In response to the recognition of the importance of co-operation among the 
developing regions, the regional commissions have taken an active part in the 
encouragement of interregional co-operation within the framework of the pertinent 
resolutions and decisions of the United Nations system j*/ and of the mandates issued 
by their own legislative organs. During recent years the regional commissions have 
collaborated closely among themselves to launch projects and programmes designed to 
stimulate and support co-operation among different developing regions in those areas 
in which the joint initiative of the regional commissions can be of greatest use to 
the governments of the interested countries in the respective regions. 
In the particular case of ECLAC, this aspect was specifically recognized and 
emphasized in resolution 438 (XIX) approved by the Commission at its nineteenth 
session. In this resolution the Executive Secretary is requested to take appropriate 
measures to strengthen and expand co-operation and co-ordination with the other 
regional commissions for the continuous exchange of information and experience and 
for promoting the initiation or strengthening of links between subregional and 
regional organizations of different geographical areas which have common interests 
and complementary capacities. 
*J In its resolution 2043 (LXI) of 5 August 1976 the Economic and Social 
Council indicated that the regional commissions are the appropriate institutions, 
within the United Nations system, to act as centres for the formulation, co-ordination 
and implementation of programmes for the promotion of interregional co-operation. 
Subsequently the Council once again underlined the instrumental role of the regional 
commissions for interregional TCDC and ECDC, in its decision 1982/174 adopted on 
30 July 1982. 
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An important step in achieving the necessary co-ordination among the regional 
commissions in this regard was the joint proposal prepared by them for the Economic 
and Social Council and presented by the Secretary-General at the second regular 
session of the Council held in June 1983. 
The analysis of the joint proposal of the regional commissions for the promotion 
of interregional co-operation led to the adoption of resolution 1983/66, in which the 
Council requested the Executive Secretaries of the regional commissions to organize 
periodical consultations among the respective secretariats and with the organizations, 
specialized agencies and entities of the United Nations system active in TCDC and ECDC 
at the regional and interregional levels, to ensure effective co-ordination within 
the system. 
In response to this resolution, the Executive Secretaries of the regional 
commissions met in February 1985 at the headquarters of the Economic Commission for 
Africa (ECA), at Addis Ababa, on which occasion they discussed possible subject areas 
for the execution of joint projects between two or more regional commissions. The 
preliminary proposals subsequently prepared by the different regional commissions were 
discussed by the Executive Secretaries at their next meeting, held in Geneva in July 
1985. The projects prepared by the regional commissions for promoting and supporting 
co-operation among developing regions are the following: 
a) ECLAC: information on trade and promotion of interregional trade; financing 
of trade; trading agreements and mixed enterprises; trade facilitation; the 
purchasing power of the public sector and the role of State enterprises; and 
training in some aspects of the development of mining resources. 
b) Economic Commission for Africa (ECA): development of materials for the 
construction of low-cost housing; fertilizers and pesticides in the context 
of the Decade for the Industrial Development of Africa; trade between African 
and Arab countries; use of containers and multimodal transport; and employment 
opportunities for women and young people in rural areas. 
c) Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP): inter-
regional trade in selected products; information, innovation and enquiry 
services on the subject of fertilizers; food security, particularly early 
warning systems; improvement of strategies for the planning, development 
and utilization of human resources for integrated development; and agricul-
tural saving and credit systems. 
These project proposals, taken together, constitute the framework within which 
it is hoped to develop the next joint initiatives of the regional commissions to 
achieve the necessary co-ordination with the interested organizations of the United 
Nations system according to the different spheres covered by the selected topics; to 
mobilize the resources required in the execution phase of the projects; and to 
establish appropriate links with national agencies in the different sectors covered 
by the set of projects. 
In addition, the regional commissions prepared a joint presentation for the 
fourth meeting of the Intergovernmental Follow-up and Co-ordination Committee on 
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Economic Co-operation among Developing Countries of the Group of 77, held in 
Djakarta in August 1985. The Committee periodically reviews the progress made in 
the fulfilment of the Caracas Programme of Action (CPA) approved by the countries 
of the Group in 1981, to give effect to economic co-operation among developing 
countries and regions.^/ The contribution of the "United Nations system to the afore-
said Programme has been repeatedly examined and assessed at previous meetings of the 
Committee (Tunis, 1983 and Cartagena, 1984), thus giving special importance to the 
different ways in which the regional commissions are effectively contributing to 
the execution of the CPA within the framework of their respective work programmes, 
as is manifested in the joint report prepared for the Djakarta meeting. 
B. RECENT ACTIVITIES OF ECLAC WITH OTHER REGIONAL COMMISSIONS TO PROMOTE 
AND SUPPORT INTERREGIONAL CO-OPERATION IN SPECIFIC SECTORS 
Within the framework of the project on interregional co-operation carried out 
by ECLAC and the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), with the support of UNDP, 
between 1981 and 1983, a joint meeting of government experts from Africa and Latin 
America, convened by ECLAC and ECA was held in June 1982 at ECA headquarters in Addis 
Ababa to discuss means for promoting technical and economic co-operation among the 
countries of the two regions in selected areas. 
At this interregional meeting approval was given to a set of action proposals 
designed to develop collectively the capacities and infrastructure of the countries 
of both regions through technical and economic co-operation among them in the spheres 
of trade, the development and utilization of human resources, and science and 
technology. 
Both the Addis Ababa programme of action and the reports and studies prepared 
by the ECLAC and ECA Secretariats in the spheres mentioned above were included in the 
book "Africa and Latin America: the prospects for interregional co-operation" published 
in Spanish by ECLAC and in English and French by ECA. 
As a result of the above-mentioned meeting of experts from Africa and Latin 
America, ECLAC co-operated with the Economic Commission for Africa in the organization 
of a tour to several Latin American countries of African specialists in the field of 
the exploitation of mineral resources, whose experience in this sphere is particularly 
valuable. 
The contacts made during this tour led ECLAC and ECA to hold consultations, in 
July 1983, in order to prepare a joint project aimed at identifying specific opportu-
nities for interregional co-operation based on the proposals for action emanating from 
the respective technical meetings on the development of mineral resources held in 
Africa (Arusha, 1981) and in Latin America (Bogota, 1982). 
V At its thirty-ninth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 39/216, 
dated 18 December 1984, in which it urges the organs and organizations of the United 
Nations system to give increasing support and assistance to economic co-operation among 
developing countries, taking due account of the Caracas Programme of Action. 
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One of the aspects which has recently aroused the interest of the regional 
commissions in the sphere of the development of mineral resources is the training of 
personnel skilled in the economic and technical aspects of the sector. In this regard 
the Secretariats of the regional commissions agreed to entrust to ECLAC the responsi-
bility of preparing a project specifically designed to promote interregional co-
operation in this field. 
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V. INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION 
A, GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Since the Regional Programme of Action for Latin America in the 19808 JL/ was, . 
published, the international economic scene has undergone profound transformations 
which have been particularly prejudicial to Latin Asterica. Some of these 
transformations have affected the fundamental assumptions on which the analysis and 
formulation of the Programme were based. 
The crisis of international co-operation in the trading, monetary and financial 
spheres has had particularly serious repercussions on our región, which are largely 
attributable to the internal and external macros-economic imbalances of the large 
countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and 
to the slackening on average of their general rate of growth. 
In the trading field there has been a constant accentuation of the trends 
towards a managed trade, increasingly at variance with the criteria and especially 
the norms of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (&ATT). Protectionism, 
especially of a non-tariff type, different forms of subsidized trade, bilateral 
agreements on voluntary restriction of exports, compensated trade, or counterpart 
trade, etc.,are outstanding features of this new style of trade. 
In the monetary and financial field, the marked rise in real interest rates, 
coupled with the overvaluation of the dollar, helped to accentuate the imbalances 
on the external accounts of the industrialized countries and to reduce their dynamism. 
In particular, the anti-inflationary policies of the centres, applied with special 
rigour at the beginning of the 1980s, stimulated the great recession of the years 
1981-1982, and, although the United States economy recovered later on, there was no 
such improvement in the European countries. These factors, along with technological 
transformations with deeper structural roots, have maintained the rates of 
unemployment above their historical average and have helped to foment the 
protectionism of the centres. Another result of these processes has been the drastic 
fall in the prices of primary commodities and —in view of the rise in real interest 
rates— the almost intolerable increase in the ratio between the interest on the 
debt and export revenues for the main debtor countries of Latin America. Thus to 
the crisis of co-operation in the trading sphere is added —especially in the case of 
Latin America— the crisis of financial co-operation. In fact, after the gradual 
replacement of public credits of multilateral origin by others granted by private 
banks during the 1970s, the serious problem of indebtedness in the 1980s has not yet 
found stable and integral solutions in the sphere of international co-operation, 
putting to a severe test the actions and strategies of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and of the International Reconstruction and Development Bank (1RDB) in 
their relationship with the Latin American debtor countries. 
292. The impact of this crisis, in so far as it affects the main institutions of 
international co-operation, is particularly acute in the case of the North-South 
negotiations and especially as regards those of Latin America with the industrial 
countries. The summit meeting at Cancun, Mexico, in 1981, the Ministerial Meeting 
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of GATT in 1982, the Sixth. UNCTAD Meeting in 1983, the summit meeting at Bonn and 
the annual joint meeting of the IMF and IRDB in Seoul in 1985, were important 
occasions on which the result obtained fell far short of the expectations of the 
developing countries. This discouraging diagnosis might be extended to the three 
main areas usually included in negotiation-; commodities, trade, and monetary-cum-
financial affairs. Without prejudice to a more detailed analysis which figures 
further on in this chapter, the evolution of NorthrSouth relations in the first 
five years of the 1980s might be summarized thus. In the trading sphere and within 
the UNCTAD Integrated Programme for Commodities very few additional agreements were 
concerted beyond the renegotiation of the. four already in existence. Similarly, 
the Common Fund ^J has turned out to be a much weaker instrument than was projected 
at the outset and, besides this, it has not come into force through lack of 
ratification and finance. Furthermore, from the gênerai standpoint of the structure 
of North-South trade, there has been no appreciable progress in the negotiations 
seeking to facilitate structural readjustment and control the advance of 
protectionism, nor, in particular, in measures to guarantee the stability and 
continuity of the Generalized System of Preferences. The only really encouraging 
event in this field has been the initiation of conversations aimed at organizing 
a new round of negotiations with GATT, but major disputes have already arisen 
between North and South regarding the topics that should be included in its 
discussion programme. 
Neither has there been success in the financial and monetary field with respect 
to the proposals for a new allocation of Special Drawing Rights, or for a major 
increase in the IMF quotas, or an expansion of its'Compensatory Financing Facility. 
Nor was any progress made in the reform of the international monetary system. Other 
international aspects of interest that will be raised in the following sections 
relate to the Latin American position as regards production, agricultural trade and 
the evolution of the levels attained in respect of food self-sufficiency; to the 
growing disarticulation of OPEC, as a result of the changes in the market structures 
that depress the price of fuels; to the dwindling and clearly insufficient role of 
direct foreign investment in the equilibrium of the Latin American external accounts 
and to the growing trading and financial power of the transnational corporations; 
to the specific regional achievements -—localized in the larger countries*— as 
regards science and technology, and to the disheartening outlook in respect of 
progress in the industrial recovery on the international plane. Some considerations 
will also be included on the subject of transport and <—on a broader basis— on the 
more general and recent trends in cooperation with some developed areas (the 
United States, the European Economic Community (EEC) and the member countries of the 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). 
*/ The Common Fund — a basic element in th.e Integrated. Programme for 
Commodities created in virtue of the Resolution 93 ClV) of UNCTAD-— has aimed at 
ensuring financial resources for the setting up and the functioning of negotiated 
agreements between producers and consumers. It was thought that a common fund would 
be more economical than several individual, funds according to product, since the 
prices of these did not rise and fall at the same time. 
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B. INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
With reference to international trade the most unfavourable events for Latin 
America have been the drastic fall --unprecedented since the 1930s— in the prices 
of commodities; the growing protectionism of the centres within the framework of the 
new forms of managed trade and the disappointing result of the most recent 
international trade negotiations. 
Different factors have contributed to the collapse of the prices of the 
commodities exported by Latin America (over 32% excluding petroleum in 1980-1985). 
Firstly, in spite of the United States recovery in the two-year period 1983-1984 
the economic growth of the OECD countries in the first half of the 1980s was less 
than past trends —especially in industry— and it is well known that fluctuations 
in commodity prices are always more marked than those in the economic growth of the 
centres. Secondly, technological changes and new- consumption patterns have further 
reduced the product elasticity of the demand in the central countries for certain 
industrial inputs (steel, copper, etc.) and the income elasticity of demand for 
certain foodstuffs (cane sugar, for example). Thirdly, the agricultural protectionism 
of the United States and the EEC not only contributed to the fall in imports of 
agricultural products by the OECD, but also to the increase in the supply of products 
which compete with those of Latin America in other markets. Fourthly, the rise in 
interest rates on the one hand increased the cost of maintaining big stocks of basic 
commodities, while on the other it reduced the general economic growth prospects and 
hence discouraged expectations of a future rise in the prices of those commodities. 
Finally, the overvaluation of the dollar had a general prejudicial effect on the 
exports of commodities quoted in that currency, which lost competitiveness in the 
European and Japanese markets. This list is not, of course, exhaustive, but it 
includes some of the main factors which, have affected international commodity prices. 
At the same time, and in the field of market structures, the producers and 
exporters of commodities face very powerful monopsonies created under the wing of 
the integrated' structures of some transnational corporations in the productive 
sphere, or under that of the large transnational trading corporations, and this also 
helps to reduce their negotiating power. 
This set of factors has worked against the developing countries in the process 
of North-South negotiations. At the sixth meeting of UNCTAD (Belgrade 1983) it was 
agreed to request the Permanent Subcommittee on Commodities to undertake new studies 
on their processing, marketing and distribution. The results of the meeting of the 
Permanent Subcommittee held in January, 1985, gave rise to such serious differences 
of opinion between the delegations of the North and South that the Subcommittee was 
not able to reach any positive or constructive conclusions. 
The experience of - several regional associations of producers and exporters 
of primary products highlights the failure to overcome the chronic problems of 
excessive supply and the consequent instability of prices. These supply problems 
have been intensified by the devaluations made by some developing countries to 
increase their exports, which generated disproportionate increases in production 
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in relation to the potential markets available. As regards co-operation and 
concertation among Latin American producers and exporters, there is an extensive 
potential field of action which should be explored and utilized, in order to 
counteract the growing influence of transnational corporations in this sphere and 
to avoid the crises that are being created by the excess of supply. 
The second, aspect worthy of special consideration concerns the protectionism 
and export subsidies of the centres, within the framework of the increasingly managed 
forms of international trade. The available indicators show that this problem has 
intensified throughout the 1980s. The proliferation of compensated trade as a 
result of the trade imbalances and scarcity of dollars is another important element 
of this new style. The marked macro—economic disequilibria of important countries 
of the OECD, especially those of the great power issuing the main reserve currency, 
have in recent times exacerbated trading frictions and protectionist pressures. 
This new- atmosphere prevailing in international trade relations has also 
affected the application of the Generalized System of Preferences for the main 
trading customers of Latin America, a subject which is treated, at greater length 
in section J of this chapter. Generally speaking the System has maintained or 
increased the pre-existing mechanisms of graduation and supervision. At the same 
time a recent proposal put forward by well-known personalities 2/ with a view to the 
next round of GATT would suggest that the preferential treatment in favour of 
developing countries has helped to diminish the functioning of the General Agreement, 
which indirectly casts doubt upon the legitimacy, and even the existence itself, of 
the Generalized System of Preferences. 
The search for new formulas of trade agreements which will avoid further damage, 
and signify a return to multilateral co^-operation, is reflected in the efforts to 
bring about a new round of negotiations within the framework of GATT. Meanwhile 
there is a persistence or aggravation of the trading problems in sectors which are 
Strategic for the Latin American economies, such as steel, copper, tin, clothing, 
and footwear, and also in others of more, advanced technology which affect the 
largest Latin American countries. These problems reflect in their deep structural 
roots both the resistance to an adequate industrial reconversion in the centres on 
the part of entrepreneurs and workers engaged in obsolete activities of decreasing 
productivity, and the struggle to obtain new markets for the development of the more 
advanced technologies. 
With regard to the future of the GATT negotiations, the developing countries 
have conditioned their participation in a new round on the complete fulfilment of 
the commitments previously undertaken by the centres in their favour,3/ especially 
those deriving from the Ministerial Meeting of GATT held in 1982. The developing 
countries —including those of Latin America—- are opposed to the inclusion of the 
subject of services on the agenda of a new round of negotiations. They have 
underlined, besides, that the negotiations should include not only manufactured and 
semi-manufactured products, but also natural and agricultural resources, and should 
cover both tariff and non-tariff barriers. These views were expressed and presented 
at the meeting of the GATT Council held in June 1985 by a group of developing 
countries which included —on the Latin American side— Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, 
Cuba, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Peru and Uruguay. 
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The Regional Programme of Action 4/ laid great emphasis on the expansion of 
Latin America's negotiating power, especially through joint measures based on the 
purchasing power of the manufactures of the region. In this Programme ratification 
was given to the proposal that common action agreed upon within SELA and the various 
groups of Latin American representatives at the appropriate forums should be applied 
vis-a-vis protectionist measures affecting regional exports of commodities.5/ The 
Programme also mentions different measures designed to give additional value to 
commodities in the different phases of their processing and marketing. Reference 
has already been made to the scant success of regional negotiations and proposals 
with regard to these primary products, With respect to measures of symmetrical 
action, after Decision 44 of the Latin American Council of SELA,6/ these were 
ratified subsequently but no substantial progress was made nor joint action carried 
out on the subject. 
It should be noted, however, that in the matter of joint Latin American action 
and in view of the seriousness of the present crisis, ECLAC and SELA, on the 
initiative of the President of Ecuador, prepared a study to serve as a basis for the 
adoption of practical measures to.tackle the existing crisis. This initiative, 
which received broad political support, culminated in the Latin American Economic 
Conference, held in January 1984, on which occasion the Quito Declaration and Plan 
of Action were approved. The subjects dealt with there concern Latin American 
economic co-operation and the need to undertake joint and concerted action in the 
negotiations of Latin America with the developed countries. This Conference gave 
rise later to successive informal meetings of Latin American Presidents (Montevideo, 
Lima, etc.) at which consideration of the burning problems of the crisis was 
continued. 
Moreover, in response to mandates explicitly formulated by the member 
governments of ECLAC in the Regional Programme of Action for Latin America in the 
1980s, the Secretariat of the Commission is concluding studies on the mechanisms of 
regional defence and negotiation in face of the protectionism of the centres, and 
on the way in which to advance towards raising the value of the commodities exported 
by the region. 
C. EXTERNAL DEBT, FINANCING AND OTHER MONETARY PROBLEMS 
The economic crisis of the 1980s not only dramatically intensified regional 
indebtedness but also changed the direction of the financial and capital flows, 
converting the region into a net exporter of capital. Factors directly affecting 
this change were the brusque paralyzation of bank, credits, the reduction of the 
flows of foreign investment and the flight of capital. 
The flow of net bank credits to the region, which in 1982 amounted to 
US$ 11.4 billion, fell practically to half in the following year, and became negative 
in 1984 and the first half of 1985. In contrast, payments of interest and profits 
to the exterior remained fluctuating closely around an average of US$ 36 billion 
per year throughout the whole period for the countries of the region as a whole. 
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The inflow of foreign investment into Latin America also suffered a drastic 
fall from 1982 onwards. The figures available show that, from an average of 
US$ 5.2 billion between 1977 and 1982, foreign investment fell to half in 1983 and 
1984. 
The flight of capital likewise seems to show-major increases. The indirect 
estimates that can be made through using the "errors and omissions" figures of the 
balance of payments and the.discrepancies between the values of imports and exports 
at the international level point clearly in this direction. 
The elements responsible for setting off this situation are to be found in the 
functioning of the international monetary and financial system itself, specifically 
in the lack of symmetry in the process of adjustment. In fact, once the global 
disequilibrium had been created, especially through problems of economic policy in 
the large centres, the obligation to adjust that was imposed on the rest of the 
countries led to drastic policies which affected the confidence of the creditor 
institutions and investors of the private sector, along with that of the citizens 
of the debtor countries themselves. 
In particular, it is common knowledge that the commercial banks, acting in 
concert, played a procyclical role which accentuated the external imbalances of the 
debtor countries in our region. The domestic adjustment policies applied in 
reaction to these imbalances affected the. stability of numerous enterprises and 
induced them to diversify their risk and finally to deposit in the exterior, through 
official and unofficial channels, a considerable proportion of their resources. 
As a result of all this, the Latin American countries have become involuntary 
net suppliers of resources to the external financial sector in an amount which., 
since 1982, has come to US$ 106 billion. In this period the net inflow of capital 
in respect of credits and direct investments was not sufficient to finance even 
30% of the net payments of interest and profits, whereas in the seven preceding 
years the net inflow- of capital was practically double the payments in respect of 
profits and interest (191%). 
In view of the seriousness of this situation, the Latin American countries 
have held numerous meetings and formulated a set of proposals and declarations in 
different regional fora that it would take too long to enumerate here. Outstanding 
among these is the above-mentioned. Latin American Economic Conference at Quito. 
Following the Declaration and Plan of Action issued at this Conference, the Latin 
American countries, disturbed by the future projections of the debt crisis, adopted 
what'is known as the Cartagena Consensus. On that occasion procedures of 
co-operation were established on the subject of reciprocal information, along with 
a programme of meetings which are being co-ordinated by a temporary secretariat. 
These meetings are convened at ministerial level and are attended by secretaries 
of state, foreign affairs, finance and economy. 
The initiative recently announced, by the Secretary of the Treasury of the 
United States, for its part, has the merit of acknowledging the importance of growth 
and the need for action on the part of creditors to tackle the debt problem. However, 
the amounts announced are not sufficient to reconcile debt servicing with economic 
growth, and the proposal also implies additional elements of conditionality. 
/The problem 
- 102 -
The problem of the Latin American external sector has two basic roots: on 
the one hand, the volume and prices of exports and, on the other, the international 
interest rates. While trade remains depressed and interest rates remain high there 
can be no reasonable solution to the financial problem of the external sector. The 
degree of compression of the domestic economy needed to achieve the required 
economic adjustment would not appear to be. sustainable for long. 
Moreover, this situation generates a vicious circle; unless trade improves 
and interest rates fall there will be no encouragement for the international 
commercial banks to maintain a normal flow of loans to the debtor countries, whereas 
it will be impossible for the latter to fulfil their debt-servicing commitments on 
the terms originally agreed, which would discourage still further the private 
creditors. There is here a clear link between trade and the financing needed to 
enable the vicious circle to be broken, and this will certainly become the central 
theme of the negotiations at international level. 
Equally important for the debtor countries is a reduction in interest payments. 
This might be achieved through a reduction in interest rates in the world market. 
Such a reduction should not depend, however, on substantial progress in the reduction 
of the fiscal deficit and the orderly management of monetary policy in the developed 
countries. Hence there have been proposals for the reduction of interest payments 
even within the present framework of economic policies. 
Among these options there have been fairly frequent references to automatic 
capitalization, refinancing —voluntary or involuntary^— and the partial reconversion 
of the debt. 
Calls for this type of solution have been appearing —it must be repeated— 
because the growth rates of the world economy are absolutely insufficient to create 
a natural way out of the debt problem. The most important international agencies 
coincide in predicting that the growth of the world economy will be relatively weak 
and in no case sufficient to ensure per se appropriate growth rates for exports and 
their prices. The estimates of some experts, which mentioned the figure of a 3% 
growth in the world economy as the minimum for the automatic solution of the problem 
of the debt, have been clearly discredited by the results of this economy in 1985. 
The results appear to indicate that the growth, rate would have to be over 4% in 
order to provide a solution to the debt problem. 7/ Rates of this magnitude are not 
expected in the near future. 
Furthermore, even if this dynamization were really to occur — a development 
which is hoped-for but unlikely— the probability of a new debilitation of the world 
economy would always be present, manifesting the lack of stabilizing mechanisms which 
would reduce the effects of the restrictive policies of the industrial countries on 
the external sector of the debtor developing countries. In view of the level -of the 
external debt contracted at a floating rate, the changes in the interest rates cause 
heavy repercussions on the external equilibrium of these countries. These 
unpredictable adverse effects originate in policy measures adopted to suit the needs 
and interests of the international financial centres. 
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One way of maintaining sufficient freedom in the management of the economic 
policy of these centres would be to set up automatic stabilizing mechanisms in the 
international financial system to cushion the effect of the variations in the 
interest rates on the debtor developing countries. These mechanisms may consist 
of special services, similar to the compensatory financing facility of the IMF, 
to mitigate the effects of the fall in export prices, or of automatic mechanisms to 
capitalize interest commitments over certain limits. 
Within the general panorama of external financing in Latin America, the 
multilateral agencies must play an increasingly important role, since credit from 
private sources is expected to be very weak for a prolonged period. For this reason 
the increases of capital from the World Bank and the XDB, along with other sources 
of funds to which these agencies may have access, become a subject of priority 
importance. Equally crucial are the conditions on which the loans of these agencies 
are granted. 
D. ENERGY 
The main aspects of the world economic trend, which have impinged on the field 
of energy in the 1980s have been the decline in oil prices and the loss of dynamism 
in the world economy. 
These two factors largely explain the principal movements in the world energy 
markets since 1980: the relaxation of the pressure which expenditure on petroleum 
exercised on the trade balance of the importing countries;^/ major advances in 
efficiency, reflected in the marked fall in energy inputs per unit of product in 
real terms, especially in the developed economies; the sluggish evolution of world 
trade in petroleum and energy-related equipment; low rates of investment in 
industries associated with energy and natural resources; the heavy burden, for the 
developing countries, of the current financing of investment projects in technology 
and natural resources which were conceived and initiated in the 1970s and early 
1980s.; and — i n the framework of the present critical conditions— the growing 
difficulty of obtaining external finance specifically earmarked for such purposes. 
Two central aspects of the present energy market relate to the emergence of 
new suppliers of petroleum —Mexico, Norway, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union— 
outside the OPEC framework, and the rise of alternative sources of energy, including 
fuels not derived from petroleum.8/ In the short and medium term the first aspect 
has particular importance. The incorporation of new suppliers outside OPEC obviously 
reduces the capacity of the latter organization to fix the prices of crude. OPEC has 
reacted by fixing maximum levels of production for its members, implanting a system 
of control and verification of production,exports and prices, and establishing a 
new structure of prices and price margins. Nonetheless, these measures have been 
offset by the sluggish growth of demand for petroleum; by the existence of a typical 
buyers' market; by the overvaluation —recently mitigated— of the dollar in relation 
to the other reserve hard currencies, and by the unilateral action of some non-OPEC 
producers. 
y This relief, however, was significantly offset in those countries which, 
to promote their export revenues, devalued their currencies in relation to the dollar. 
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With regard to the rise of new sources, of energy, the magnitude and extent of 
their effects will only become known, in the long term. In what remains of the present 
decade, the price of petroleum will largely depend on the capacity for internal 
concertation displayed by OPEC and on the interests and elements of power that affect 
the relations of this organization both with producers outside OPEC and with the 
large transnational corporations which are at the same time oil producers and 
intermediaries. 
E. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE 
1. Evaluation 
Between 1980 and 1984 the gross regional production in food and agriculture has 
not progressed in relation to the objective of achieving an expansion of 4.4% per year 
postulated in the regional agricultural programme; on the contrary, it has lost ground, 
increasing barely 2.0% per year. The deterioration is even more serious if one 
considers that nine countries in the region recorded negative rates. In these 
circumstances, the contribution of national production to the per capita food supply 
in several countries of the region has recorded only negligible increases and in 
others, particularly in those in which these supplies were already meagre, the 
decline in the per capita supply of food was felt even more severely. Since no 
progress has been made in the region towards the establishment of an adequate system 
of food reserves or in putting into practice an efficient regional information and 
warning system, and there has been a fall in food imports, nutritional insecurity 
has intensified. 
Capital formation in regional agriculture as a whole, and in its individual 
components, has diminished since the beginning of the decade, as a result of the 
repercussions of the adjustment programmes and the ensuing contraction of credit and 
public expenditure destined for agriculture. At the same time there has been a 
reduction in external financial assistance because more rigorous conditions were 
applied to the official commitments with agriculture, whose component and 
concessionary conditions fell considerably, and because of the delay in the 
disbursements in respect of the commitments. There was also a decline in commitments 
of foreign assistance for the supply of fertilizers, pesticides and seeds and for 
aid in the form of fertilizers. 
The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) has prepared various 
criteria for co-operation with governments in the solution of the numerous and 
serious problems of rural poverty and hunger. Since the early 1980s it has approved 
loans to finance 24 projects in 20 countries of the region, designed to increase small 
farmers' output. 
Agricultural research in the region remains very backward as compared with that 
of the developed countries, both in absolute and in relative terms. Some progress 
has been made, but there is still a great deal to do, particularly in the 
orientation of international research resources towards crops and ecological 




The importance of international trade for the achievement of national and 
regional food security has been manifest in recent years, but its utilization for 
this purpose has been restricted by the scarcity of foreign exchange confronting 
the countries. After their drastic reduction in 1982 and 1983, regional food imports 
grew by 4.6% in 1984 owing to the increased purchases of wheat, dairy products and 
meat; those of oilseeds remained relatively low-. 
The recessive features of international trade have had highly adverse effects 
on markets, prices and even on the functioning of international agreements on major 
commodities. Added to this there are the consequences of the protectionism applied 
in recent years by the developed countries and the ensuing arbitrary disorganization 
of trade movements, which, taken together, have changed the linkages with 
traditionally important markets for the agricultural exports of the region. The 
case of beef is an example of this. 
In these latter years, the concertation of common positions and the utilization 
of the region'.s capacity to react have been concentrated on the renegotiation of the 
external debt and the consideration of the more critical conjunctural situations. 
It is to be hoped that both approaches will soon be centred on regional food security, 
in which an important role must be played by intra-Latin American co-operation. 
2. Policies 
The early years of the 1980s have been a particularly unfavourable period as 
regards international co-operation received by the countries of the region in the 
area of food and agriculture; nor have they been propitious for the negotiation of 
international commodity agreements to ensure greater stability in the world markets 
of food and agricultural products. In general, the drastic fall in many 
international prices of products in the early years of the decade, coupled with the 
volatile instability of prices, have confused both consumers and producers as 
regards the world market and have increased uncertainty respecting the appropriate 
levels at which these prices should be stabilized and the correct adjustment of 
production and consumption. 
The hardening of competition among exporters for markets in this period in 
which the demand for imports has been generally depressed and the forms of utilization 
of exportable surpluses have changed in the world has aggravated the difficulties 
faced by international efforts to stabilize the markets and to introduce appropriate 
adjustments in national policies. There has been at the same time an apparent trend 
towards greater polarization of political opinions regarding the degrees of 
intervention in the functioning of the international commodity markets. 
The negotiations to conclude a new- International Sugar Agreement failed in 
1983/1984, mainly owing to the. incapacity of the large exporting countries to reach 
a consensus on the distribution of the market among themselves in order to establish 
reference export availabilities. The successive attempts made in 1984 and 1985 to 
negotiate a new International Cocoa Agreement could not overcome the differences 
between producers and consumers as to the economic dispositions —the key to the 
price range— their analysis and annual review-and the forms and dimensions of the 
supplementary plan for the formation and retention of stocks. The International 
Coffee Agreement concluded in 1983 is now being applied and decisions have been 
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taken regarding prices, export quotas for the 1984/1985 and 1985/1986 harvests, 
new regulations, for declaring shortages and other operational matters for 1985. 
The International Agreement on Dairy Products concluded under GATT has run into 
difficulties in trying to ensure that the minimum prices agreed for dairy 
subproducts were respected in 1984 and 1985. The UNCTAD Integrated Programme for 
Commodities has been virtually at a standstill during recent years, except in the 
negotiations on jute and tropical timber. 
No consensus has been reached on the renewal of negotiations for a new 
International Wheat Agreement containing economic clauses. There has still been 
no application of the Agreement to create a Common Fund for Commodities, whose 
First Account is expected to help to stabilize the international markets. In June. 
1985 the Agreement had been ratified by 85 countries out of the necessary minimum 
of 90, but they represent barely 51% of the directly paid-up capital, as against 
the total of two-thirds needed. 
The increased food insecurity affecting the region, particularly in 1982 and 
1983, was partly due to problems outside the food and agricultural sector, 
especially monetary and energy problems. It has become manifest that food security 
cannot be regarded as linked almost exclusively to agriculture; there are many 
complex issues involved, particulary in the countries which are heavily dependent 
on food imports. For these assistance in respect of food may come to have as much 
importance as that relating to fuels or capital. It must be recognized, at the same 
time, that the different objectives and effects of the various categories of food 
assistance—for programmes, projects and emergency situations— may come to be 
important contributions to the development process, always provided that an 
appropriate policy framework is established for the effective distribution of 
this assistance and that this ..is linked with global development policies, plans and 
programmes in the countries that receive it. 
3. Reactivation and reorientation of international co-operation 
The difficulties relating to the negotiation and application of commodity 
agreements are due in part to the instability and uncertainty of the market situation 
which they are attempting to stabilize and in part to the fact that attempts have 
been made to remedy the symptoms instead of attacking the causes of the fluctuations 
in supply and the disequilibrium of the. market. The dispositions and arrangements 
that are made may soften the short-term fluctuations of supplies and prices but they 
cannot be expected to counteract the long-term structural imbalances between supply 
and demand, which are attributable to the failure of the national policies designed 
to stimulate adjustments between food production and consumption. It seems essential 
that international agreements should give more importance to external assistance and 
to national policies, instead of concentrating on prices and volumes, through which 
they hope to reconcile the varied expectations and aspirations and conflicting 
interests of the countries taking part. 
International commodity agreements combined with national policies directed to 
adjustment may make an appreciable contribution to world and regional food security. 
To support the measures which the countries of the region may adopt in this regard 
it is essential that the developed countries should substantially increase their 
financial aid to agriculture, both bilateral and multilateral, so that it may be 
possible to give timely assistance to the increased need for investment on the part 
of Latin American agriculture. /The well-known 
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The well-known asymmetry of; Latin America's form of insertion in the 
international economy must be progressively reduced, so that agricultural products 
may be exported which, have a more elastic international demand in the world markets 
and which are also capable of incorporating a greater added value. 
F. THE INFLUENCE OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN THE REGION 
Throughout the 1980s the influence of transnational corporations — i n the 
broadest and most far-reaching sense of the term-'- over the Latin American economies 
was apparent in three main fields. 
Firstly, in connection with that feature which has in the past been the 
favorite subject of most reports on.this question, and which is linked to the 
location or expansion of such, enterprises in Latin American territory, the accrued 
value of direct foreign investment in Latin America reached approximately US$ 60 
billion at the end of 1984, and had been at this level in nominal terms since 1981. 
Direct foreign investment from the United States represented slightly more than half 
the total and was in excess of TJS$ 30 billion. 
Between 1976 and 1981 direct foreign investment grew steadily, reaching 
US$ 7.5 billion in the latter year. Nevertheless, in following years a sharp drop 
occurred, and investment was barely more than one-third of that amount in 1983. In 
this respect, and if the imbalances on the region's external accounts are borne in 
mind, direct foreign investment, contrary to what is generally assumed, has been 
procyclical rather than anticyclical. 
Latin America's share of the accrued direct foreign investment made by the 
central countries in developing countries continues to represent more than half the 
total. 
In 1983, however, Asia for the first time received a greater flow of invest-
ment than Latin America, whose share of investment fell to 35%.9/ 
Estimates made at the end of the 1970s had assumed that the product generated 
by these enterprises was around 8% of the region's gross domestic product, but in the 
industrial sector this proportion fluctuated between 20 and 25%. Some provisional data 
indicate that so far these percentages have tended to decline in the 1980s. Similarly, 
the share of transnational enterprises in Latin America's external trade represented 
around 25% of the total, yet their contribution to the trade balance was negative, as 
their exports did not generate sufficient foreign currency to cover their own imports. 
Unfortunately, more up-to-date information on the 1980s which would make it possible 
to assess how these features have evolved is not available. 
It is perhaps worth pointing out that in 1983 the share of accumulated direct 
foreign investment, as a percentage of total external liabilities (defined as the 
sum of direct external investment plus the external debt) was as follows for the 
countries shown: Argentina, 11.6%; Brazil, 21,8%; Colombia, 19.5%; Chile, 17.5%; 
Mexico, 13.2%; Peru, 16.8%; and Venezuela, 10.9%. As can be seen, in none of the 
countries indicated —which, with the. exception of Colombia, are affected by serious 
indebtedness— did the contribution of direct investment exceed 25% of the total:10/ 




It should be pointed out that Brazil has received greater direct foreign 
investment than any other developing country in the world. At the end of 1983 
the amount was more than US$ 22 billion. The Latin American country which occupies 
second place as the recipient of this type of investment —Mexico—attained only 
half this amount. 
The regulations which govern the entry of direct foreign investment affect 
the percentages indicated. In Argentina investment in some sectors must have been 
previously approved by the government. These sectors include certain public 
services —communications, energy, financial and insurance institutions and in 
general any investment of this nature in excess of a certain amount. In Brazil, 
entry of such investment is not generally affected by restrictions, although strict 
control is exercised in certain fields, such as the production and marketing-ofmicro 
and mini computers, which are restricted to Brazilian firms. Nonetheless, such 
investment as well as the reinvestment of profits must be registered, to ensure 
control over the repatriation of capital and profits. In Mexico further flows of 
direct external investment into banking and insurance are prohibited. Furthermore, 
certain sectors —radio, television, public transport, forestry, etc.— are 
reserved for Mexican investors alone. Others, including petroleum, basic petro-
chemicals, electricity, nuclear energy, railways, telecommunications, etc., are the 
preserve of public investment. In any case, all direct foreign investment must be 
registered.11/ The regulation of the entry of private investment is a field where 
there is scope for concertation and agreements among the countries of the region. 
Secondly, another main area in which the influence of transnational 
corporations in the region is apparent is connected with external trade and in 
particular with the structuring of the markets for the basic commodities which Latin 
America exports. Generally speaking, and as a preliminary indication of the 
magnitudes involved, at the beginning of this decade the major trading companies 
controlled approximately 70% or 80% of total world trade in basic commodities, which 
then represented US$ 980 billion. This figure includes US$ 230 billion out of the 
total of US$ 306 billion of crude petroleum exports controlled by the major world 
producers and distributors of the product, and approximately US$ 500 billion of the 
US$ 670 billion corresponding to the other basic commodities, controlled by trading 
companies dealing with a number of products and by the trading subsidiaries of 
transnational indus trial corporations.12/ 
Moreover, data relating to 1981 for United States imports made through 
affiliated enterprises, which are those firms in which 5% or more of voting shares 
belong to the company with which they deal, reveal that more than half of the United 
States imports from Latin America fell into this category. Analysis of United States 
trade carried on through affiliated enterprises would seem to indicate that the 
degree of trade within a single firm shows a tendency to increase in accordance 
with the degree of processing of the product. 
In the light of these facts, the possibility of setting up Latin American 
trading companies — o r of extending the scope of those which already exist— would 
appear to be fully justifiable, above all if they diversify the range of their 
tradeable products. Such initiatives could strengthen regional negotiating power 
vis-à-vis transnational corporations, develop joint activities, increase reciprocal 
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information (particularly in the field of harmonization and standardization of 
trading contracts), more efficiently control restrictive trading practices, attempt 
to reach users and consumers in the centres in a more direct manner, and, in short, 
pursue various kinds of concerted and co-operative action at the regional level. 
The third area in which the influence of transnational corporations in the 
region is apparent is related to the private transnational creditor banks. This 
feature was examined in section C with special reference to the procyclical role 
played by these banks in the crisis of the 1980s. The negotiating power of these 
banks, and their recent behaviour at the various meetings held to negotiate the 
Latin American debt, has been the subject of a variety of studies and observations, 
whose broad dissemination makes it unnecessary to examine the theme in greater 
detail in this section. 
G. TECHNOLOGY 
Governments are intensifying their efforts to develop technological policies in 
keeping with the lines of their development policy. Nonetheless, activities aimed 
at technological development have so far continued to receive very little attention. 
When the present crisis broke out, the countries in the region had an annual 
expenditure on science and technology of between US$ 2.5 and US $ 3 billion, 
equivalent to approximately 0.3% of the regional product; almost half these funds 
corresponded to Brazil. The restrictions on resources as a result of adjustments 
to face the crisis has no doubt contributed to a further contraction in these 
investments. These efforts in the field of research and development are far 
inferior to those made by developed countries of similar size. 
Information on small European countries suggests that while the number of 
inhabitants may be comparable, the per capita levels of expenditure are far lower 
in Latin America and are comparable (as also is the expenditure on science and 
technology as a proportion of the gross domestic product) with those of Spain, 
Portugal and Greece, which the OECD classifies as countries assigning "low priority 
to research and development". In absolute terms Latin American expenditure would 
appear to be of a similar level to that of Canada or Italy. 
The shortage of investment resources brought about by the crisis and the net 
transfers of resources abroad mean that technical progress represents an opening of 
even greater strategic importance than before, which the countries of the region 
could use to diminish the enormous distance separating them from other countries as 
regards development and to improve their standards of living. Although it is urgent 
to make progress in this direction, there has nevertheless been a weakening of the 
traditional sources of technology: direct foreign investors are more reluctant to 
invest in the region; imports of capital goods and technology encounter the 
constraints imposed by the external adjustment; and the already-mentioned low level 
of expenditure on science and technology considerably restricts the development of 
local technological capacity. 
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Capital goods supply and demand in Latin America have certain features which 
it is impossible to ignore —in the light of the present crisis— in the future 
programming of regional technological policy. A high proportion of regional demand 
originates from sectors in which there is only a small number of potential 
purchasers. This is particularly so in the mining, petroleum extraction, electrical 
energy, petrochemicals, refineries, steel-making, pulp and paper, railways and air 
and sea transport sectors. These represent no less than one-third of total regional 
demand for equipment. The concentration of demand for equipment among a small number 
of purchasers, who are generally easy to identify, gives particular interest to the 
economic sectors mentioned. Moreover, in many cases the main purchasers are State 
enterprises. The technology employed in the manufacture of a considerable proportion 
of the equipment required by these sectors is not over-complex, and mainly involves 
boiler-making, structural engineering and other relatively routine mechanical 
processes. The three largest countries in the region, as well as all the medium-
sized and some of the small countries, possess installed manufacturing capacity 
which would enable them to satisfy the above-mentioned demand on a local basis. 
Nevertheless, mainly as a result of the lack of explicit policies and support 
mechanisms for domestic sales, almost all the requirements of the medium-sized and 
small countries are satisfied by extra-regional purchases, a fact which is also 
true of the larger countries, although to a lesser degree. This behaviour pattern 
militates, albeit indirectly, against the region's technological progress. 
In order to solve this problem it is essential to apply strategies which 
favour the development in each country of scientific and technological capacity of 
an international level, in areas which have been chosen on the basis of the desire 
to take advantage of local resources and of the possibilities for complementation 
and the generation of external economies within a climate encouraging creativity. 
It is also necessary to conceive sustained technological policies which attempt to 
bring down as far as possible the costs of research and development activities by 
making optimum use of resources —within suitable lead times— and which actively 
promote the application of know-how and technological progress to productive 
activities. It is necessary to give priority to the development and consolidation 
of those technological resources (human, institutional, infrastructural and linked 
to information processing) which interact in fields in which there is a broad 
spectrum of applications, and of technologies which can be widely disseminated or 
which offer multiple possibilities for endogenous complementation and dynamization. 
It is also necessary to explore to the utmost the possibilities of regional 
complementation for undertaking joint projects and maintaining research and 
development networks whose combined dimensions and capacity are sufficient to achieve 
levels of excellence. 
Before the crisis broke out, the most technologically advanced countries in 
the region had already demonstrated their capacity to compete, in certain items, 
with imported technology from the central countries. This was reflected in certain 
technological choices made in relation to supplies for their domestic markets and, 
in particular, in the export of engineering services and >of turn-key plants to 
other countries in the region. The present harsh circumstances have undoubtedly 
affected the dynamism of such trends, which could be strengthened by the application 




The technological policies of the countries of the region must face a 
permanent challenge: that of the need to combine the promotion and development of 
suitable technology with the achievement of levels of excellence in technological 
resources and the adoption of techniques which ensure adequate levels of inter-
national competitiveness. This challenge is made doubly hard to meet in the present 
critical phase by the shortage of capital, the limited import capacity and the 
urgent need to improve the worsened standards of living and to satisfy basic needs 
which have been neglected. In such circumstances, it may be more appropriate to 
adopt technologies which make less intensive use of capital and more intensive use 
of labour and local resources, as well as being better adapted to the satisfactory 
functioning of the ecosystems, lending themselves to smaller scales of production, 
and leading to the manufacture of products whose characteristics are more appropriate 
as regards the redirection of domestic demand and the reduction of external 
vulnerability. Moreover, in order to make optimum use of available resources so as 
to maximize the possibilities for improving the levels of well-being, it is in 
general necessary to adopt technologies which ensure adequate international 
competitive potential. Both features need to be analysed in a dynamic context, with 
particular attention to the development of human resources, the consolidation of 
technological and productive complementarity, and possible changes in the patterns 
of international specialization. The key strategy allowing these requirements to be 
combined would seem to lie in the development of first-rate technological resources, 
integrated into the productive apparatus by links capable of nurturing processes of 
endogenous dynamization, generating autonomous technological solutions, interacting 
with foreign technology, analysing the appropriateness of the options offered by 
the latter and, if necessary, competing with it. 
The need to base growth strategies on sound technological development faces 
many hurdles. To start with, investment resources (particularly public funds) for 
broadening support for research and development are scarce. Nevertheless, the 
consolidation of technological development capacity is so vital for redirecting 
socio-economic development in the countries of the region, that the provision of 
financial resources is a major social priority. In view of the high social cost of 
the resources and the magnitude of other areas of deprivation, however, it is vital 
that the resources devoted to scientific and technological development should be 
allocated in accordance with clear strategies, should concentrate on activities whose 
foreseeable social yield is high, and should maximize the possibilities of 
complementation betwen scientific and technological activities as well as between 
these and the productive apparatus. 
In order to carry out strategies which favour both the concentration of 
technological resources and the dissemination of creativity, it is necessary to 
strengthen and at the same time give greater flexibility to the scientific and 
technological structure, transcending the specific interests of the professional 
groups. Rapid progress is required in both areas. 
In spite of the considerable expansion of post—secondary education, an 
appreciable number of shortcomings still remain regarding the training of human 
resources of key importance for technological development, particularly in those 
areas in which technical progress is most dynamic and in which there is the greatest 
lack of integration between the available supply of technology and the requirements 
of the productive apparatus. 
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At all events, too little attention is paid to the technological dimension 
and to promoting the theme of creativity and national technological development 
throughout society. The conception of educational processes, the content of the 
mass media, official orientations and assessments of the various productive 
activities, and the performance of public enterprises and bodies themselves, reveal 
an insufficient and occasionally distorted awareness of the possibilities for 
developing local creativity and innovative capacity and of the advantages this may 
have for personal and societal development. 
In 1982, the fifth session of the United Nations Conference on an International 
Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology took place, yet little progress has 
been made and a number of questions remain unanswered relating to international 
transactions in respect of technology transfer, to almost all aspects of the 
regulation of practices and agreements involving technology transfer, to the 
settlement of differences and the applicable laws, as well as to the international 
institutional machinery. It will be difficult to go beyond the declarations already 
agreed upon unless determined joint action is taken by the developing countries to 
link negotiations over the Code with themes of interest to the developed countries, 
such as the GATT negotiations on the services trade. 
H. WORLD INDUSTRIAL REORGANIZATION 
The proposals made in the Regional Programme of Action for Latin America in 
the 1980s 13/ relating to this subject reflect the views and aspirations which 
existed towards the end of the 1970s: an expanding world economy, increasing 
importance of international trade, the likelihood of industrial redeployment from 
the developed countries towards the developing ones in those activities in which 
the former were aware of losing their comparative advantages, and finally the real 
possibility of achieving a favourable consensus on the optimum and rational 
allocation of industrial production in the world. 
The events which occurred during the first half of the present decade have 
made it necessary to alter the views and consequently the aspirations in question. 
Factors which converge in this direction are the lower expectations as regards the 
rate of growth of the world economy; the possibility that sustained expansion of 
world trade will be interrupted for a number of years; the intense and systematic 
effort on the part of the developed countries to lessen their disadvantages in 
those sectors that make intensive use of labour and natural resources, which implies 
the reconversion and modernization of traditional industrial sectors rather than 
their redeployment towards the South; their simultaneous endeavours to create 
comparative advantages in those sectors which make intensive use of the most 
advanced technology; and, finally, the diversity of the external and domestic 
challenges which are facing Europe, the United States and Japan, and which affect 
the possibility of establishing an international consensus on the optimum and 
rational allocation of world production. 
Within this context the establishment of surveillance mechanisms allowing for 
the systematic monitoring of the changes under way in the central countries and of 
the new industrial and technological trends so as to assess their repercussions 
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upon the industrial and technological policy developed by the countries of Latin 
America is especially important. In this respects ECLAC and the United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization (UNIDQ) have jointly undertaken, in close 
collaboration with the governments of the region, a regional monitoring programme 
for industrial reorganization which covers both general and sectoral aspects of 
the process. 
It is worth emphasizing that in the North-South negotiations which have taken 
place in recent years, the theme of industry has been systematically absent and 
attention has been focused on energy, agriculture0 finance, and more recently 
services. Exclusion of the theme of industry is even more serious in so far as it 
is acknowledged to represent precisely that area of production which furthers 
technical progress and with which, for the same reason,, those sectoral activities 
which have been or are at present the subject of negotiation all tie in. The 
system of consultation on the industrial sector which has been promoted by UN1D0 
could, if suitably adapted, represent an efficient and constructive means for filling 
this want. 
With this outlook, impetus should be given to consultatory sectoral meetings 
at the regional level under the auspices of UNIDO, at which it would be possible to 
define positions that would later be set out at the relevent world-level meetings. 
Thus, for example, ECLAC and UNIBO convened a regional expert meetings, in 
preparation for the second world meeting on the capital goods industry, with special 
reference to energy-related technology and equipment. 
I. TRANSPORT 
In the international sphere, transport has been marked over the last five-year 
period by a generalized excess of credit for the purchase of equipments contrasting 
with insufficient resources for looking closely into the type of equipment needed, 
or even into whether other changes of a different kind would produce better results 
than would an increase in equipment. This holds equally true for the shipping 
owner who is considering acquiring additional tonnage, for the haulier who desires 
to purchase a new truck, for the airline interested in modernizing its fleet, and 
for the city which is seeking to increase the capacity of its subway. 
This problem is particularly serious in the case of sea transport, as there 
is a big excess of services together with a pronounced shortage of cargo. The 
origins of such a situation are to be found in the rises in the cost of oil which 
began in 1973, and whose consequences have led to deep and permanent structural 
changes in the volume and direction of trade flows at the worldwide level. It is 
well known that radical changes can occur in these flows within a period of only 
18 months, while a ship intended for a specific branch of transport has a useful 
life of up to 20 years. 
The structural changes have in turn given rise to a new setting as .regards 
legal measures, which is the result of action taken both by developing countries 
and by industrial countries and international organizations and which merits 
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careful study in order to assess its precise repercussions on the region's fleets. 
One aspect which must be investigated with particular care is connected with 
regulations concerning reserved cargo in the countries of Latin America an.d the 
Caribbean, and their effect upon the size of the fleets of these countries. 
Consideration could be given, for example, to the advisability of requiring any 
firm which wishes to benefit from the protection provided by the system of reserved 
cargo to fulfil certain minimum requirements regarding profitability, technology, 
tonnage, routes and frequencies of service. 
Another aspect of the problem concerns the relationship between maritime and 
land transport. Clearly, maritime transport can hardly serve the majority of its 
users without land links between the wharf and the point of origin or final 
destination of the cargo. The structural changes mentioned have also affected 
land transport, which is one of the key elements in the chain of distribution, and 
in many cases have made it possible to improve levels of efficiency and to achieve 
remarkable reductions in costs. It is to be expected that in many countries in the 
region it will be in the interest of major shipping consortia to promote the 
installation of the land-based infrastructure necessary for taking full advantage 
of these technologies, as well as to work to bring about the corresponding legal 
changes. Although the countries might share the resulting benefits, these technolo-
gies may represent huge investments which not all are capable of bearing, and the 
legal changes could have unfavourable political and social repercussions, so that 
it is necessary to carefully examine the options available. 
Factors similar to those mentioned have had considerable incidence on air 
transport over the last five years. Finance has been readily available for the 
purchase of new aircraft, and far-reaching technological and legal changes have 
taken place. The introduction of a new generation of aircraft and other equipment 
with low fuel consumption has made it possible to achieve significant savings in 
operating costs. Moreover, the abolition of a variety of provisions applying to 
air transport in the United States, as well as the widespread liberalization of 
regulations in other countries, has sparked off sharp competition reflected in the 
establishment of exceptionally low special tariffs which have led to increases in 
tourist traffic, with extremely satisfactory consequences for the income of some 
countries for which the tourist industry is a major source of foreign currency. 
Many airlines in developing countries are experiencing their cwm crisis 
caused by the joint decline in traffic and tariffs, which prevents them from 
acquiring more efficient new equipment. In some cases, freight transport is also 
affected, as the decline in imports may lead to disequilibria in traffic with 
unfavourable effects on the export of perishable goods by air. An objective source 
of technical assistance, in no way tied to the sale of equipment, should be made 
available as soon as possible so as to provide help in reorganizing an industry 
which in some countries is in a precarious position. 
Urban transport is another field in which an excess of credit is available 
for equipment. In the past, this sector has been largely dependent on the transfer 
of technology from the industrialized countries. For this reason, their transport 
systems have been imitated in many cities in the developing world, which possess 
networks of urban railways, motorways and automobile industries that are not. always 
the most suitable answers to the problems of mass passenger transport. 
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Although there are still supplies of credit for the purchase of urban 
transport equipment, the economic crisis in Latin America and the Caribbean 
restricts the funds available for paying such debts and for obtaining credit for 
setting up infrastructure. This fact has led to a slight change of focus towards 
solutions based on operational rationalization of the existing systems. Various 
international co-operation bodies in industrialized countries have launched 
programmes aimed at promoting the transfer of their experience in this field to 
developing countries, and at encouraging an increase in the exchange of ideas 
between the latter. In the immediate future not only must such exchanges be 
increased, but also exchanges between Latin America and the Caribbean and other 
regions facing the same situation, as the developing countries have considerable 
potential for producing original solutions to problems related to mass passenger 
transport. 
J. CO-OPERATION WITH DEVELOPED AREAS 
1. The United States 
Between 1980 and 1984 a number of important changes took place in trade 
relations between the countries of Latin America and the United States, affecting 
both the structure of reciprocal trade and the balance of export and import flows. 
After a period of relative stagnation in 1980-1982, Latin American exports to 
the United States increased in 1983 and even more in 1984. At the same time, 
Latin American imports from the United States declined considerably as from 1982. 
Consequently, Latin America, which had a trade deficit of US $ 6.6 billion with the 
United States in 1980 and of US$ 9.3 billion in 1981, earned surpluses of US$ 12 
billion in 1983 and US$ 15.1 billion in 1984. 
In recent years, while Latin American exports to the United States have grown, 
sales to the rest of the world have stagnated, as a result of which the United 
States has acquired even greater importance as the main country with which the 
region trades. In 1984 the North American market absorbed 39.4% of all Latin 
American exports, compared with 30.3% in 1980. 
Interesting changes have also been recorded in the structure of Latin 
American exports, with a reversal since 1982 of the trend towards an increase in 
the relative weight of fuels. In that year they represented 46% of all United States 
imports from Latin America, while in 1984 their share fell to 38%. At the same time, 
imports of manufactured goods from Latin America grew steadily, so that their value 
doubled between 1980 and 1984, while their share in total exports grew from 17.6% 
to 25.3%. 
Nonetheless, the changes mentioned and the favourable evolution in the 
structure of trade with the United States have not proved capable of making a 
sufficient contribution to the economic development of the countries of Latin 
America, which have been obliged to use their trade surpluses to service their 
external debt, while at the same time making drastic cuts in the imports needed to 
sustain the process of growth. 
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Generally speaking —and partly as a consequence of its growing trade deficit— 
the United States showed a tendency towards increased protectionism during the 
period under consideration, involving the application of various non-tariff 
restrictions to products exported by Latin America. These products have also 
frequently been the subject of anti-dumping investigations by the United States 
International Trade Commission. Furthermore, the bills of a protectionist nature at 
present being considered by the United States Congress threaten many Latin American 
countries with further tariff and non-tariff restrictions. 
The new United States Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), which was 
approved in 1984, covers more products than the previous system, but this extension 
has not been associated with increased flexibility of the system and, furthermore, 
a number of products exported by Latin American countries have been excluded. In 
spite of Latin American opposition, the principles of selectivity and graduation 
have been incorporated into the new GSP: a development which affects many countries 
in the region. The new system sets limits of competition, whereby the preference 
that a product enjoys is lost if the shipments of the product in question in one 
calendar year exceed 50% of the value of total imports of this product purchased 
by the United States, or another pre-established value. In 1985, several countries 
in the region lost the advantages granted by the new system to some of their 
products. 
The present United States Administration has pursued a policy which runs 
counter to the concerted stabilization of international prices for basic 
commodities and has ceased to participate in multilateral attempts to prevent them 
from falling. Furthermore, the United States continues to resort to sales of part 
of its strategic reserves of some basic commodities: a measure which, in depressed 
market conditions, helps to destabilize their prices yet further. 
There is still a need to achieve greater liberalization of trade with the 
United States in order to facilitate access of Latin American products to the 
United States market beyond the favourable conjuncture which corresponded to the 
1983-1984 biennium. To this end it would be necessary to negotiate with the 
United States, in the relevant forums, for the elimination from the new GSP of the 
principle of graduation and of the competitive need clause, or at least to give 
it greater flexibility so as to reduce the restrictions affecting Latin American 
exports. 
Moreover, experience of the external debt crisis during the period under 
consideration has shown that a prerequisite for its solution is the joint 
negotiation of two features: trade and external debt, since an improvement in trade 
can only be turned to account for economic growth if it does not have to be used 
entirely to service the debt. 
2. European Economic Community (EEC) 
EEC imports from Latin America increased in 1980-1984 and the Latin American 
share in total extra-Community imports also grew, from 5.9% in 1980 to 6.2% in 1984. 
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EEC exports to Latin America have declined in recent years, as a result of 
which Latin America's share in total extra-Community exports fell from 6,5% in 1980 
to 3.6% in 1984. 
This evolution, which is directly linked to the adjustment policies pursued by 
Latin America since 1982, meant that the region's trade balance with the EEC became 
increasingly positive, reaching 10 612 million European Currency Units (ECU) V in 
1984, as compared with only ECU 1 822 million in 1980. This was the highest level 
since 1958. 
Nevertheless, there is considerable asymmetry in the type of goods which are 
traded between the two regions, and this situation has even tended to become more 
marked since 1980 as a result of the increased weight —around 80%— of raw 
materials in Latin American exports. This was principally due to the fact that the 
share of fuels in the composition of these exports increased from 16.7% in 1980 to 
26.3% in 1983. 
Approximately 90% of Latin American imports from the EEC are made up of a wide 
range of industrial products, especially machinery and transport equipment. 
Asymmetry has also persisted in the degree of relative importance of 
reciprocal trade; in 1982 trade with the EEC made up 16.9% of total Latin American 
trade, while for the Community, trade with the region did not exceed 5.2% of its 
extra-Community external trade, 
Latin America's share of the official development aid provided by the EEC 
member countries has declined. In no recent year has it equalled the 7% reached 
in 1976, and it even fell to 5.2% and 4.8% in 1981 and 1982 (US$ 660 and 580 
million, respectively). 
It is estimated that at present almost one-third of Latin America's external 
debt with banks involves economic agents residing within the EEC. It -may be noted 
that the structure of Community financing has altered, as the sources of credit have 
increasingly become private. 
At present the EEC has trade agreements with three Latin American countries: 
Uruguay (since 1973), Brazil (1974 and 1980) and Mexico (1975); an agreement which 
it is planned to renew on broader bases was. in force with Argentina between 1971 
and 1980. Towards the end of 1983 a co-operation agreement was drawn up between 
the EEC and the Andean Group. 
As far as Community policy on development aid, as set out in the Pisani 
Memorandum (1982),14/ is concerned, Latin America has only marginally benefited 
from these resources (with the exception of countries in the English-speaking 
Caribbean which are associate members of the Lome Convention), as it has never 
received more than 20% of the total aid budget. Towards the end of 1982, however, 
jV This is a European unit of account which floats against the dollar; in 1982 
one European Currency Unit was worth approximately one dollar,, while during the 1983-




the Council of Ministers approved 30 million European Currency Units of special aid 
for some countries in Central America and the Caribbean. 
In April 1984, the European Economic Community transmitted to the Council of 
Ministers a set of "guidelines for strengthening relations between the Community and 
Latin America",15/ which proposes strengthening these relations on three levels 
—national, subregional and regional— and sets out policy guidelines for trade, 
development, scientific and energy co-operation and finance. In connection with 
the latter, a proposal is made for financing projects through the European 
Investment Bank (EIB). Nevertheless, competition from the Iberian countries and 
the signatories of the Lome Convention for any resources which are potentially 
available makes it unlikely that this recommendation will be carried out. 
In September 1984, the Foreign Ministers of the member States of the EEC, 
of Spain and Portugal, of Central America, and of the Contadora Group, together 
with a representative of the EEC Commission, met in Costa Rica. This ministerial 
conference culminated with the adoption of a joint communiquS, agreeing on action 
to promote co-operation between Central America and the EEC. 
As far as the EEC's Common Agricultural Policy is concerned, both direct and 
indirect existing restrictions have been maintained, and disadvantageous regulations 
continue to apply to agricultural exports from Latin America to the Community. 
The reforms which the EEC made in its Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) 
in 1981, in order to correct some operational drawbacks which restricted its 
utilization, did not represent any further advantages for the Latin American 
beneficiary countries. The Commission's proposal to include four new agricultural 
products in the GSP for 1985 was rejected by the Council of Ministers. While all 
Latin American countries have enjoyed preferential treatment in the industrial 
sector, in 1985 the exports of six countries were adversely affected by quota 
limitations under regulations of the EEC's GSP: Brazil (17 products); Argentina and 
Mexico (2 products each); and Chile, Uruguay and Venezuela (one product each). As 
the EEC's GSP is practically the only trade instrument which provides some access 
facilities for Latin American exports, however, its evolution should be closely 
followed and efforts should be made to ensure that it is properly applied. 
As far as the Multifibre Agreement is concerned, during the second half of 
1983 seven countries in the region signed limitation agreements with the Community. 
Guatemala and Haiti signed flexible agreements, while Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, 
Peru and Uruguay had to accept the inclusion of anti-surge and anti—fraud clauses. 
It is interesting to note that these countries, attended the negotiations 
separately. 
During 1980-1982, four Latin American countries were accused of ''dumping" or 
of having granted subsidies: Brazil, on nine occasions, Venezuela on two, and 
Argentina and the Dominican Republic once each. Furthermore, some more recent 
steps taken by the EEC merely confirm the trend towards increasingly restrictive 
trade with unfavourable effects on export products of interest to Latin America. 
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The above remarks allow us to assume that the results achieved will be 
inadequate in terms of the objectives set out by the Regional Programme of Action 
for the 1980s. As considerable obstacles still remain in economic relations 
between the EEC and Latin America, it would be useful to seek new formulae which 
could prove more fruitful and prevent a further deterioration of these relations. 
In order to achieve this, it is first of all necessary for Latin America to 
increase its negotiating capacity by consolidating its own identity so as to be 
able to adopt joint approaches in policy design with respect to the EEC. 
Secondly, economic co-operation between Latin America and the Community needs 
to operate on the basis of complementation of efforts and resources, always 
following a two-way approach whereby the action of one region finds its counterpart 
in the action of the other. In this respect the basic task is to identify and 
mobilize those specific sectors in which it is possible to develop sustained 
co-operation based upon mutual and convergent interests. 
As a major supplier to the region of certain manufactures, capital goods and 
technologically advanced services, it is obviously in the Community's interest to 
increase its exports to Latin America, but this will only be achieved if Latin 
American products are accorded freer access to EEC markets, thus making it possible 
to generate the necessary foreign currency to sustain the level of imports from 
the Community. 
Moreover, both groups of countries have shown their interest in co-operation 
programmes in specific sectors, particularly in mining and energy, in view of the 
enormous mineral resources existing in Latin America and the substantial deficit 
which exists in these products in the countries of the Community. In this field 
it would be possible to develop considerable complementary activities in the phases 
of processing and manufacture of mineral products of interest tcr both regions, 
through joint projects or mixed enterprises. 
Finally, in negotiations with the Community, account should be taken of the 
interdependence between trade and financial, productive and technological aspects. 
3. Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) 
Between 1980 and 1984 trade between the countries of Eastern Europe belonging 
to CMEA and those of Latin America failed to grow, with the exception of trade with 
Nicaragua, and there was even a slight drop in total trade between the two areas. 
Nevertheless, in the period under review the amounts of trade fluctuated 
appreciably. In 1981 Latin American exports reached US$ 5.3 billion, principally 
reflecting the evolution of Soviet purchases of cereals from Argentina and Brazil, 
which have become the most important single factor in trade between the two areas. 
These two countries together account for 85% of all Latin American exports to 
CMEA countries, while the other 17 countries of the region considered (with the 
exception of Cuba) send approximately US$ 0.5 billion worth of exports to the seven 
European member countries of CMEA. Trade with CMEA is insignificant in terms of 
both volume and share of total trade for the countries of Latin America, with the 
exception of Argentina, Brazil and Nicaragua. 
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The trend followed by trade between 1980 and 1984 gives rise to some revision 
of previous assessments of the principal restrictions affecting the growth of trade 
between Latin America and the CMEA. The persistent disequilibria affecting trade 
flows (a pronounced deficit of the CMEA countries) and the structure of trade 
(Latin American exports of primary products and exports of manufactured goods by 
the CMEA) are of some importance for the countries concerned, but in most cases 
do not constitute insurmountable obstacles to the growth of reciprocal trade. 
Even in 1984, when Latin American exports to CMEA exceeded imports by 
US$ 2.5 billion, 90% of this surplus was generated by Argentina and Brazil, while 
the other Latin American countries recorded small surpluses or even deficits, as in 
the case of Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela. It should be noted that the CMEA 
countries' trade with Argentina and Brazil has prospered despite the deficits 
recorded, while trade with other Latin American countries remains at a low level. 
Nor does its asymmetrical composition constitute a serious obstacle to the 
growth of trade between the two areas, since despite their interest in promoting 
exports of manufactured goods, most Latin American countries would be prepared to 
increase sales of basic commodities to the CMEA countries. In the case of Brazil, 
which has an active export promotion policy, its exports of such goods already 
exceed its total imports from CMEA member countries. 
The real restrictions affecting the growth of trade between the Latin American 
countries and those of CMEA lie in the financial conditions prevailing in both 
areas, which lead them to tightly control their imports payable in hard currency. 
It should not be forgotten, either, that political will is an essential factor for the 
evolution of trade between Latin America and CMEA. 
As far as economic relations in activities other than trade are concerned, 
there has been a certain improvement in co-operation in industry and in the field 
of hydroelectricity, which has contributed to the process of industrialization in 
some countries in Latin America. This has taken place despite the difficulties 
arising mainly out of the distance between the two regions, as well as out of the 
problems existing in respect of freight and communications and the mutual ignorance 
of each other's potentialities and requirements. 
In order to overcome the obstacles standing in the way of an increase in trade 
between Latin American countries and those of CMEA, it has been proposed to improve 
and intensify trade promotion, long-term supply contracts and co-operation in third 
markets, as well as to update the systems of payment and improve institutional 
instruments and mechanisms. 
In practice, in order to step up trade promotion the Latin American countries 
have gradually extended their participation in international fairs held in the 
member countries of CMEA, and similar steps have been taken by the latter; some 
countries in both areas have intensified the exchange of delegations of 
entrepreneurs and foreign trade officials, and the CMEA countries have organized 
more frequent seminars and other means of informing Latin American representatives 




In the face of the unsatisfactory evolution of international trade, and in 
response to the serious payment problems facing the nations of Latin America, the 
CMEA member countries have flexibilized their payment mechanisms, adopting certain 
formulas which are more convenient for their Latin American partners. While 
previously clearing agreements had mostly been replaced by payment in convertible 
currency, in recent years there has been a tendency to resort to barter, clearing 
contracts, inter-bank agreements and repurchase guarantees, which make it possible 
to overcome monetary restrictions. Some CMEA member countries, such as the Soviet 
Union, allow goods exported by Latin American countries to be used in payment for 
the credits granted by them. 
Moreover, in the 1980s trilateral economic co-operation involving Latin 
American countries, member countries of CMEA and third countries has expanded. 
In recent years there has been continued favourable evolution of institutional 
instruments and mechanisms for stimulating economic relations between the two areas, 
while simultaneously various co-operation agreements, (including agreements on 
electrical, fishing, hospital and teaching equipment) have provided satisfactory 
results. In some cases, however, all the possibilities offered by the existing 
institutional mechanisms have not been fully utilized. 
Examination of the present state of economic relations between Latin American 
countries and CMEA countries confirms that the political factor remains decisive 
for their evolution. All forms of bilateral relations require decisions at a very 
high level if any progress is to be made, whether in the field of trade, of 
industrial co-operation, of hydroelectricity or of joint ventures. 
In any case, even when the political decisions have befen taken, the structural 
elements which determine the concentration of trade and co-operation in State 
enterprises and bodies on both sides require increased flexibility to be introduced 
into their operation as soon as possible so that they can efficiently expedite the 
implementation of the agreements and conventions signed. 
It would be desirable for Latin American exporting enterprises to demonstrate 
greater dynamism in their trade with CMEA countries and to investigate more 
carefully the markets in those countries and their import potential, while more 
actively promoting sales of their exportable goods and the setting-up of joint 
ventures. In addition, an effective means of promoting Latin American exports would 
be for exporter enterprises in the region to form trading companies, with the 
technical and administrative backing of the State. 
Finally, it would be desirable to promote tighter links and contacts between 
the CMEA and regional integration and co-operation bodies, with the aim of examining 
and setting up suitable mechanisms for appreciably increasing economic and trade 
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